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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho)
Corporation; TIMBERLINE DEVELOPMENT)
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability
)
Company,
Case No. CV-2009-554*C
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

-vs) Supreme Court No. 38830-2011
VALLEY COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO,
Defendant/Respondent.
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CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley.
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge
Presiding
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ORIGINALJed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villegas ISB# 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main
P. O. Box 959
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
Vvillegas@evanskeane.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV-2009-S54-C
AFFIDAVIT OF MATT WOLFF

Plaintiff,
vs.
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idabo.
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS.

County of Ada

)

MATT WOLFF, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows:

t.

That I am an aduJt over the age of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of

Boise, Ada County. Idaho, and that 1 have personaJ knowledge of the facts set forth in this

Affidavit.
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2.

I am a member of and a manager of RedWolff Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited

liability company (referred to hereafter as "RedWolff Ventures").

Henry Rudolph, also a

member and manager of RedWolff Ventures, signed an application to Valley County for a

conditional use permit ("CUP") on behalf of RedWolff Ventures to construct the Whistler's
Cove Subdivision located in Valley County. RedWolff Ventures' application was approved by
the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission on March 8,2007 and CUP No. 07-04 was
issued to RedWolffVentures, effective March 20,2007. A true and correct copy of the CUP is
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A.
3.

Condition No.1 J of the CUP states that RedWolff Ventures shall enter into a

Development Agreement with Valley County. Exhibit A, Conditions of Approval, of the Staff
Report of Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission, dated March 8, 2007, identifies as
Condition No.5 that RedWoltT Ventures "[mJust enter into a Road Development Agreement
with the Board of County Commissioners." A true and correct copy of toe March 8,2007, Staff
Report is attached this Affidavit as Exhibit B. The Staff Report's Attachment D is a letter from
Valley County's engineer, Jeffery Schroeder, dated February 28, 2007, which states, in relevant
part: "4. CU.P. 07-04 Whistler's Cove Subdivision: ... Vaney County will require a Road
Development Agreement (RDA) for this project."
4.

In fulfilling the conditions of the CUP and in order to obtain approval of the final

plat for Whistler's Cove Subdivision, RedWoltT Ventures was required to enter into a Road
Development Agreement with Valley County and pay the fee caJculated by Valley County
Engineer for the Wagon Wheel 2007 Capital Improvement Area where Whistler's Cove
Subdivision is located.
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5.

RedWoltT Ventures did not otTer to pay to mitigate for any impacts on county

roadways attributable to traffic generated by Whistler's Cove Subdivision.

Rather Valley

County required RedWoltTVentures to enter into the Road Development Agreement pursuant to
the conditions placed on its CUP.
6.

At no time in my meetings and interactions with any Valley County representative

with regard to RedWolff Ventures' CUP was I told or advised that the Road Development
Agreement and payment of the fee was voluntary, or that RedWolff Ventures had an option not
to enter into the Road Development Agreement. At no time in my meetings Or interactions with

Valley County representatives with regard to RedWolffVentures' CUP was I told or advised that
the fee paid under the Road Development Agreement was negotiable or that RedWoltTVentures
could elect not to pay a fee. At no time in my meetings or interactions with Valley County
representatives with regard to RedWolffVentures' CUP was I told or advised that the contents of
the Road Development Agreement were negotiable or that ) could strike certain parts or
provisions of the Road Development Agreement. Red Wolff Ventures was not given the option
of proceeding with the development of Whistler's Cove without improvements to the roadways.
7.

Since Valley County imposed the Road Development Agreement and the

associated fee as a condition to receive a final plat. I believed that Valley County had legal
authority to do so.

Had J been advised by Valley County that the fee under the Road

Development Agreement was negotiable or that RedWoltfVentures had an option not to pay the
fee, RedWolffVentures would not have paid the fee.
8.

With my consent, Henry Rudolph signed the Road Development Agreement on

behalf of RedWolff Ventures on September 17. 2007. A true and correct copy of the Road
Development Agreement is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C. RedWoltfVentures paid the

AFFlDA VIT OF MATT WOLFF· 3
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fee required by Valley County on October 29, 2007 in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Six and no/l00 Dollars ($44,256.00).
9.

RedWolff Ventures did not voluntarily enter into the Road Development

Agreement with Valley County or voluntarily pay the fee under the agreement.

RedWolff

Ventures did so only because Valley County required it as a condition to approval of the final
plat and as a condition for scheduling a hearing before the County Commissioners to approve
final plat for RedWolffVentures' project.

~~
~

SUBSCRIBED and S WORN to before me this

.;:LIs+- day of

20] O.

MARY C. HOLT
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IVff/.tlt./ur ,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
).. day of
2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to: by fax transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by persona~ly delivering to or
leaving with a person in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, 10 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ']

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise. ID 83701-2720
TeJephone: (208) 388-1 200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

r

U.S. Mail
Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery

i U.S. Mail

[ J Fax
f ]

Overnight Delivery

[x1 Hand Delivery

Victor Villegas

AFFIDA VTT OF MA TT WOLFF· 5
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·-.
Plannina and Zoning Commission
VAJ.J.E( COUNTY
IDAHO

P.O. Sox 13SOI219 Hortt\ Main ~, Idaho 83611-l3SO
!>hone: 208.382.7114
FAX: 208.382.1119

Approved by _~~!!!"£~~1l:J~~ __

CON DI T JON AL V S'E PI: RMIT
NO. 07-04
Whittler', Co-ve Sab4Msion
Issued to:

Henry Rudolpb

Red Wolf Ventutes, LLC
56 Meadow Lane, Highway 21
Boise, ID 83716
Property Location:

The site is located on Lots 6 II.. 7. M&E Wagon Wheel Subdivision No. 7
and portions of Sec. 34. T. 16N. R. JE. a.M., Valley County,1daho.

There have been no appeals of the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission's decision of
Marcb 8, 2007, The Commission's decision stands and you ~ heJeby issued Conditional Use
Pennit No. 07-04 with Conditions for establishing a 26 lot single famjly residence as described in

the application, staff report. and minutes.
The effective date of this permit is March 20,2007. The use mLlSt be estabHshed according to the
phasing plan or a permit extension in compliance with the Valley County Land Use and
Development Ordinance will be required.
Conditions of Approval:

t . The application, the staff repon. and the provisions of the Land Use and Development
Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations are aU made a part of this permit as if written in full
herein.

2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shall require an additional
Conditional Us~ Permit.

Conditional Use Permit
Page 1

EXHIBIT A
415

3. The final plat shall be recorded within one year of the date of approval or this permit sba]] be
null and void.

4. The issuance of this permit and these conditions will not relieve the applicant from
complying with applicable County. S1a1e. or Federal laws or regulations or be consuued as
pcrmislrion to operate in vioilllion of any statute or regulations. Violation of tbese law"~
regulations or nales may be grounds for revocation of the Conditional Use Permit or grounds
for suspension of [he Conditional Use Permit.
S. A final site-grading pJan with a stonnwater management plan showing BMPs should be
reviewed and approved by the Valley County Engineer prior to construction of the road.
6. The CeRs shall address wood burning devices and lighting requirements.
1. Utilities shall be placed to each tot and the road constructed prior to final plat reeordation or
shall be financially guaranteed.
8. A wetland delineation/detemination shan be submitted to the Planning and wning office
prior to distwbanee of the land.
9. A letter of approval from the Donnelly Rural Fire District is required.
10. A will serve letter is required from the North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District
prior to plat recordation.
11. A Development Agreement shall be approved by tbe Board of County Commissioners.
12. No building permits shall ~ issued until sewer and fue protection are in place.
'3. A note shall be placed on the face of the plat that states. "There must be safe separation of
two feet between the foundation and groundwater. Also. if fiJI is required. the fill must be
imported."
14. High groundwater eJevation muu be sbown for each Jot on the fmal plat.
END CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT

Conditional Use Pennit

Page 2
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Cynda Hm-iek. AlCP

PODoll3S0
~19}lor1h

VALLty COUNTY

Main Strcd

C~.ldaho aJ611·13~

ID~HO

Plannin& .t. ZORina AdministralDr
f lood Pia;" CoorOirwor

Phone: 208.312.11 IS
F.x: !0i.312.7119
E·Mail: chemck@Co.vallcy.id.us
Web: "'_,tQ,vlllcy.jd,\!!

STAFP REPORT
Conditional Use Pennit Application No, 07-04
Whistler's Cove Subdivision, Preliminary Plat

HEA.RING DATE:

March 8,2007

TO;
STAPF:
APPLICANTIOWNER:

Planning and Zoning Commission
Cynda Herrick, AICP
Hul')' Rudolph
Red Wolf Ventures. LLC
56 Meadow Lane, Highway 21
Boise,lD 83716
Bob Fodrea
Rennison Fodrea. Iii<:.

SURVEYOR:

PO Box 188
Cascade,lD 83611
LOCA TIONISIZE:

Located in Sec, 34, T. 16N, R. 3E, B.M .• VaUey County. Idaho .

REQUEST:
EXISTING LAND USE:

The property j s 12 acres.
26-Lot Single-Family Residential Subdivision.
Singtc-Family Residential Subdivision.

BACkGROUND:

The applicant is Henry RudoJph. He is requesting preliminary plat approval to re-establish a. 26lot single-family subdivision, on 12 acres. The lots would be served by individual wells and
North Lake Recreational Water and Sewer District. Access would be from Jacks Lane. The site is
located on Lots 6 and 1, Blo<:k 2, ofM&E Wagon Wheel Subdivision No.1.
Whistler's Cove Subdivision, preliminary plat, was previously submitted on January 27, 2005.
The Planning and ZOning Commission denied the application on March 10,2005. due to density
and wetland concerns. An appeal of the PJanning and Zoning Commission's decision went before

the Board of County Commissioners on May 2, 2005. The Board overtumed the Planning and
Zoning Commissjon's decision. A Conditional Use Pennit was issued. effective May 3. 2005,
Staff Report
C.U.P.07*04

Page 1 of 11
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expiring on May 3, 2006. The applicant was notified after the permit had expired.
FINDINGS:

1. Application was made to Planning and Zoning on January 22, 2007,
2. Legal notice was posted in the Central Idaho Star News on February 15, and February 22,
2007. Neighbors within 300 feet of tbe property line were notified by letter dated February 20.
2007. Potentially affected agencif:5 were notified by letter dated February 5, 2007. The site was
posted February 28. 2007.
3, Agency comment reeeived:
Bureau of Reclamation responded by tetter received February 27. 2007. They requested the
following:
• Include infonnation regarding encroachments on the recorded plat.

•

Prepare a stormwatel' abatement pJan.

•

Construct a single-raU fence. on Reclamation lands, along the subdivision
boundary.
Infonn residents that Reclamation lands are designated as conservation and open
space areas.
No Rt:elamation lands shall be designated within the subdivision plat.

•
•

Central District Health Department responded by fax received February 16.2007. They have nOl
received an application for this development and have no comments at this time.
Neighbor comment received: none.

4. PhysicaJ characteristics of the site: Agricultural.
S. The surrounding land use and zoning lncludes:
North: Single-Family Residential Subdivision.
South: Agricultural (Bureau of Reclamation land).
East: Agricultural (Bureau of Reclamation land).
West: Single-Family Residential Subdivision.
6. The Comprehensive Plan contains policy created and adopted by VaHey County. The Plan
promotes residential uses to increase private property values. However. it also requires

consideration of compatjbili1y with swroundingland uses.
7. Land Use and Development Ordinance. This proposal is categorized under 2. Residential
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Uses c. Subdivision for single-family residence 1n Table 1~A.
The following se<::tions ofthe land Use and Development Ordinance apply to this application.
3.03 STANDARDS

The provisions of 1his section shaH apply to the various buildings and uses designated herein as
Conditional Uses.
3.Dl.01 LOT AREAS - GENERAL

a. Minimum lot or parcel sizes are specified herein under the site and development standards for
the specifiC use in sections 3.03.09 through 3.03.13.
b. The minimum lot size and configuration for any use shall be at least sufficient to
accommodate water supply facilities, sewage disposal facilities, replacement sewage disposal
facilities, buildings. parking areas, streets or driveways, open areas, accessory structures, and
setbacks in accordance with provisions herein. All lots shall have a reasonable buiJding site
and access to that site.
c. AU lots or parcels for Conditional Uses shall have direct frontage along a public or private
road with minimum frontage distance as specified in the site or development standards for the
specific use.
3.03.02 SETBACKS - GEN~RAL

a. The setbacks for aJ I structures exceeding three feet in height are specified herein under the
site and development standards for the specific use.
b. All residential buildings shaU be setback at least thirty (30) feet from high water lines. All
other buildings shall be setback at least one-hundred (100) feet from hlgh water lines.
c. Front yards shaU be determined by the structure establishing the principal use On the property
and the location of the access street or road.
d. No other struc1ure may enc.roach on the yards determined for the structure establishing
principal use.

e. All building setbacks shall be messlll'ed horizontally, on a perpendicular to the property line,
to the nearest comer or face of the building including eaves, projections, or overhangs.
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3.03.03 BUILDINGS - GENERAL
a. AU buildings or structures to be set on a pennanent foundation and exceeding ] 20 square feet
in roof area are subject to the provisions. of "County Building Code ONinance" 1-76, 2-77. 488. and 99-2. or any subsequent updates or adoptions. Compliance with the provisions of
said ordinance shall be a condition of approval of the Conditional Use Permit.
b. Building permits are required and may be obtained from the Valley County Building
Department after the Conditional Use Pennit is issued. The Building Department win assist
the zoning department by imposing pertinent conditions of approval on the building penni1.
c. Building height, shape. floor area, construction material, and location on the property may be
regulated herein under the site and development standards for the specific Use as well as by
provisions of the "Building Code".

3.03.04 SITE IMPROVEMENTS - GENERAL

a. Grading
Grading to prepare a site for a conditional use or grading. vegetable removal, construction or
other activity that has any impact on the subject land or on adjoining properties is a conditional
use. A Conditional Use Pennit is required prior to the start of such an activity.
Grading for bona-fide agricullUl'8.1 activities, timber harvest, and similar permitted uses herein are
exempt from this section.

Grading within flood·prone areas is regulated by provisions of Section 4.02 herein and the Flood
Damage Prevention Ordinance No. 3-90. A pennit, ifrequired, shall be a part of the Conditional
Use Pennit.

Grading or disturbance of wetlands is subject to approvaI of the U.S. Corps of Engineers under
the Federal Clean Water Act. The federal penn it. if required, shall be part of the Conditional Use
Pennit.
The Conditional Use Permit Application shall include a site-grading plan, or preliminary sitegrading plan for subdivisions, clearly showing the existing site topography and the proposed final
grades with elevations or contour lines and specifications for materials and their placement as
necessary to complete the work. The plan shall demonstrate compliance with best management
practices for surface water management for pennanent management and the methods that wilJ be
used during construction to control or prevent the erosion, mass movement, siltation,
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sedimentatioll, and blowing of dirt and debris caused by grading, excavation. open cuts, side
slopes, and other site preparation and development. The plan shall be subject to review of the
County Engineer and the Soil Conservation District. The information received from the County
Engineer, the Soil Conservation District, and other agencies regardins the site-grading plan shall
be considered by the Planning and Zoning Commission andlor the Board of County
Commissioners in preparing the Cooditions of Approval or Reasons for Denial of the
applications.
For subdivisions, preliminary site grading plans and storm water management plans must be
presented for review and approval by the Commission as part of the conditional use permit
application for subdivisions. However, prier to construction of infrastructure, excavation, or
recordation of the final plat. the final plans must be approved by the Valley County Engineer.
All land surfaces not used for roads, buildings, and parking shall be covered either by natural
vegetation. other natural and undisturbed open space, or landscaping.

Prior to issuance of building pennits. The administrator must receive a certification from the
developer's engineer verifying that the storm water managemen1 plan has been implemented
according to approved plans.
b. Roads and Driveways.

I. Roads for pub]jc dedication and maintenance shall be designed and constructed in
accordance with the "Subdivision Ordinance" and in accordance with "Construction
Specifications and Standards for Roads and Streets in Valley County. Idaho" .
2. Residential Developments, Civic or Community Service Uses, and Commercial Uses
shaH have at least two acces1 roads or driveways to a public stree' wherever practicable.

3. Private roads shan meet the provisions of the Valley County Subdivision Ordinance and
any policies adopted by the Board of County Commissioners.
4. Cattle guards shall not be installed in public roads within residential developments.

5. Access to Highway 55 shall be limited al all locations and may be prohibited where other
access is a'Vailable. An access pennit from the Idaho Transportation Department may be
required.
c. Parking and Off Street Loading Facilities. (See LUDO for specifics.)
d. Landscaping.. (See LVnO for specifies.)
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e. Fencing:
3. If livestock are allowed in a residential development then fencing shall be installed to keep
Jivestock out' of public street rights-of-way. Cattle guards shall not be installed in public
roads within residential developments.
S. Fence construction and materials shall be in accordance with commonly accepted good
practice to produce a neat appearing durable fence. The location, height, and materials
used for constructing a fence shall be 8J)J'fOved by the Commission and specified in the
conditional use permit. Fences required for any conditional use shan be maintained in
good repair.

6. Where a Conditional Use adjoins an Agricultural Use where animal grazing is known to
occur for more than 30 consecutive days per year, the permittee shall cause a fence to be
constructed so as to prevent the animals from entering the use area. The pennittee shall
provide for the maintenance of said fence through covenants, association documents,
agreement(s) with the adjoining owner(s). or other form acceptable to the Commission
prior to approval of the permit so that there is reasonable assurance that the fence will be
maintained in functional condition so long as the conflicting uses continue.
7. Sight-obscuring fences. hedges, walls, Jattice-work, or screens shall not be constructed m
such a manner that vision necessary for safe operation of motor vehicles or bicycles on or
entering public roadways is obstructed.

f. Utilities:
1. All Jots or parcels for, or within Conditional Uses, shan be provided, or shall have direct
access to, utility services including telephone, electrical power, water supply, and sewage

disposal.
2. Central water supply and sewage systems serving three (3) or more separate users shall

meet the requirements of design, operation, and maintenance for central water and sewage
systemS in the "Subdivision Ordmance".
3. Probability of water supply, as referred to in (1) above, can be shown by weUlogs in

general area or by a determination of a professional engineer, hydrologist, or soil
scientist.
4. Ifindividual septic systems are proposed to show compliance with sewage disposal
requirements in (I) above, sanitary restrictions must be lifted on every )ot prior to
recordation unless it is designated as a lot where a building pennit will never be issued
for a residential unit, such as pasture lot, common area, open space, or a no build lot.
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5.

Easements or rights-of-way shall be set aside or dedicated for the constnJCtion and
maintenance of utilities in accordance with (he provisions oftbe "Subdivision
Ordinance" .

6. A Utility Plan showing the schedule of construction or installation of proposed utilities
shall be a part nfllie Conditional Use Pennit.

3.03.05 IMPACT REPORT
3.03.06 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS· GENERAL
a. Noise.

1.stockpiling, andJor hauling ohald materials from site approved by the County for said
purposes that are located outside the North Fork of the Payette River Drainage of the
County.

2. The noise emanating from any residential, recreational, or commercial airstrip or airport
will be considered in the conditional use pennit process. The FAA will be consulted.

b. Lighting.
Purpose - These regulations are intended to establish standards tliat insure minimal light
pollution. reduce glare, increase energy conservation, and maintain the quality of Valley County's
physical and aesthetic character.
Applicability - These standards shall apply to al1 outdoor lighting including. but not limited to,
search. spot, or floodlights for:

I. buildings and structures
2. recreational areas
3. parking Jot lighting
4. landscape lighting
5. signage
6. other outdoor lighting

Standards:
1. All exterior lighting shall be designed, located and lamped in order to prevent:
• Over lighting or excessive lighting;
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• Energy waste;
•

Glare;

•

Light trespass;

•

Skyglow.

2. All non-es.sehtial exterior commercial and residential lighting is encouraged to be turned
off after business hours and/or when hot in use, Lights on a timer are encouraged.
Sensor activated lights are encouraged to replace existing lighting that is desired for
security purposes.
4. All other outdoor lighting shall meet the following standards:
a.

The height of any ljght fixtUJe or illumination source shall not exceed twenty (20)
feet.

b.

AJllighting or illumination units or sources shall be hooded or shielded in a
downward direction so they do not produce glare or cause light trespass on any
adjacent lot Or real property as depicted in Fi gures 1 and 2 (located at the back of the
chapter).

c.

Lights or illumination units shall not direct light, either directly or through a
reflecting device. upon any adjacent lot or real property. Lighting should not
Hluminate the sky or reflect off adjacent water bodies or produce glare or cause light
trespass on any adjacent lot or real property.

5. A II outdoor lights used for parking areas, wa~kways, and similar uses mounted on poles
eight reet or greater in height shall be directed downward. The light source shall be
shielded so that it will not produce glare or cause light trespass on any adjacent lot or real
property.
7. The installation of mercury vapor lamps is hereby prohibited.
8. Flashing or intermittent lights. lights of changing degree of intensity, or moving lights

shall not be permitted. This section shan not be construed so as to prohjbit the flashing
porch light signal used only while emergency services are responding to a call for
assistance at the property or holiday lights.
9. Industrial and elderior lighting shall not be used in such a manner that produces glare on
public highways and neighboring property. Arc welding, Acetylene Torch-Cutting, or
similar processes shaH be perfonned so as not to be seen from any point beyond the
property line. Exceptions will be made for necessary repairs to equipment.
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10. Sensor activated lights, provided:
a. 1t is located in such a manner as to prevent glare and Hghting onto properties of others
or into a public right.of.way;
b. ]t is set to only go on when activated and to go offwjthin five minutes after activation
has ceased;
c. It shall not be triggered by activity off the property.
II. Lighting of radio, communication and navigation towers along with power Jines and
power poles; provided the owner or occupant demonstrates that the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) regulations can omy be met through the use of lighting.
12. All applications for a conditional use pennit shall include an outdoor lighting plan for the
entire site. which indicates how the above standards are to be met. Tbe approved permit
shall be a part of the conditional use permit andlor the building pennit.
d. Emissions.

The emission of obnoxious odors of any kind shall not be pennitted, nor the emission of any
toxic or corrosive fumes or gases.
Dust created by an industrial, commercial, or recreational operation shall not be exhausted or
wasted into the air. All operations shall be subject to the standards in Appendix C - Fugitive
Dust. State air quality permits, when required, may be a condition of approval of the
condjtional use pennil or may be required to be a part of the Conditional Use Permit at the
discretion of the Commission.
Wood burning devices shall be limited to one per site. Wood burning devices shaH be
certified for low emjssions in accordance with EPA standards.

e. Dust.
Dust and other types of air pollution borne by the wind from such sources as storage areas

and roads, shall be minimized by appropriate landscaping, paving. oiling, watering on a
scheduled basis, or other acceptable means.
Dust created by any approved operation shaH not be exhausted or wasted into the air. The
standards in Appendix C - Fugitive Dust along with State air quality permits, when required.
may be a condition of approvaJ of the conditional use permit or may be required to be a part
of the Conditional Use Permit at the discretion oftbe Commission.
f. Open Storage.
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g. Fire Protection.
Provisions must be made to implement pre-tire activities that may help improve the
survivability of people and homes in areas prone to wildfire. Activities may include
vegetation management around the home, use offire resistant building materials, appTopriate
subdivision design, removal of fuel, providing a water source, and other measW'es,
Recommendations of the applicable ftre district wi)) be considered,
h. Community Housing.
All residential developments, PUDs, and Subdivisions shall provide on-site Community
Housing units at the ratio of not less than one unit per each ten total pennitted dwelling units
or platted lots. AU Community Housing W1i.ts must conform to the regulations set out in
Appendix 0 of this ordinance.

Subject to the approval of the Commission, which shall consider the recommendation of the
VARHA. and only according to the procedW'es set out in Appendix D hereto, these Wlits may
be provided in alternate locations andlor fees may be paid '"in-lieu" of provision of these
units.
Developments shall provide Community Housing according to the following fonnula:
Density per Gross Acre
Less than 1 Unit
1.00- 1.24
1.25 - 1.49
1.50 - 1.74
1.75 - 1.99
2 Units or More

CommWlity HOusing
10%

11%
12%
13%
14%
15%

There shall be a family deferral for land owners who give a portion of their land to immedlate
family members, up to a maximum of5 lots per land owner. Lots gifted to family members
shall be restricted for resale for at least S years. [f any lot is sold to an unrelated party prior to
5 years from date of recordation the family member holding title to said lot shall, at the date
of such sale. comply with Commtmity Housing requirements,calculated as of the date of the
original subdivision. Lots gifted to family members shall be recorded with a deed restriction
desl:.ribing this process.

Other pennitted and conditional uses, including commercial and industrial uses, win be
required to include Community Housing should the Commission detennine thal1he use
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creates a demand for such housing which should be mitigated. In such instances and subject
to the approval of the Commission, which shall consider the recommendation of the
VARHA, and only according to the procedures set out in Appendix D. hereto, these units
may be provided in alternate locations and/or fees may be paid "m*lieu" of provision of these
units.
All Community Housing shaU be priced (on the average, according to the procedures set out
in Appendix D) to serve households with incomes not exceeding 800/0 of the median income
for Valley County.
3.03.07 BONDS AND FEE
Dependent on the impact report and the compatibility rating as wen as the applicant proposed site
improvements and structure to be used or constructed, the Administrator may recommend bonds;
a Development Agreement; reimbursement fees or impact fee ofthe applicant. The Board shall
have the option of exclusively dealing with the issues of bonds. reimbursement fees, and/or
application fees, in the case of developments, which are deemed by the Board to be large enough
in scale to have significant impact on County services and infrastructure. In such case, p\ll'suant
to the direction of the Board, the Commission shall defer such matters to the Board
The Commission or Administrator shall have discretion as an inherent condition of the permit to
impose and collect fees from the applicant for the cost of monitoring and enforcement of
standards.
3.03.• ' RESIDENTIAL USES

Residential uses requiring a Conditional Use pennit shall meet the foHowing site or development
standards.
Subdivisions of land shall also comply with the standards of the "Subdivision Regulations for
Valley County. Idaho" adopted April 29. i970 and as revised hereafter,
Developments accommodating mobile homes, motor homes or recreational vehicles shall also
comply with the standards of the "Minimum Standards and Criteria for ApprovaJ of
Development and Operation of Mobile Home Subdivisions and Parks, Travel Trailer
Courts and Parks" adopted May 12, )911 and as revised hereafter.
Planned Unit Developments, condominiums, and multi·family residential developments sha)) be
platted in accordance with the regulations of this chapter, the "Subdivision Ordinance", or as may
be approved in accordance with Chapter g as a planned unit development prior to the sale or
transfer oftitle to any lot, parcel, or unit.
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a. Minimum Lot Area.
!. The equivalent minimwn lot area shall be unlimited herein except for provisions of
Section 2.03.01, Section 3,03.01 b. t the "Subdivision Ordinance''. the "Mobile Home
Standards", Table In-A herein, paragraph e. of this section. and paragraph 2 herein.

2. New subdivisions must be compatible with existing or proposed surrounding land uses
(See Appendix A).
New subdivisions for single-family residences and multi-family residences shan provide
the following minimum lot sizes:
•

An average lot size of two acres where individual sewage disposal and individual
supply systems are proposed e)l(cept participants in the Community Housing
program may have an average lot size of 1.6 Bcres;
20,000 square feet where a central water supply system and individual sewage
disposal systems are proposed;
12,000 square feet where a central sewage collection and disposal system and
individual wells are proposed;
8.000 square feet where both central systems are proposed.
wil1er

•
•
•

These minimum Jot sizes may not be used to exceed the density limitation of paragraph e.
of 1his section for any development plans.
Lot sizes wi1hjn new Planned Unit Developments may vary from these minimum becau~
of reduced setbacks or other consideration in accordance witb the proVisions of Chapter

8. In subdivisions where the amount of Community Housing provided exceeds the
requirements of Section .3.0.3.06, require"d Jot sizes may be reduced (provided that the
conditions of aU other sections of this ordinance, and state and federal requirements, are
met) by an amount equivalent to offset the number oflots in excess of those required
under Section 3.03.06.
3. Frontage on a public or private road shall not be less than thirty (.30) feet for each lot or
parcel. The lot width at the front building setback line shall not be less than ninety (90)
feet. A P. U.D.• Condominium, or other cluster development may contain lots without
frontage on a road and widths less than ninety (90) feet in accordance with the approved
development plan or plat.
h. Minimum Setbacks.

The minimum building setbacks shall be thirty (30) feet from front. rear, and side street
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property lines and fifteen (I S) feet from all side property lines. Setbacks for mobile
homes in Subdivisions or Parks shall be in accordance with the "Mobile Home
Standards". A P. u.n., Condominium or other cluster development may include zero lot
line development and other reduced setbacks in accordance with the approved
deveiopmenl pJan or pial.

c. Maximwn Building Height and Floor Area.
1. Building heighls, except or may be modified by a P.U.D., shall not exceed thirty· five (35)

feet above the lower of existing or finished gmde.
2. The building size or floor area. except as may be modified by a P.U.D. shall not exceed
the limitations of Section 3.03.01 and 3.03.03.

3. No structure OT combination of&tructures, except as may be modified by a P.U.D., may
cover more than forty (40%) percent of the lot or parcel.

d. Site Improvement.
I. Two ofT-street parking spaces shall be provided for each dweJling unit. These spaces may
be included in driveways, carports, or garages.
2. All utility lines, including service lines, that are to be )()Cated within the limits ofthe
improved roadway in new residential developments must be installed prior to placing the
leveling coarse material.
e.

Density.
The density of any residential development or use requiring a conditional use pennit shaH
not exceed 2.5 dwelling units per acre except for planned unit developments.
Developments which provide Community Housing at the rate set out in Section 3.03.06.h
may increase density from 2.5 dwelling units per acre to 3 dwelling units per acre.
Density shall be computed by dividing the total nwnber of dweJling units proposed by tbe
total acreage of land within the boundaries of the development. The area of existing road
rights·of-way on the perimeter oflhe development and public lands may not be included
in the density computation.
In subdivisions where the amount of Community Housing provided exceeds the
requiremenlS of Section 3.03.06, density may be increased (provided that the conditions
of all other sections of this ordinance, and state and federal requirements., are met) by an
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amount equivalent to offset the number oftots in excess of those required under Section
3.03.06.h.
8. Subdiv .. ioD Regulado.lI:
Section 315. Lots
1. The lot size, width, depth, shape and orientation, and the minimum building setback lines,
shall be appropriate for the location of the subdivision and for the type of development and use
contemplated. Every lot shall abut upon II street. Comer lots for residential use shall bave extra
width to pennit appropriate building setbaclts from and orientation to both streets.
~

(The Commission should review this list to determine any additional necessary
infcnnation needed.)

7. The subdivider, upon demand by the Commission. shaH provide the Commission with the
following infonnation. or sucb portion thereof as the Commission deems necessary.
(a) data setting forth the highest known water tables for the proposed subdivision and for
the property lying down-grade and coatiguous to subject subdivision.
(b) the strata formation of the proposed subdivision for a depth of sixteen (16) feet.
(c) a percolation test for each acre within said proposed subdivision
(d) the known weH logs of well! located in surrounding contiguous property.
(e) the location cfall existing or proposed irrigation ditches, streams, drainage ditches, or
known underground water courses.
(1) a statement of policy to be included in the recorded subdivision covenants, jf animals
are pennitted. regulating and restricting the area against use by animaJs for a radius of 50
feet from any well site.
(g) the minimum size of the lot in all instances shaU be adequate to provide for the
installation of two sewage disposal areas commensurate with sewage disposal demands in
addition to providing adequate space for typical structures to be erected thereon.
8. If, upon consideration of such information, the Commission finds that by reason of the factual
situation and circumstances concerning the subdivision in ques1ion. the health. safety and welfare
of the inhabitants of the subdivision and the aquifers and streams in question would not suffer
from pollution. the Commlssion, upon review of such infonnaticn, may approve minimum lot
sizes for areas to be served as fo11ows:
(a) public water and public sewage disposal service - 8,000 sq.ft. per lot.
(b) semi-public water and sewage disposal services -12,000 sq.ft. per lot.
(c) individual well and individuaJ sub-surface sewage disposal service - 20,000 sq.ft. per
lot.

Section 330. Easements
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1. There shall be provided easements for the utilities upon and across lots, or centered on the
side lot lines, of a width of a minimum of 12 feet (except fOT entrance service) as and where
considered necessary by the Commission. There shall be provided an easement 20 feet wide
centered on the Tear lot line of each Jot for utilities upon and across said lot and which may be
opened as an alley as set fOM hereinafter. Such easement shall be opened and used as an alley
upon the determination and finding of the Commission. that the same is required by the public
convenience and heanh.
SUMMARY:

Compatibility Rating; Stall's compatibility rating is a +38.
StaR' RecommeDdatioD:

Staff believes the application is consistent with the Valley County Comprehensive Plan, complies
with the Subdivision Regulations. and substantially complies with the Valley County Land Use

and Development Ordinance.
The following item, however, needs to be addressed:
•

I do recommend that you contact Michael David at 315-3711 concerning compliance with

•

your participation in the community housing program.
How much of the infrastructure is already located?

Staff recommends approval of the subdivision upon a favorable response 10 the above item.

ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment A:
Attachment B:
Attachment C:
Attachment D:

Conditions of Approval
Compatibility Rating
Map of Surrounding Area
Agency Responses

CODdidoDB of Approval- Attaebmeut A

I. The application. the staff report. and the provisions of the Land Use and Development
Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations are all made a part of this permit as if written in full
herein.
2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shall require an additional

Conditional Use Permit.
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3. The final plat shan be recorded within one year or this pennit shaH be null and void.

and these conditions wiU not reHeve the applicant from
complying with applicable County. State, or Federal laws or regulations or be construed as
permission to operate in violation of any statute or regulations, Violation of these laws,
regulations or rules may be grounds for revocation of the Conditional Use Pennit or grounds
for suspension of the Conditional Use Pennit.

4. The issuance of this pennit

5. Must enter into a Road Development Agreement with the Board of County Commissioners.
6. Must comply with the requirements of the Donnelly Rural Fire District. A Jetter of approval
is required.
7. Must participate in the Housing Authority.
8. All proposed improvements shall be constructed or financially guaranteed, including but not

limited to: power. roads, phone, and common areas.
9. The CCRs shall address wood burning devices, bear proof garbage containers, lighting
requirements, and Bureau of Reclamation lands designated as conservation and open space
areas.
10. The Valley County Engineer shall approve the site grading/storm water management plan
ptior \0 construction or excavation.
il. A wetland delineation/determination shall be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office

prior to disturbance of the land. .

12. Must construct a singlewraiJ fence, on Bureau of Reclamation lands, along the subdivision
boundary.
13. Final plat must include, "[n accordance with Jdaho Code Section 42-1 J02, no person or entity
shall cause or permit any encroachments onto Reclamation lands, including public or private
roads. utilities, fences, gates, pipelines, structure, or other construction or placement of
objects. without the written pennission of Reclamation".
L4. No Reclamation lands shall be designated within the subdivision plat.

1S. A wi1l serve letter is required from the North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District
prior to plat recordation.
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16. No building pennits shall be issued until sewer and fire protection are in place.
17. A note shall be placed on the face of the plat that states, "There must be safe separation of
two feet between tbe foundation and groundwater. Also, if fill is required. the fill must be

imported. "

18. High groundwater elevation must be shown for each lot on the final plat.

END OF STAFF REPORT
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cona&r\Jd8d ~ 'With
1owK, mutherly poItiaI:\ ofae aIDe.

0Jr2_

*

2. PUD 06-01 BfI/frIIo lIDs", ""'" Y..4C 07-01 A. Pt1Jrfkm o;IOId Slate Ht~

Pre!imiDaIy aiel: . . . . . plmt haw beta suhmiuod 10 VaUcy County for
mriew lad ba¥llt been IIPPfOWCl

Bt:sI Mwegt:meot PrIicticcs (BMP9 S) ........ bccu ~ OIl tile subadW
'I1tfa pmjeec ...ru requite ~ wiCft the VaUey COUIIty
Stoauw*", Bell Mwwe' ,d't Pmcticea M.uaL TOIDPOIC)' EmsiDD CoDtIol
Meu&Uel m1 BMP'. sbaIl be mplace 1&.1 times 'ltInNah out ooastnM:tion
_my rcquirecI penDIIIIC:IRt aoROD 00IID'0l ........... be iastaIJed. per tho
JDIIPI8I.

p.n -.

. The AppliClm will be tecluRd to Ibow saai1Iry ICWCI' and WIter MlI"Vice
toc:a1ioDs 0Jl the tbI ck:sian for CODJInIdioD widtin My VIIIJey ~ riahtof-way ............. oftbis ~ mutcomply with the Iddo
S1IndadJ for Pubic WOIb ~ (lSPWC).
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~ withlD
CCNDty
approved. traftIc coaIrOI plao in IICCOI'Ciance wi'Ib
the Manual OD Uaifonn TndIic Com:n.ll Devices (MUTCD). Due to
l0c:ati0D and ICOpC of ... ptopOICd PUn. a. compr. . . .ve ~l plm
IhouIcl be 18bm1tted ad iDdude rmew(l) from lIlY IIffeded GitJ(s) (i.e.
Idabo State PIIIrOl. Dclaaclly R.uraI File DUdriet C!tC.).

Iury infi'utnIotuIe imbUatfOD

~r-'MI)' IDUSt haYe _

*

...,aatee 00.., wadi:

The ApplicIDl wiU be required to pn:Mdc • two yar
compbtted for puhIic .-vices or within. public rtabHf-way.

It COIIIIIUOtiDD ovoIutIons Nm8iD .. tile time of fiDaI pili. the AI1Pliwnt ...til
be mraiNd to provide • ....,. boad in die amonat of 110% of toIal
C6a1rUaIioa COIbJ. 11JiI 00IIIIIUCIiGD C08C etIt:ImIde wiD IIIMId prior IlJIIIIOVIl
&om the vaOcy County EatPneer aadlor Valley COtBItf Road SupcdDle.ateDt.

rwnatntna

J. CUP 01-02 Our FWd IbIda SubtltvUltJIt
P1te1Unin.ry . . . . - . plAIDS have bees Abmitted to Valley Comuy aad have
bcca appwed.

Bat Manaaemc-t Practicet (BMI'ts) ..... .., bean aboWIl aa die ~
plaD let. nia project will NqUire compIbuace wkb die VIIIIey County
StomrwItet Bat ~ Prae1U:a Manual. Temporary &osioo Conrtol
Me.uun:.1Dd BMP·. abalt be in pWce It aU timet tJJroqb out ClOIlSCrUCtloa
and 8Jf1 required petJD8DCnt aoRca CODtJoI meuun:a .... be iastaO.ed per . ,
.".,UaI
Vcricalp.- in .... prcliminaty _ ... _ _ to be milled with. N8pDCt to
it1taIcdiOJ(s) II per" Valley COUld Minimum StInduds for R-.d Detdp.
.ad Ca.astructian (VCSRDC). Addldoaally. ~ erades IDUIt be
deslped wi1bia. die tblJowiDa pInIDdcr. O.j% < G < 10%
TypieaI.-dleCdon(l) Deed to be pnMd.od. ia the te'riaed pi_ .....
VCSJU)C.

00Jd Fork RoId iI idealifJecl lIS • miDDr collcecur RIId wbm '*loins .10'
npt.ot-way (35" adt lide ofCCl1ferlb:wl). ThiI cIcwIopmeat wiU DeOd to
dedieatc IIoIfditi.oa.J. riaht-of-WILJ aJoaa Gold Pea __ to aaoomrMt1atc .3S·

riaJd..ot..way ftom CCIIIk:Idilie. 1'biI rigbt-of..-ay decliad:i0D 'Will DeOd 10 be
~

on'" reviIoct pI-." pior

to final pilla ippOVal.

ApplicIDl must ~ all public ritJhta-of-'MI)' withiD 1M1ep1 bolmd.ri.
of1bl propoted cIcvelopmcat.
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Valley CowIty will ~ a Ro.d DewIopDeat Aereeaeat (RnA) for Ibi.
project.

T...........,. cui...... mu.t be nJdoei.... with mini",..,. mdU of 4" ..
Raad Daip aad
Co_~. ~ iDcludo bl1be nNiJed plaD lid. b lppJuvU prior to

pet'the VaUq Q)unay Minimum Standmds for

~

The AJlpliamt wiD he requiIed to prcwide dn1Mac c:aIcuIItioDt with aU
eulvert ~ OIl the reviMd pian lISt prior to eon.uQC1ioo.
Cutl6Il..,.,. 011 die ~ daip jtovIiqte the pouible crouin. oaIo
priWllt Jot&. The Appliamt will be ftIqUiIed 10 re-4aip dIoIc adj...., . . .
... proWIe a DOfIe ( 8 die ftlUIJ pl.r ......ta.iq ..-y .sditiotwl riIbt-of-WII)' rIuc

to tbe ".-ioDed.

The AppliclDt wilt be RIqUiftId to pcOYide all harizloaIaIlDd ~ m.d
aIf........ ou tbe~,...1CI to.lade ~ C\Irft

caJcuIadou.
Dc Appli.cM1 wiD be roquind to proYide tile de-iD
FOlk Raid oa 1M ~.,. __

"*' .,i.meat

with Gold

A private toed decllnlioll DGte IDUIC be bIcIudecl prior to fmII pblt IpIlIOvll.
If CODIItructioo. ~ rem.in lit the time or fiDal plat. tbe Applicaut wiD
bo JeqUired to pnwlde. sunty boad ill the ~ of t 10% of .... remaiN",
coaBtIl~.'tian colli. Tbia CODIInJdion oa&t .,.n.". wiD tilled prior appmval
from 1M V.uc, Coua£y
.adlor Valky Coualy Road Supe.rirttcod.c

En...,

i. CUP 0741 JJ1dn1.'J Caw SrJHIJyUi""
PleIimjrwy" amdiDa pIMI wc:re nMewaI, ad sut.equatC'.O",mmu
Iddnuod per die .pprovallcua'daMd 1 November 2005 I I ~
by .I>ouB ~ P.E.. Paramarix.

vaUey ~ will nqaal!e. R'* ~ ~ (Rl>A) for 1biI
ptoject.
JKb Loop (CcMmty RaId) will be idcdi6ed • • _dad 1oaIItw:.d wtJich
requires .10' ri&hHf-way (3S· elida side of~)' nil ckvetopmcDt
will DCIOd 10 dediQlle the n:quirtd 70' of ~.way 1« pubHt 'IIIe . . .
1.... Loop. 1'be Applicant wUl-*'lO ..".,. dDI required riabt-ot'-'MI)' OD.
dac hi plat p:for 10 appO'V8l. AdditioNIly, tile Valley CouI!q ~
aodIor Va!lcy Cauaty
Supet_•..seaa DIUtlICCqlt tbI ~
ftWl for;public 1IIC prior to &aal ""'lIFPOwi.

a-s
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Valley Couaty woukl request 1bat.,. cbaqa 10 the.pproved piau be
~

tbrreYNwllpplOVll.

Prior to 6mt plat lPJIilWaI, VaDey CoUld)' will required that puhllc road

CODItI'bcIiGD (Jacb Loop) be cati.ficd by cbI: DevelO(JCl'·. En. . . .
If COIaItrudion cvoIUIiou rarIIIiJl at the time of ... plat. the AppJl. . wiD
be 1't1!qUifed to provide aanty bond ill Oae 8IbOlmt of 110% oftoCll ,.",.iDinl
~CMItI. 11da eoDltl'Oction COIl estiJute will . . . prior apptoYal
80m the VIDeyCoua., BItaia«w mtJIot Valley Couaty RGId S~

Upon ~ ofdle pubJic n:.I (Jacb Loop). the .AppIiamt will be
nquimllO IUII-- the aforUleUlioaad for a period of two ,....

Applicant.tIIt praervc all pahlic npu-cf-way wifhiD the lcpl bomJdaries
of the ]'l'O:POIed cIeveIopmeaL

appovod"'"

The AppIicaat will 1Ie ntqUhed to aubmi1cb1:
pIcu f« my
retMl"., I8Ditary ~ wter i..-U....oo within tho public riaJd-ofway.

Pl__ ClOIIfaCt m.,.,u (382-7117) with my quadioas 8ddIor CO!ICXI'DII'IIIaId to tbI:.~
n::fereaced itant.

~L?a
J~

VaUcy Couaty RA*I J)epa1mIat

Co: 00rd0D CNieksbank. Valley County Road ~
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Whistlers Cove Subdivision

ROAD DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made dlis
17 ~ day of Sep -M19 b".

, 2007,
by and between Red Wolff Ventures. LLC whose address is 1804 Rairmee Drive, Boise.
Idaho, 83112, the Developer of that certain Project in Valley County, fdaho, known as
Whistlers Cove Sulxiivision. and Valley County. a political subdivision of the State of
Idaho. {hereinafter referred to as "VaUey County"}.
RECITALS
Developer has submitted a subdivision application to Valley Count) il..')r approval of a 24
lot residential development known as Whistlers Cove Subdivision.
Through the development review of this application, VaHey County identified certain
unmitigated impacts on public services and infrastructure reasonably attributable to the
Project.
Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by
contributing its proportionate fair share (If the cost of the needed improvements idemiflCd
in this Agreement and lis1ed on the anached Exhibit A.
Valley County and the Devdoperdesir~ to memorialize the temlS of their agreement
regarding the Developer's participation in the funding of certain of tbe aforesaid
improvements.

AGREEMENT
Thel'efore. it is agreed as follows:

I. Capital Improvement Program: A listing and cost estimate of the Donnelly to
Tamarack Area 2004 Roadway Capita' Improvement Program, incorporafing
construction and right-of-way needs for the project area (see map. Exhibil B) is
attached as Exhibit A.

2. ProponionfJle share: Developer agrees to a proportionate shal"e of the road
improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by Whistlers Cove Subdivision
as established by Valley County. Currently this amount has been calculated by
the Valley County Engineer to be $461 per average daily vehicle trip generoted by
the Project. Refer [0 Exhibit A for details of the Donnelly to Tamarack Area 2004
Capital Improvement Program Cost Estimate. Road impact mjtigation may be
provided hy Developer either through the c·ontriblltl011 of money or capital offsets
such as right-of-way or in-kind COI,stl'llction. Such an oftset to the road
improvements is addressed in paragOlPh 3 of this Agreement.

Whistlers Cove Subdivision

Road Development Agreement
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3. Capital contribution: Developer agrees to pay a sum equal to $1,844 per Jot (an
averoge of 4 trips per single family residential lot times $461 per [rip). The
Developer's propOItionate share of the road improvements identified in Exhibit A
fOl' rhe 24 Jots shown 01) the Final Plat is $44,256.

The Developer agrees to pay VaHey County their propoltionate share of roadway
tor a total casb pa.)'mem of$44,256 dl.le at the time of Final Plat approvaL

COSl.'i

4. The contributions made by Developer to Valley County pursuant to the terms of
this Agreement shall be segregated by Valley County and earmarked and applied
only to the project COsts of the road improvement projects specified in Exhibit A
or to su.:h other projects 8S are lnutullfly agreeable to the parties.
S. The sale by Developer Df part or all of tllC Project prior to the plaUing lhereof

shall not trigger any payment or c.ontributicn responsibility. However, in such
case, the purchaser OfSllCh property. and the successors and assigns thereof. shall
be bound by dle terms ofihis Agreement in the s!'Ime respecr as De\'e!oper,
regarding the· property pun:hased.

6. Recorda/ian: It i~ intended that Valley County will rttotd this Agreement. The
incent of the recordation will be to document the official aspect of the contractual
obligati.on set tofU' in d.\\s Agreemei)t. Ihis Agreen"len\ win not in :loy way
establish a lien or other interests in favor of Valley County as to any real property
owned by the Developer at the lime of recording, or any real propeny that may be
acquired by the Developer on any date aftet' the recording of this Agreement.

Whistlers Cove Subdivision
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Henry Rudolph, Red Wolff Ventures, LLC Manager

By:

')j;AMSp- <: e~

VALLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS:

B.Y;....--l."c::e==-"'~~_~=~~I.,--~""':=:O'

______ Date: I J( " 0 -

0;7

CommissionerJChatrman Gerald Winkle

Commissioner F. W. Eld

Commissioner Gordon L. Cruickshank

ATTEST:

Date:

Whistlers Cove Subdivision

Road Development Agreement
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STATE OF IDAHO)
) 58.

COUNTY OF VALLEY

)

On this '
day of ~)~ 2007. before me, Pt:br-och L.. ~
the undersigned, a Notaryp blic in and for sajd State. personally appeared
l:lmr:>j
;z..;do I ph and acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

J-tb.
c..

Tn witness whereof. J have unto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year
first above written. (

~

, h"'AI,.! ." ~ \OA ..!J-, -

My Commission Expires:

f i5-Q.)- r~._

DEBROAH L. NEMETH
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
•••••

b

¥.

l'

0 (k~'

STATE OF IDAHO
) ss.

COUNTY OF VALLEY

)

On [his .f?
day of ~-..L-- 2007, before me . ..s;;~~u.......L~~::::!:::~
the: undersigned, a Notary Public i~apd fOJ sL\iQ _~tate. personally ap red
& .£_
,)<.a....L.",L an~'ieCfgeato me that they executed tb~ sam' .

l-'Vu.

rn witness whereof [have unto set my band and aftixed my official seal the dar' and year
abovt: writte

My Commission Expires: _--,-,II,--'_-_r!.!!.)..._-~()_t'
_ __
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IN 1'lll! DISTRiCT COURt OF 'rUB FOUR."LlilUDIClAL DIS'1'R.IC1' Of
ntH Sl'A.tE Oli 1.DAJiO. iN ANt) FOR nm COUNTY OF v ALLEY

BUCKSKIN P.R.C)P1.~RT.:r.BS. INC.. an!Jdaho
Corgoratiou. aIl4 TIMBEIU.TNB.

OEVBLOPMl!NT. LI.C, an 141M lJmitcd
LiabUi1;y CQ~.

ORQBR. GMNT/NQ' V ALUyeouNTY'.
'Mo~1.or. :tQ r.NI.A.Rtt PI\C;l\: '

LIMI'tA'rIONJ

V A.tl..EY

CG)tJ.N'Mf~

a ,poli~1 ,:IubdiyiJ,ion

ot'l'J:w State'of Tda\c."

'nils MATTER. having c()mc bef'"re ~o C:O'W:f upon Van:"y C~'3 Mo{io~ tt? En~c
Prge ~in!i:tallOJl', olJd havlar ,found IJ'Kd CIW3e tb~!b~j
IT TS'lf£R£BY CADER.FiO ilutt V~I.Iey (',(lumy"'mution t\'t t:lllargc:'paac linu'hnlorw,i$
ORA.NT.P.D 8Ild Valley CCJWlt),:r.. Reply Brief in Kuppon. ofM,udunfor Su..mn~ClI'1 JlIdQMC.t\t.1\
1:'101 dccced ·tw\,'1lty-tWO palJCl6 ill.l~th.

TlATflO this

_t!... day ofNavem.bcr. 2{)J O.
.

.~

CRett

~---

CHA. ... It. MCLAUOUt..1N'
})j8~el

=-==----..

c.ourt Judge

i'led TilDe No'y, 9,' 12:31PM
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Attorney
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1'.0. 80x .1350
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l:aoaimik:.

Tel~phone!G208)382,7120

B-Mall

. l'acsiinlJc: (208) 38Z-7.114
,,,,wlitia;os(f~():,,a1'cy ,td ;u&
CbrbtQplJe.r 'H. .~yer~ 1$"& tl446l
MAllin.C. Hend¥ic~ L'SBojj5871S
GIV'I'J,ilS PtJRSlJ:!i" .1.1.1' .
601

w. 8.uanock. St.'

p .0,. I~()I( -2720·
llt)iae,. Idaho 1l1m·2.?2t}
1.'i'tJopbonO: lOtl·lUI' J·200·
'Fac..""Ilmlle; .2QS..i)8S. UOO
o~i~oyer@givtm'PUtJltY.CQl1\
rllcll@ti\'\Wl,'UlUtsJ~.Y .I:OJD

ARCHlE N. BANBURY
CLERK

Received lime Nov. 9. 12:31PM

Received Time N()v.l0. il:43AM

444

Matthew C. Williams, ISB #6271
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade,lD 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
mwilliams@co.valleyjd.us
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com

mch@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Umited
LiabHity Company,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 2009-554
VALLEY COUN1Y~S REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
VALLEY COUN1Y. a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.

V ALLEV COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEl" IN SUPPORT OJ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10915--2_100628C21
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INTRODUCTION

This is Defendant Valley County's ("County") reply brief in support of Valley County's

Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 14, 2010. It follows Valley County's Opening
Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment ("Opening Brief'), and replies to Plaintiffs •
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response Brief').
In Idaho. certain impact fees are illegal taxes under Idaho '5 Constitution unless imposed
pursuant to an ordinance compliant with the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIF A"'),
Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Valley County did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance,
because it believed in good faith that none was required. Recent lawsuits involving other
municipalities have successfully challenged impact fees. Accordingly, to be on the safe side, the
County is now exploring enactment of a new IDIFA-compliant ordinance. But there is no need
to detennine whether the Conditional Use Pennit ("CUP") or the preliminary Development
Agreement, proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, final Capital Contribution Agreement,
and/or Road Development Agreement (collectively "Agreements") at issue here imposed iUegal
taxes. The question presented in the pending motion is whether Plaintiffs proposed and/or
entered into the Agreements without objection. accepted the CUP without complaint, avoided
opportWlities to raise the issue administratively, and waited too long to chaIlenge. I
This case has nothing to do with due process. Plaintiffs had plenty of process. Indeed.
part of the County's defense is that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the remedies available to them.
Plaintiffs' so-called due process claim is based on the contention that the County should have

enacted an IDIFA -compliant impact fee ordinance and that, if it bad done so, they would have
been given even more process. But counties are not required to enact ordinances under IDIFA.
1 In this brief,

we use the tenn P1aintiffs to refer to the eurrent Plaintiffs and/or the original

developers.
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Thus, the question is, given that Vaney County decided not to enact an ordinance under IDIFA at
the time, was it unlawful for it to issue a CUP requiring an Agreement? That is purely a state
constitutional law question which. if answered in the affirmative, would give rise to an
unconstitutional per se regulatory taking under the state and federal constitutions. But there is no
need to reach the merits of this claim if the defenses in the pending motion prevail.
Plaintiffs' devote most of their Response Brief to their effort to show that the County had
a policy of requiring road impact fees and that there was no room for negotiation. Some of their
statements inaccurately reflect the record. See footnote 14 at page 21. But this debate is not
material to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. It is undoubted1y true that, as a general
statement, the County expected developers to help improve the roads near their developments.
The County held this expectation in good

faith. believing, correctly or incorrectly, that they had

the power to provide for such improvements without adopting a special ordinance under IDIFA.
Most developers welcomed having a funding mechanism available to improve local roads and
operated under the same assumption that this was proper.
Even if the Court were to assume as true all the facts as stated by Plaintiffs in their
Response Brief, the defenses to this litigation posed by the pending motion remain valid. The
material facts are not in dispute, and the motion should be granted as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR THE ALLEGED
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.

Plaintiffs' Complaint includes two claims for relief. In their first claim for reJief,
Plaintiffs purport to seek declaratory judgment that the County's alleged practice of requiring
developers to pay for a proportion of road improvement costs attributable to the development is
illegal under unspecified state law and unidentified state and federal constitutional provisions.
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Complaint at 4-5. In the second daim for relief, Plaintiffs allege that the County's collection of
funds pursuant to the Agreements was a taking under the state and federal constitutions for
which they are entitled to compensation in the fonn of a refund. ld. at 5. Nowhere in P1aintiffs'

Complaint do they identify the specific Constitutional provisions upon which their daims are
based nor do they reference any source for their causes of action.
In its Opening Brief, the County pointed out that claims that are premised on alleged
vioJations of the U.S. Constitution must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs disagree,
claiming that they can bring suit alleging federal takings and procedural due process claims
directly under the federal constitution independent of § 1983. Response Brief at 15-16. (Actions
broUght directly under the constitution are referred to as Bivens claims, after Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents o/Fed. Bureau a/Narcotics; 403 U.S. 388,389 (1971).) Thismatters
because ifno Bivens claim is available and § 1983 is Plaintiffs' only access to these federal
claims, Plaintiffs have problems: (i) they have failed to plead § 1983 and have affirmatively
disavowed it and (2) a § 1983 claim in this case is barred by various procedura\ hurdles.
Plaintiffs fail even to address the settled Ninth Circuit precedent on this point in Azul-

Pacifico. Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (91h Cir. 1992). the authorities relied on
in Azul-Pacifico. or subsequent cases such as Golden Gate Hotel Ass 'n

1!.

City and County ofSan

Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482 (91h Cir. 1994). (TIle "cause of action" issue is a question of federal
Jaw, so federal cases are controlling.) Instead. Plaintiffs rely primarily on First English

Evangelical Lutheran Church ofGlendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987),
and the reference to that case in a footnote in BHA Investments, inc. v. City oj Boise, 141 Idaho
168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). Although First English contains some remarkably broad language
regarding takings claims, it does not address the particuJar question of whether claims alleging
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violations of the U.S. Constitution may he brought independent of § 1983. The opinion does not
even mention § 1983, and the dissent mentions it only in another context. Nor do the parties'
briefs. Nor does the case on remand, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church o/Glendale v.
County ofLos Angeles, 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 258 CaL Rptr, 893 (1989).

Given that § 1983 was not discussed, it is fair to say tbat First English is not On point. In
any

event, the commentators have recognized that First English is not definitive. "In the wake of

Monell and the provision of a remedy under § 1983 there is a split in authority as to whether a

right of action based on the Fourteenth Amendment provides a claim for relief sufficient to
invoke the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts," Kenneth B. Blcy, Use 0/ the Civil
Rights Acts 10 Recover Damages in Land Use Cases, ALI-ABA, § lU(S) (2001) (available on

Westlaw at SF64 AU-ABA 435) (citing Monell v. Dep', o/Social Se~ices, 436 U.S. 658
(\978». The cases and commentary, however, overwhelmingly support the rule established in
the Ninth Circuit by Azul-Pacifico and other cases. For exampJe:
Although § t 983 provides express authorization for the
assertion of federal constitutional claims against state actors, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the view, expressed in several circuit
court decisions, that limitations which exist under § 1983 may not
be avoided by assertions of Bivens-type claims against state and
local defendants. [Footnote citing Jell v. Dal/as Independent
School Disl., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989).] Thus, the availability of
the § 1983 remedy precludes reliance upon the Bivens doctrine.
Whether § 1983 preempts an alternative constitutional or statutory
claim depends upon congressional intent.
.. , As discussed below, it is settled that § 1983 operates to
preempt alternative Bivens-type claims asserted directly under the
federal Constitution.
The federal courts have consistently adhered to the principle that
§ 1983 preempts Bivens-type remedies against those who acted
under co)or of state law. [Footnote citing Azul-Pacifico among
others.]
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Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims and Dejenses, § 1.05 (2010) (available on
Westlaw as SNETLCD s 1.05).2 The authority on this point, none of which is addressed by

Pla.intitf~ is overwhelming.) An of these cited authorities are post-First English. In any event,
Azul-Pacifico is crystal clear and directly on point.
Plaintiffs cite Davis v. Passman. 442 U.S. 228 (1979), for the proposition that due

process claims may be brought directly l.Dlder the U.S. Constitution and that § t983 is not the
only means of raising these matters. Plaintiffs misrepresent the holding in this case. Davis

2

Cases from other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion as Azul-PacifICo include the

following: Smith

Y.

Dep'tofPublic Health, 410 N.W 2d 749,787 (Mich. 1987) t'Thus, both Chappell

and Bush signal a retrenchment from the broad remedial scope evident in the Court's earlier Bivens,
Davis, and Carlson opinions. Both Chappell and Bush suggest greater caution and increased willingness
on the part of the Court to defer to Congress on the question whether to create damages remedies for
violations ofthe federal constitution."); Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Town ofLebanon, 627 A.2d
909, 921 (Conn. 1993) ("In its current configuration, the Bivens line of United States Supreme Court
cases thus appears to require a would be Bivens pLamti.ff tc establish that he Or she would ~ack any remedy
for alleged constitutional injuries if a damages remedy were not created, It is no longer sufficient under
federal law to alJege that the available statutory or administrative mechanisms do not afford as complete a
remedy as a Bivens action would provide."); Wax 'n Works v. City ofSt. Paul, 213 F.3d 10]6,1019 (8th
Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff asserted claim directly under Fourteenth Amendment; court treated it as WIder § 1983

and denied relief on exhaustion/ripeness grounds); Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir, 1987),
vacated on other grounds & remanded, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) (when § 1983 action is precluded by statute
of Jimitations, plaintiff may not bring separate action directly under the Constitution). A case that adopts
Plaintiffs' view of First English, albeit in dictum. is Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service Dist. No.1,
220 F.3d 298 (4'" Cir. 2000). Even this case, however, recognizes that this is a departure from the AzulPacifico line of precedent: "Other courts, however, have held, in apparent conflict with First English,
that a violation of the Takings Clause can only be redressed through a claim under § 1983." Lawyer at
303 n.4.
3 Another hornbook on § 1983 notes a variety of federal cases reaching the same conclusion,
concluding, "The Ninth Circuit asserted that Fourteenth Amendment actions for damages against state
defendants are precluded by the availability of § 1983." Sheldon Nahnlod, Civil Rights and Civil

Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983. § 6:59 (2010) (available on Westlaw at ClVLmLIT
§ 6:59). Another law professor concludes: "Under Bivens, the courts are to refrain from a Bivens-type
action for damages only when Congress has created an alternative remedy. Originally, the Court withhe1d
a Bivens damages remedy, because unnecessary, only when the remedy provided by Congress was
equally effective. Since Bivens, however, the Court bas retreated from that principle and now refuses a
damages action whenever Congress has made available some relief even if not equal to the damages
remedy." Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action,
Federalism and the Courts, 59 Missouri L. Rev. 499, 551 (1994) (footnote cites David C. Nutter, Note,
Two Approaches to Detennine Whether an Implied Cause ofAction under the Constitution is Necessary:
The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 683 (1985».
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involved a suit by a congressional staffer alleging discrimination protected by the Fifth
Amendment. The Court specifically noted that she could not bring her suit under § 1983,
because, as in Bivens, no state actor was involved. Davis,442 U.S. at 239 n.16. Thus, Davis and

Bivens are consistent in recognizing a direct cause of action for constitutional deprivation under
facts where no other cause of action is available. Neither is inconsistent with Azul-Pacifico and
other authorities holding that § 1983 displaces direct constitutional challenges when § 1983 is
available.
As the above-referenced authorities make clear, § 1983 is the only cause of action
available to Plaintiffs for their federal claims. Given that Plaintiffs have afftrmatively,
definitively, and repeatedly stated. that they are not pursuing any § 1983 claims, they have no
cause of action for their federal claims. For this reason alone, the federal claims should be
dismissed.. If Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed under § 1983, their c1aims fail for the reasons
discussed below.

II.

PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE ACTIONS IS NOT
IUPE.

As noted in Valley County's Statement ofMaterial Facts in Support ofMotion for

Summary Judgment at 13, the County's future approach to fees for road impacts is evolving.
Given this, Plaintiffs are in no position to claim that they are entitled to a declaration or
injunction regarding whether the County can legally require a contract that includes payment
toward off-site improvements as a condition of approval. Plaintiffs' supposition that the County
will not change course in the future is, at bes~ hypotheticaL Indeed, the very quotation provided.

by Plaintiffs (Response Brief at 37. quoting Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767. 773, 133 P .3d
1232, 1238 (2006» works in the opposite direction. Allowing events to unfold will demonstrate
whether or not the County and Plaintiffs are able to reach an accommodation as to new plats.
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Given that many of the defenses the County has raised to this action would not apply to future
actions, it seems a pretty good bet that the County win wotk out an accommodation. In swn,
claims based on future actions of the County (regarding the remaining phases or any so-called
"policy" of the County) are not ripe and are improper subjects for a declaratory judgment. 4

III.

THIS LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS.

Plaintiffs concede that § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute oflimitations.
Response Brief at 17. We have shown above that all claims alleging violation of constitutional
rights must be brought under § 1983. Accordingly, they are subject to the two~year statute. End
of story as to the federal cJaims. 5
If the Court does not dismiss them for other reasons, Plaintiffs' state law claims (takings

and anything else) are subject to the state's catch-all four-year statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs
concede this point as well (ex.cept for their side argument with respect to the five-year statute
applicable to contract claims, which we discuss below). Thus, as to state constitutional claims,
the only question is when the clock starts. lfthe statute began to run before December 1, 2005,
the state constitutional dairns are barred.
Plaintiffs contend the statute did not begin to run until they wrote a check on December

15,2005, thus beating the statute by a few days. For starters, this ignores the fact that they had
already conveyed right-of-way under the Capital Contribution Agreement on or before final plat
4 See, e.g., Davidson v. Wright. 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812,816 (2006) ("Idaho has
adopted the constitutionaUy based. federatjusticiability standard. (Citation omitted.] Idaho courts are
authorized under I.C. § 10-1201 to render declaratory judgments under certain circumstances, but even
actions filed pursuant to that statute must present an actual or justiciable controversy in order to satisfy
federal constitutional justiciability requirements.").

5 If this Court were to detennine that Plaintiffs could bring their federal constitutional claims
independent of § 1983. they, too, would be subject to Idaho's catch-all four-year statute of limitations
under Idaho Code § 5-224. Accordingly, both federal and state claims would be barred for the reason.~
discussed below.
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approval on October 25,2004. 6 lt also ignores the law. It is well-settled that the claims run from
.. the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes
apparent," that is, when the plaintiff"was fully aware of the extent to which [the government]
interfered with his full use and enjoyment ofthe property." McCuskey 11. Canyon County

Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996), Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential

facts on July 14, 2004, the day they received the CUP and they signed the final Capital
Contribution Agreement setting out the contribution requirements in ful1 detail. And Plaintiffs
knew on September 26, 2005, the day they signed the Road Development Agreement governing
phase II. Indeed, the clock started running even earlier. It ran at least from April 1, 2004, the
day that Plaintiffs submitted their proposed Development Agreement and Capital Contribution
Agreement. The Plaintiffs have admitted that the deve]opers included the proposed mitigation
agreements because they believed such mitigation was required. Pachner Aff., W 4-8. Even if
the precise tenns or the total amounts changed. it does not matter because the statute runs even
though plaintiff does not know "the full extent of his damages." McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 217,
912 P.2d at 104. Indeed. in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982), the
Court said the statute ran on the date of a meeting between the parties at which time there was
"recognition of the severity of the problem."
In the face of this, P1aintiffs cling to the fact one of the pa~ents (for Phase lJ) occurred
after December 1, 2005. The cases they cite do not help them push the clock back this far. In

Harris v. State. ex reI. Kemp,horne, 147 Idaho 401, 405,210 P Jd 86,90 (2009). the Idaho

Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations on inverse condemnation ran from the day the

6 The minutes of the approval at page 2 recite as foHows: "'accept the dedication of public rightof-way along Norwood Road and West Roseberry Road; ... agree that the Development Agreement that
is [in] place covers off-site road improvement costs for this phase; ...." Herrick Aff., Exh. 15.
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plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a nrinerallease with the state, not the time they made
payments to the state under the lease. Even if the Phase II payment had been the first
conveyance under the Agreements, the date the check was written is not the issue. The statute
was triggered. at a minimum, on the date of the Capital Contribution Agreement and the Road
Development Agreement. Accordingly, the lawsuit came too Jate.
Plaintiffs creatively try to avoid application of the four-year limitations period by arguing
that their claims arise out of the Agreements they entered into with the County, making the fiveyear statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 5-216 applicable. "Plaintiffs' have requested in their
Complaint declaratory relief declaring that the Road Development Agreement executed on

September 26,2004 [sic], is void ab initio" and should be rescinded. Response Brief at 19. The
allegations in Plaintiffs' own Complaint belie this assertion. There is nothing in PlaintiffS'

Complaint that can fairly be interpreted as a breach of contract claim or any request that the
Agreements be declared void.
Even if Plaintiffs were pennitted to amend their Complaint (more than six months after
the deadline) it would be futile. If a contract is deemed illegal, the remedy is not rescission-the
Court would simp1y refuse to enforce the contract and leave the parties as it finds them. Trees v.

Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). Here, the parties have both performed their
respective obligations under the Agreements so there is nothing left to enforce. Rescission is an
equitable remedy that relieves the parties of their duties and obligations under the contract, and
returns the parties to their pre-contract positions. Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d

957 (1971). But rescission is not a proper remedy where it would be impossible for the parties to
return to their pre-contract positions. GME, Inc. v. Carter. 120 Idaho 5]7, 520, 817 P.2d 183,
185 (1991). That is the situation here. The right-of-way dedicated and the money paid by
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P1aintiffs have already been put to use. Plaintiffs have already received approval of their final
plat and the completion of improvements near their development. Herrick Aff., '" 31-35. There
is no breach of contract claim or theory that would pennit Plaintiffs to obtain both the benefit of
their bargain with the County (improved roads serving their development) and a refund. In any
event, it is apparent that this is a case about alleged constitutional violations. not contractual
violations. This ruse fails.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS FAlL THE TWO SPECIAL "RIPENESS" REQUIREMENTS OF
W ILLJAMSON COUNTY.

A.

Williamson County Test 1: Tbe "fmal decision" requirelDent applies
because this is a regulatory taking, not a pbysical taking.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton

Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (l985) establishes two special "'ripeness" tests applicable to
all federal regulatory takings claims. Response Brief at 33. The first is the "final decision"
requirement. This means that Plaintiffs must use reasonably availabLe opportunities to raise their
concerns at the administrative level. Plaintiffs undisputedly did not do so.
Plaintiffs continue to misunderstand the finality requirement in Williamson County. They
say, "Valley County basically asks this Court to find Plaintiffs should be precluded from
maintaining this action because it did not object during the public hearings .... " Response Brief
at 26. That is the least of their failures. The finality requirement in Williamson County is not

limited to raising an issue at the hearing. For instance,

in Williamson County, the Court faulted

the developer for failing to initiate a new variance proceeding. Plaintiffs had ample
opportunities to object or otherwise bring their concerns with the Agreements to the COWlty'S
attention. 7 Williamson County requires that they employ at least one of them.

7 Plaintiffs could have filed a petition with the County to reopen and amend the CUP. Although
there is no express provision in the ordinance for such an amendment, the County, having issued the CUP
VALLEY COUNTV'S REFL V BRlEF rN SUPPORT OF ManON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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In any event, PlaintiflS' principal defense is that Wmiamson County does not apply to
them at all because this is a physical taking, not a regulatory taking. Response Briefat 33-34.
The difference between physical takings and regulatory takings is well-established blackletter law. In a physical taking, the government forcibly appropriates the person's property.
There is no quid pro quo and the property owner cannot say, "No thanks." Exactions are
different. They occur when the plaintiff wants something from the government (e.g.• a pennit)
and the government seeks to exact something from the plaintiff (e.g. , an easement). When the
government goes too far, that is a taking. The identifying factor in an exaction is that the
government takes the property by leveraging its regulatory authority, not by fiat. The regulated
person could avoid the exaction by decJining the permit. For this reason, exactions are treated as
a subspecies of regulatory takings, even when the exaction involves land or money.s Because

pursuant to LLUPA, has inherent authority to entertain a petition by the pennit holder to change the
permit based on changed conditions or new infonnation. In addition, there are specific remedial
provisions in the ordinance that could have been employed. First, they could have submitted an
application for fmal plat approval without making the conveyances contemplated under the Agreements.
Subdivision Regulations § 250. In that proceeding, Plaintiffs could have presented their position that
payment oftheir share of road costs is an unlawful exaction. Second, Plaintiffs could have filed an
application for a new CUP with different conditions to replace the existing ClJP. LUDO, Chapter 3.
Third, they could have initiated .an investigation Wlder Chapter 12 ofLUDO. This chapter allows any
person to initiate a proceeding to investigate noncompliance with a CUP. Although these are typically
employed by third parties andIor County staff, it could just as easily have been employed by Plaintiffs
through notification to the County that they were unable to reach agreement oc an Agreement, a violation
of the CUP. Plaintiffs then could have presented their defense that the requirement is unconstitutional.
Alternatively, they could have simply informed the County that they would not sign the Agreements, and
waited for the County to initiate an investigation Wlder Chapter 12.
8 "'The government affects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the
physical occupation of his or her land." 26 Am. Jur. 2d. Eminent Domain § 10 (2004) (emphasis
supplied). Exactions in land use cases are discussed under the section on regulatory takings. Id. § 16.
This black letter rule derives from many cases, notably Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc" 544 U.S. 528, 54647 (2005) (citing Nol/an v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825. 831-32 (1987) and Dolan v.
City olTigard, 512 U.S. 374.384 (l994)). In one case, the Ninth Circuit struggled with this more than
necessary, we think, but came down the same way: "(The] claims arising out of the exaction of the offers
to dedicate can plausibly be characterized as either regulatory or physical takings. .,. We think it most
plausible to eharacterit.e [the] claims as aUeged regulatory ratber than physical takings." Daniel v.
County olSanta Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002), cerro denied, 537 U.S. 973.
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this case involves an alleged regulatory taking, the physical takings exception to Williamson

County does not apply.

B.

WIUiamson County Test 2: The requirement to employ state iDvene
condemnation procedures applies.

Plaintiffs concede that Williamson County requires takings litigants to employ state
inverse condemnation proceedings before going to federal court. Response Brief at 33. They
say this does not apply because they have in fact brought an inverse condemnation claim as part
of this lawsuit. But the fact that Plaintiffs are pursuing a state inverse condemnation action now
(albeit one subject to fatal flaws), does not solve their problem Wlder Williamson County with
respect to their federal claims. Williamson County requires that Plaintiffs fully litigate their state
law claims first, and lose, before bringing a § ] 983 action. Bringing the federal and state claims

in the same lawsuit does not satisfy Williamson County.
Plaintiffs also argue that this second test does not apply to their procedural due process
claims. The problem is they have no independent due process claim; it is a meaningless
restatement of the takings claim in an effort to avoid Willia1n3on County.9 Nor does it matter
what reJiefthey seek. Plaintiffs' attempt to end-run Williamson County is also similar to the endrun tried unsuccessfully in Daniel, 288 F.3d at 384-85. The plaintiffs in Daniel argued they were

not subject to Wiiliamson County because they were seeking injWlctive and declaratory relief,
not damages. The Daniel court recognized an exception to the requirement to employ state
inverse

condemnation proceedings (where the plaintiff is making a facial chaJJenge to a

9 Note also that Plaintiffs quote Williamson County out of context. The statement that "the
remedy for a regulation that gO(l$ too far, under the due process tbeory is not 4just compensation' but

invalidation of the regu.lation," Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197, was not the Court expressing its
view. but the Court reciting the county's argument-which it found unnecessary to reach. "We need not
pass on tbe merits of petitioners' arguments, for even if viewed as a question of due process, respondent's
claim is premature." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199.
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municipaJ ordinance). but found it not applicable there. Nor is it applicable here. Neither Daniel
nor our case involves a challenge to an ordinance, much less a facial challenge.

1o

Where an

action is alleged to be a regulatory taking. the remedy is not to stop the exaction, but to make the
government pay for it. Declaratory and injunctive relief is inappropriate, Daniel, 288 F.3d at
385.
In swn, Plaintiffs' attempt to sidestep Williamson County by characterizing this as a due
process case or a case seeking injunctive and declaratory relief falls flat. This is a takings case at
its core. The Court should do as the district court did in Daniel, 288 F.3d at 380, and throw out
the federal claims under Williamson County. Iu to the state 'aw inverse condemnation claim, it
fails under the statute oflimitations and

v.

tor all the other reasons discussed. elsewhere.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL THE "EXHAUSTION" AND "VOLUNTARY~TESTS
EST ABUSHED UNDER IDAHO CASE LAW.

A.

Plaintiffs failed to exhaust.

Plaintiffs had ample opportunities. both formal and informal, for bringing their concerns
to the County's attention. In addition to potential avenues at the administrative level, II they
failed to seek judicial review under LLUPA, another exhaustion requirement. The law of
exhaustion requires that they employ at least one of them. As the Court said in KMST,
"[Plaintiff] simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially calculated.. Having done so, it
cannot now claim that the amount of the impact fees constituted an unconstitutional taking of its
property."

KMST, u..C v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56,62 (2003).

10 Plaintiffs claim that they are facially challenging Sections I and J of Chapter 8 of LUDQ, but as
explained above, this is both fiction and futile. Rather, Plaintiffs are challenging the CUP and its
application through the Agreements.
11

See footnote 7 at page II listing administrative actions that could have been taken.
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Plaintiffs defend their failure saying that exhaustion is not required here. KMST and
other cases recognize two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (I) where the interests of
justice so require and (2) challenges to actions "outside the agency's authority." These and other
al1eged exceptions are discussed below. None apply here. Plaintiffs should have exhausted, and
they did not.

1.

Exhaustion exception 1: Plaintiffs cannot meet the "interests
of justice" exception.

In light of the current challenge and other litigation, the County has initiated a thorough
review of its road mitigation process and, as previously noted, is considering new IDIFA-based
ordinances. Had Plaintiffs timely challenged the County during the course of the
CUP/development agreement process, who knows what might have happened? Instead,
Plaintiffs waited for years, raising the issue after the money was spent and it is too late to reverse
course. No public policy is served by encouraging such delinquent behavior.
There is no countervailing consideration. Plaintiffs have not offered a shred of evidence
that the County acted in bad faith in the pennitting process.

In American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. ] v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862,872,154 P.3d 433,443

(2007), the Court explained why exhaustion matters:
"Important policy considerations underlie the requirement for
exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the
opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial
intervention, deferring to the administrative processes established
by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of
comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body."
White v. Bannock County Comm 'rs, l391daho 396, 401-02, 80
P.3d 332,337-38 (2003).
This statement is a good summary of why the ·'interests of justice" exception does not
work here.
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2.

Exhaustion exception 2: The "outside the agency!s authority"

eXceptioD does Dot apply.
Valley County explained in its Opening Brief at 22 n.15 that the "outside the agency's
authority" exception applies only to facial challenges. Plaintiffs dismiss our analysis of White v.
Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003) as a manipulation,

Response Brief at 23, but fail to explain why. They cite only one case, American Falls. This
case suggests that there may be some instances in which the exception could apply to an as
applied cha1lenge, but our case is not one of them.
The American Falls Court began by recognizing the exhaustion principle. "Additionally,
a district court cannot properly engage in an 'as applied' constitutional analysis until a complete
factual record has been developed:' American Faiis, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. "In this
case, the district court recognized that parties must choose between either a facial or <as applied'
constitutional challenge and that an 'as applied' analysis is inappropriate before administrative
proceedings have been fully completed." ld. 143 Idaho at 871, 154 P .3d at 442.12
The Court then recognized the two standard exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.
American Falls, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443. However, the Court proceeded to sharply

narrow the circumstances in which the first exception might apply to an as applied challenge.
The Court explained that deciding whether an agency acted outside its authority sometimes calls
for a "circuitous analysis." ld. If the agency's action was entirely beyond the scope of its
authority, no circuitous analysis is required. In such cases exhaustion is excused, apparently in
both facial and applied challenges. But where the nature of the action falls within the agency's

See AmericQn Falls, 1431dabo at 870-72, 154 P.3dat 44)-43. fora good discussion of the
difference between facial and as-applied challenges under Idaho law.
12
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broad authorization, exhaustion will be excused only for facial challenges. The Court concluded,
143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443:
Thus, the exception for when an agency exceeds its authority does
not apply unless the eM [Conjunctive Management] Rules are
facially unconstitutional. Therefore, this Court's review wiH be in
tenns of the CM Rules' constitutionality on their face and not in
tenus of the Rules' ·'threatened application" or '''as applied."
This is a more nuanced statement of the simpler rule articulated by the County in its

Opening Brief, but the end result is the same, Indeed. American Falls reinforces the County's
main point. If an agency acts in a manner entirely outside its regulatory authority (for instance,
if the County had no planning and zoning power), then the agency's action could be challenged
without exhaustion. But where the governmental entity has regulatory authority to act on the
subject matter and the only question is whether it has exercised that authority properly in a
particular "as applied" action, then exhaustion is required.
Plaintiffs, in a transparent attempt to sidestep the exhaustion requirement (and the statute
oflimitations), assert that their claims include a facial challenge to Sections I and J of Appendix
C of LUDO. Response Brief at 24-25. Nowhere in Plaintiffs' Complaint is there any reference
to any provision of LUDc nor is there any allegation that can fairly be interpreted as bringing a
facial challenge to any County ordinance. The aJlegations in Plaintiffs' CompJaint are clearly
directed at the condition included in the CUP that required a development agreement and the
payment of money that was ultimately a part of the Agreements. Based upon the Plaintiffs' own
allegations, their claims are an "as applied" challenge to the particular requirements that were
placed upon their applications rather than a facial challenge to any County ordinance.
Even if Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their Complaint (despite the fact that the
deadline for amendments to pleadings expired more than six months ago) to assert a facial
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challenge, such a claim would have no merit. Plaintiffs' sole argument in support of their
purported facial chalJenge is that two provisions of LUDO illegally require the payment of
impact fees. However, the provisions at issue do not mandate any payment of fees whatsoever.
Section I of Appendix C of LUDO provides that, due to the unique nature of each PUD, the
County requires the developer to work with the appropriate county entities and enter into a
development agreement with the Board No particular content is specified. Similarly, Section I
of Appendix .C of LUDO provides only that the P&Z ''may recommend" impact fees to the
Board and that the Board "may implement" such fees as recommended or as deemed necessary.
If a party asserts a facial challenge to a legislative act, it must prove that the act is
unconstitutional in all of its applications. In other words, "the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the [1aw] would be valid." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho
706, 7l2, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003).

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by a party to frame its claim as a
facial challenge in Lochsa Falls. L.L. C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P .3d 963 (2009). The
plaintiff in that case was required to construct a traffic signal as a condition of a construction
pennit issued by the Idaho Transportation Department. The rules at issue provided that the
department may require payment of costs associated with highway improvements in oonnection
with the issuance of such a penni 1. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's action
was an <4as applied" challenge.
The same may be said of this lawsuit. Here, since the provisions do not specify any
particular requirement or even that a fee will be charged at aU, they cannot be unconstitutional in
every application and a facial challenge fails. In fact, the statute referenced in Section J is Idaho
Code § 31-870 that authorizes counties to charge fees for services. (See footnote 15 at page 22.)
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Obvious1y, Section J could be applied constitutionally so long as only service or user fees were
required to be paid.

3.

Euclid A venue is inapposite.

Plaintiffs offer a smokescreen by raising Euclid Avenue Trust v. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho
306, ]93 P.3d 853 (2008). Response Briefat 25. This case simply he1d that parties can no
longer combine in the same lawsuit a civil complaint and a judicial review.

13

So be it. Both may

still be pursued in separate lawsuits, if need be. But there would have been no need for separate
lawsuits here. Plaintiffs could have obtained all the necessary reliefsimply by filing a timeJy
judicial review of the CUP pursuant to LLUP A. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(whose judicial review provisions are incorporated by LLUPA) allows permitting decisions to be
set aside for violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). That
is one way of undertaking an inverse condemnation. Indeed, it is probably the only proper way.
If that would have occurred, there would be no need for this tardy collateral attack.

4.

Idaho Code § 67·6521 is inapposite..

P1aintiffs seek re1ief from exhaustion under Idaho Code § 67-652]. Response Brief at

22·23. This is the same strategy that the plaintiff tried unsuccessfuJly in KMS'L 138 Idaho at
580,583-84,67 P.3d at 59,62-63. As the Court ex.plained in KMST, the statute has no
applicability here.
By its tenns, that statute has no application to the impact fees
imposed in this case. 1t only applies if the basis of the inverse
condemnation claim is ''that a specific zoning action or permitting
action restricting private property development is actual1y a
regulatory action by local government deemed 'necessary to
t3 The Euclid Avenue Court employed the tenn "administrative appeal" as a shorthand for
''judicial review of an administrative action." The Court was not referring to administrative appeals
within the agency (e.g., an appeal from planning and zoning to the county commission), which is a
separate exhaustion issue.
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compJete the development of the material resources of the state,' or
necessary for other public uses."

KMST. 138 Idaho at 580, 583-84, 67 P.3d at 59, 62'()3. (The quoted provision was changed
slightly by the Legislature in 2010, but the change does not affect the Court's analysis.) The
reference to whether the action is "necessary to complete the development of the material
resources of the state" is a reference to whether or not an eminent domain action is undertaken
for a legitimate public purpose--an issue made famous in the case of Kelo v. City ofNew

London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Plaintiffs' Complaint cannot be read to embrace such a claim.

s.

BHA 11 is inapposite.

Plaintiffs cite BllA Investmenls, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BBA If'), 141 Idaho 168, 108 P. 3d
315 (2004). This case involved a transfer fee cbarged by the City of Boise on liquor licenses.
The Court ruled in a prior case, BRA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BHA l'), 138 Idaho 356,
357-58, 63 P.3d 482, 483~84 (2004), that the City had no regulatory authority whatsoever with
respect to the transfer ofliquor licenses. Only the State has such authority. Id. In a separate
case involving different parties (which was consolidated in RHA 11), the district court dismissed
plaintiffs' claim because they had not paid the fee under protest. In BHA II, the Supreme Court
reversed that point, ruling that special rules requiring that taxes be paid under protest do not
apply to "an action seeking recovery of unlawful fees." RBA II, 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at
323. This bas no applicability here. Valley County has not claimed that fees required under the
development agreement are taxes. Nor has it relied on the line of authority addressed in RHA II
requiring that taxes be paid Wlder protest as a prerequisite to challenge. Thus, the language
quoted by Plaintiffs is inapposite.
The BHA II Court then turned to the exhaustion requirement. The Cow1 discussed KMST
noting that in that case exhaustion was required because ""had KMST pursued available
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administrative remedies, its fee would have been reduced." The Court dlstinguished KMST:
"'That case has no application to this one. The City has not cited any ordinance granting the city
council the authority to waive the liquor license transfer fee unlawfully charged by the City."

BHAll, 141 [dahoat 176-77, 108 P.3d at 323-24.
Our case is like KMST, not BHA IJ. In BHA II, Boise had no discretion to eliminate or
reduce the transfer fee. Valley County, in contrast, had ample authority to agree to any tenns it
thought appropriate for the development agreement-including imposing no road mitigation fees
at all. If Plaintiffs had timely raised the issue, Valley County might have backed off. It certainly
had that discretion, bringing it within KMST's exhaustion requirement.
Another distinguishing factor is that in BRA II, the City was imposing fees with no
authority to regulate in the field (liquor transfers) at all and was instead intruding on authority
expressly and unequivocally granted to the State. This reinforces the point we have made above
with respect to KMSTandAmerican Falls that the exhaustion exception comes into play only
when the governmental entity acts entirely outside the subject of is regulatory authority.

6.

Plaintiffs' alleged failure to perceive their rights at the time of
the administrative proceedings does Dot excuse their failure to

exhaust.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that they are excused from exhaustion because they assumed
the County had the right to require mitigation. Response Brief at 26-27. The cases they cite are
inapposite. The controlling cases on the subject of exhaustion clearly identify the exceptions to
the exhaustion requirement. Failure to recognize one's own claim is not one of the exceptions.

Although BHA II arose in a different context (the damage claim requirement applicabJe to
cities), the case makes this point. "[Plaintiffs] argue that they timely filed their notice of claim
because they could not reasonably have known until January 30, 2003, when we issued our
opinion in BHA 1. That opinion did not create a cause of action where none previously existed."
VALLEY COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPpORT OF MonON FOR SUMMAItY JUDGMENT
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BHA II, 141 Idaho at 174, 108 P.3d at 321. Thus, those plaintiffs were not excused by the fact

that Boise City believed and acted like it had authority to regulate liquor license transfers.
Likewise, in Harris v. State. ex rei. Kemp/horne, 147 Idaho 401,403-05,210 P.3d &6, 88-90

(2009), the Court fOl.md that plaintiffs were not excused from the statute of limitations by the fact
that the State affirmatively misstated the law and demanded that plaintiffs enter into a mineral
lease over minerals that, as it later became known, the State did not own. There is no basis for
Plaintiffs' suggestion that exhaustion should be treated any differently.
B.

Plaintiffs' actions were voluntary.

Plaintiffs contest whether their signing of the Agreements was voluntary. They contend
that there were no meaningful negotiations, that the County had a policy of requiring al1
developers to pay fees according to the County's schedule, and that Plaintiffs believed their
failure to do so would result in delay or denial oftheir application. The County contests those
facts. 14 But those facts are not material, and any disagreement over them does not bar summary
judgment here. Even if everything that Plaintiffs say about the County's policy of seeking
mitigation were true, these fact remain: Plaintiffs themselves included proposed mitigation
agreements (including payments for off-site improvements) in their initial application, they did

14 The County directs the Court's attention to testimony in the rerord by County representatives
that establishes that the use of development agreements to help pay for road improvements was first
suggested by developers and was enthusiastically supported by them when the real estate market in the
County was booming. Cruikshank Depo., 154:9-155:24; Davis Depo.. 26:18-33:22,47:2548:18; Herrick
Depo., 55: 18-59:8. (The deposition transcripts are exhibits A-D to the 4ffidavit o/Victor Villegas in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.) Also, only one applicant objected to the inclusion of a payment for
road improvements in a development agreement and the Board negotiated a reduced amount for that
applicant, which contradicts Plaintiffs' position that the agreements were standard and non-negotiable.
Eid Depo.• 34:13-36:13; Herrick Depo., 81 :17·82:10, 103: 12-107:1. Finally, no applicant ever refused to
pay and demanded approval by the Board without a development agreement. COW1ty representatives
testified that they did not know how such a demand would have been bandIed. Cruickshank Depo.,
143:5-146:12~ Eld Depo., 39:5-45:3. That the Plaintiffs have misrepresented these issues in the record is
troubling but u1timately inconsequential because none of these disputed facts is materia! to the dispositive
issues raised by the County's MotionjorSummary Judgment.
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not protest or object to the condition in the CUP that required a mitigation agreement, they
signed both Agreements. and they did not object to the conveyance of property or the payment of
money required under the Agreements.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their actions from those of the developers in K}.;fST by
claiming that they believed that LUOO mandated the Agreements,15 and that County officials
told them that road impact mitigation would be required. Response Brief at 28. But that is no
different from the situation in KMST. In that case, the developer agreed to the road dedication.
He did so not because he was anxious to give something away, but because he was t()ld by an
AeHD official that he would recommend it as a requirement. KMST, 138 Idaho at 579, 67 P.3d
at 58. Thus, plaintiffs in KMST and here both believed they saw the writing on the wall; both
decided that the easiest course was to give what they thOUght would be required at the end of the
day. This is what the law means by ·'Voluntary."
Plaintiffs meet that test as a matter of law. They included an express offer of mitigation
contributions in their application and then agreed. to slightly modified terms in the Agreements.
The terms of the Agreements are unambiguous. They are plainly entitled "AGREEMENTS" and
provide that the developer "agrees" to participate in the cost of improving the roads near the
proposed development. Regardless of what discussions mayor may not have taken place with
County starf 6 and regardless of the Plaintiffs' understandings and assumptions, ifit were not

IS Plaintiffs point to section J ofLUOO (formerly Appendix C, now codified to Chapter 8)
entitled "IMPACT FEES" as the basis for not timely chaUenging the road development fees. Response
Brief at 3, 28, 32. The text of the provision, however. references only fees based on (clabo Code § 31.
870, a statute authorizing counties to conect user fees for water, sewage, and the like. Even if reliance
was appropriate to justify failure to challenge, which it is not, Plaintiffs should not have relied on this
provision with respect to fees charged for off-site road construction. This provision, on its face,
contemplated lawful user fees.
16 To the extent that Plaintiffs contend their entering into the Agreements was involuntaly
bet:ause of things they say were said by County staff, this argument is without merit Idaho case law and

V ALLEY COVl'lTY's REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JuDGMENT
10915-2_1006261_21

Page 22

470

true that the developer was voluntarily agreeing to help pay for the improvement of the roads,
then Plaintiffs simply should not have signed the Agreements without protest.
Joseph Pachner represented the developers with respect to their application. In language
embraced by the Plaintiffs, he testified in his affidavit that he included the payments for road
improvements in order to ensure an efficient application process and avoid delays. Pachner AfJ..
~ 4,6,

and 8. This is precisely the same reason that the developer in KMST included the

dedication of the public street.
The district court found "that as a general matter developers do not
include conditions in development applications if they disagree
with the conditions." The district court also found, "KMST
representatives included the construction and dedication ofSird
Street in the application because they were concerned that failing
to do so would delay closing on the property and development of
the property." KMST's property was not taken. It voluntarily
decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to speed the
approval of its development. Having done so, it cannot now claim
that its property was "taken."
KMST. 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. The inclusion of the mitigation measures in their

application, combined with the lack of any objection and the execution of the Agreements,
establishes conclusively that the payment was voluntary. No doubt the KMST developers did not
really want to dedicate a road to the public. Nor does the County doubt that PLaintiffs did not
really want to pay money to help improve the roads to their development. But in this context,
"voluntary" does not connote desire-it simply means that the developer made a choice to agree
instead of to object or protest. 17 Having made this choice, the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by it.

LUDD itself are clear that only the Board of County Commissioners bas authority to make a final
decision on such matters.
\7 This is apparently true of the other developers who signed affidavits that have been filed in
this action. As with Plaintiffs, they may not have wanted to enter into the agreements, but they did so by
their own choice. The fact that the developers (including Plaintiffs) may have thought that the County
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VI.

EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PREVENT PLAINTIFFS FROM OBTAINING THE REMEDIES
THEY SEEK HERE.

Plaintiffs offer but one response to Valley County's equitable defenses: that the payment
was not voluntary. But even if Plaintiffs believed that the COWlty was inflexible and that
agreement to the road fees would ex.pedite approval. this does not change the fact that they
signed two separate documents, without protest, which on their face say "Agreement," accepted
the benefits of the Agreements, and waited for years before bringing this litigation. This is not
the sort of behavior that equity encourages.
CONCLUSION

In short, payments made by Plaintiffs were voluntari1y made payments that benefited
them by funding road construction on an ex.pedited basis. Even if those payments had been
illegal taxes, it is too late to challenge them now. Plaintiffs were obligated to challenge them at
the time. Doing so now violates the statute of limitations as well as well-settled ex.haustion and
ripeness principles.

FOT

these and all of the other legal and equitable reasons discussed above.

judgment should be entered dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit.

bad the authority to require a payment of fees is also irrelevant. LUOO was available to all as were the
Idaho statutes that relate to these issues.
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DATED this 10th day of November, 2010.
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on 1he 10th day of November, 20 10, a true and correct copy of 1he
foregoing was served upon the following individuates) by the means indicated:
Jed Manwaring
Victor Villegas

Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jrnanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

o
o

o~

V.S. Mail, pos1age prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

E-Mail

Christopher H. Meyer
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TN THE DlSl'RICT COURT Or. THE FClt)RTH JUDICIAL DISTJUCT OF'
TUE STATE OF .IDAHO, IN AND '~()R THE COlJNTY Of' VAI-L,BY

BUCKSKIN ,PROPERTlES, lNC.~ an Idaho
Corporation, aIm TIMBER1JNE
DE'vEWPMJ1N1'. LLC, _n Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case NQ, CV 2009-5S4

OllDiJ\ GkAoNl'ING STIP\lLATIQN TO
MODIFV SCHEfJ\ll.INtr ORDIR

Plaintiff"
v.
VALLEY COUNTY, o political. 3.\Jb~viston
of t,be 'S1at-c! ,of IdAl1o,

DefC::Jldant.

nus MA TIER.: having wmcbcibrc the Covrt upon,the Stipulation to Modify
Sc:hedu.lini Orticr, and havina fbund ~ood cD.t..ISletherefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED du&t the Scheduling Order Ctlt~ 111 this acdon 01,1 f'cbl'Ull.t'Y
24.2()IO, is m<>dified
1.

a., follouts:
'Thw:t the deadlille fur the AtlO~Y~' Conference described in
parqraph 1t of the ~hedu1iI18 Orde-t. and the qssoc:iat~ ~tjvitif)s
including e~cbattBe ofwi,tl'IeS51ists and exhibits., and ptepal'ation of
the pre~td~stipu1atjon, if c~nacd from November 22, 2()10, to
Janu,oUy '7; 20 t 1~. and

2.

a1J pr~ttial

Ttual the deadline fo.rs.ubm).sslQn oftbe Pre~trial Memorandum .by
eaehparty described ill parasrap.hl2 of the Schedu.ling Order is
changedfrQm November 29.2010" to JanuarY' 7.20'11;
~lines

wiJl be set.fi:lr J~ 7. 2.011.
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3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

5
6
7

8

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an idaho
corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an Idaho limited
liability company,

9

Case No. CV-2009-554-C

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DEC\S\ON RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10

vs.
11

VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision,
12

Defendant.

13

14

APPEARANCES
15

For Plaintiff: Victor Villegas of Evans Keane LLP
16
17

For Defendants: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens
Pursley

11:)

PROCEEDINGS

19
20
21

This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

22

23

BACKGROUND
The

Plaintiffs

Buckskin

Properties,

Inc.

("Buckskin

ft
)

and

Timberline

24

Development, lLC ("Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in
25

Valley County, Idaho called The Meadows at west Mountain (the "Meadows"). Valley
26
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II

County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition to approve the Plaintiffs'
2

final ptat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plaintiffs filed this \awsuit seeking

3

a declaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of

4

impact fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the

5

Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the

6

impact fees.

7

8

Valley County has filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment

seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of limitations
has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and paid the fees.

9

LEGAL STANDARD
10

Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings. depositions. and
11

12

admissions on file, together with the affidavits. if any, show that there \s no genuine

13

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

14

matter of law," I.R.C.P.56(c}. When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial

15

court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw ail

16

reasonable factua\ inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowners

17

Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343. 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The

18

motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if

19

reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot. 117 Idaho 963,
20

793 P.2d 195 (1990),
21
22

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

23

rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,

24

887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who

25

resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court

26
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II

i

2

the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. Sf.
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,508.768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988).

3

The resisting party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of

4

facts which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those

5

facts by deposition, affidavit, or othelWise. Id.; I.R.C.P 56(e).

5

7

B

A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Corbn"dge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85. 87,
730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). In other words. there must be evidence on which a jury

9

might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,
10

368 (1969).

Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary

11

12

judgment when the ptainUff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

13

of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at

14

trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425. 426,816 P.2d 982. 983 (1991).

15

16
17

18

DISCUSSION

Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs' allegations of violations of the federal
constitution must be dismissed because the Pla,ntiffs' failed to bring th)s action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs respond that they have not sought relief under 42

19

U.S.C. § 1983, nor were they required to do so. The Plaintiffs argue that an action for
20

inverse condemnation for violations of the Fifth Amendment can be brought
21

22
23

independent of a § 1983 action. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
. Constitution

of the United States, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

24

Amendment, Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provides: U[N]or shall private

25

property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Article 1. § 14, of the

26
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Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: "Private property may be taken for public
2
3

use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by
law, shall be paid therefore."

4

A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein.

5

has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of

6

law and the payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse

7

condemnation. McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987). The

8

property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has

9

actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho
10

777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). Here, the Plaintiffs have not made a claim pursuant to 42
11
12

13

U.S.C. § 1983. However, they were not required to do so because they have a valid
claim pursuant to the State constitution.

14

Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs failed to timely file this action within: (1)

15

the four-year statute of limitations under I.C. § 5-224 for an inverse condemnation

16

claim; (2) the two-year statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim; (3) the three-year statue

17

of limitations for the taking of personal property; and (d) the six-month statute of

18

limitations for claims against a county.

The Plaintiffs respond that their inverse

19

condemnation claim was timely filed because the statute of limitations began to run on
20

December 15. 2005 when the Plaintiffs drew a cashier's check in the amount of
21

22
23

$232,160.00 in orderto pay the impact fees for Phases 2 and 3 oHhe Meadows.
Idaho Code § 5-224 contains the statute of limitations for an inverse

24

condemnation claim. and states: "[a]n action for [inverse condemnation] must be

25

commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued. ~ See C &

26
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G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dis!. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143,75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003).
2

The date when a cause of action accrues is a question of law to be determined by this

3

Court where no disputed issues of material fact exist. Id. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. "The

4

actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be

5

fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to

6

constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent."

7

Tibbs v. Cityo! Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979).

B

The Complaint in this case was filed on December 1, 2009. The facts in this
9

case are essentially undisputed. The Plaintiffs are making a legal argument that the
10

Valley County's "taking" did not occur until the cashier's check was drawn in order
11

12

to

pay the impact fees on December 15. 2005. However, as Valley County points out, the

13

"Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential facts on July 14,2004, the day they received the

14

Conditional Use Permit and they signed the final Capital Contribution Agreement setting

15

out the contribution requirements in full detaiL"

16

reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, October 25, 2004 was the date when the

17

statute of limitations began to run. This was the date when the dedication of right of

18

At the very latest, drawing all

way was accepted and it was at this point in time at which the impairment of such a

19

degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property
20

interest became apparent. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion for
21

22
23

Summary Judgment because Plaintiffs are barred from recovering under their inverse
condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224 because their Complaint was not filed within the

24
25

26
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four-year statute of limitations. 1
2

Although the Court is granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

3

based on the statute of limitations, the Court will address the remaining arguments

4

submitted by the parties in order to provide a more complete record. As a general rule,

5

a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge

6

the validity 01 administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899,906,854 P.2d 242,

7

B

249 (1993). However, there is an exception to that rule when the interests of justice so
require and the agency acted outside of its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140

9

Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004).

Valley County argues that summary

10

judgment should be granted because the Plaintiffs could have objected or otherwise
11

12

filed an appeal to the conditions of approval, but did not do so. The Plaintiffs respond

13

that they had no duty to exhaust any administrative remedies because the Plaintiffs'

14

claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion.

15

record that Valley County did not follow the provisions set forth in the Idaho

16

Development Fee Act ("IDIFA") and Valley County concedes as much.

17

specifically, Valley County failed to follow the procedure for the imposition 01

16

It appears from the

More

development impact fees set forth in I.C. § 67-8206. As such, the Plaintiffs were not

19

required to exhaust their administrative remedies because the proper administrative
20

procedures were not in place.
21

22
23

Valley County also argues that the Plaintiffs should have raised their objections
to the impact fees with the local govemment in a timely manner in order to set up their

24
25
26

1 The Plaintiffs also argued that this action is subject 10 a five-year statute of limitations based on I.C. § 5216. However, this is not an action for breach of conlract. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the recQrd
before the Court thaI the contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was ever breached.
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1

2

•

claim that their payment was involuntary. In essence, Valley County is arguing that the
Plaintiffs should be precluded from maintaining this action because they did not object

3

during the public hearing on their previous approvals for Phases 1 through 3.

4

Plaintiffs respond that they were not required to object because there is no Idaho law

5

requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest in order to later recover an

6

illegal fee and the Plaintiffs had no reason to question Valley County's LUDO at the

7

time of the public hearings on its CUP/PUD application. The Plaintiffs are correct. As

8

The

the ldaho Supreme Court stated in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise. "[w]e have

9

not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to impose at
10

all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered." 141 Idaho 168,
11

12
13

176, 108 P .3d 315. 323 (2004). Here, the Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact
fees under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have

14

the authority to impose the impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the

15

procedures set forth in I.C. § 67-8206.

Hi
11
18

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

1

day of January 2011.

19

20
21

ICHAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

23
24

25
26
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,-[,J "

2

I hereby certify that on the'

day of January 2011. I mailed (served) a true

3

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
4

5

6
7

8
9
10

11

12
13

VALLEY COUNTY COURT
VIA EMAIL
Victor S. Villegas
EVANS KEANE. LLP
1405 W Main St
PO Box 959
Boise. ID 83701-0959
Fax: (208) 345-3514
Christopher H. Meyer
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W Bannock St
PO Box 2720
Boise. 1083701-2720
Fax: (208) 388-1300

14

15

16
17
18

ARCHIE N. BANBURY
Clerk of the District Court

~

By:;

~,

-

Dei5Cier

19
20

21
22

23

24
25

26
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EVA.'\S KEM"E LLP

Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Vidor ViUegas ISB# 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main
P. O. Box 959
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514

~u

.._'
· k ..'9

,

i- ,f\i:-;·
,-

1-f .,...........-

'Ht CLERK
,

.•.

,-----DePUty

AM 1tl 20U

e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
VvilIegas@evanskeane.com
Attorneys for Plaintift's

IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF TIlE FOURTH JODIClAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..~D FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited

Liability Company,

Case No.

CV~2009-554-C

MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUl>GMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

VALLEY COUNTY, 8 political subdivision
of the State of Idaho.

Defendrutt.
PLaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane

LLl'",

move this Court,

pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedme, for partial summary judgment 011
Count One of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

This motion is made and based upon this Court's

Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment entered on January 7,
2011 wherein this Court held "Here, Plaintiffs had no obligation to payth.e impact fee fees under
protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have the authority to impose
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the impact fees as Vaney County bad not complied with the procedures set forth in I.C. § 678206."

This motion is also based on the Memorandum and Affidavits in support of PlaintiftS'

opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sumnwy Judgment previously tiled with this Court.
Dated this 10th day of January, 20 J 1.
EVANS KEAl\""E LI.l'

By

Kk~~

Victor vut;ga~the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that all this lOth day of Januazy. 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing docttme1lt was served by first-elass mail. postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax
transnlission to; by overnight delivery tOi or by personally delivering 10 or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor

[X] U.S. Mail

[X] Fax

P.O. Box 1350

[ J Overnight Delivery

Cascade, ID 83611

[ ] Hand Delivery

Telephone: (208) 382·7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pursley LLP

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

[X) L"".S. Mail

Lx)

Fax

[ ] Overnight Delivery

[ ] Hand Delivery

Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile; (208) 388-1300
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Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor ViHeps ISB# 5860
EVANS KEAl\'.E LLP
1405 West Maio
P. O. Box 959
Boise., Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: jmanwaring@e.VauskeaDe.com

':ase No·-----.J_Inst No.
J:'iled

_AM .;J.. :-;t-g""""'-P.-I\A.

Vvillegas@evanskeane.com
Attorneys for 'PlaintitTs

IN THE DIST.RICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES. INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TL\fBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability CompaDY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2009-SS4-C
MOTION TO VACATE
TRIAL DATE AND REQUEST
FOR STATUS CONFERENCE

vs.
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivisjon

of tbe State of Idaho.
Defendant.
Pmsuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff Buckskin Properties. Inc.
and Timberline Development, LLC move this Court to vacate the trial presently set for January 24,

2011. This motion is made and based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's
Motion For Summary Iudgment entered on January 7, 2011. The Memorandwn Decision appears
to have decided all issues i11cluding Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed

COllCutrcntly. A status conference is requested.

MOTl&~c.ej ~.~LT.Ll!!.erJJ.~ LD...T J J~PN!EQUEST FORS1ATUS CONFERENCE- \
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Dated this 13th day of January, 2011.
EVANS KE.A1\""E L1.P

By

Y~Y~

Vi~to;Villegas:the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l:3th day of January, 2011, a

true

and correct copy of

the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley Cowlty Prosecutor

P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611

[X] U.S. Mail

DG Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

Christopher H. Meyer

Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens PursJey LLP
P.O. Box 2720

{X] U.S. Mail
(.Xl Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery

[ J Hand Delivery

Boise, ID 83101-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200

Facsimile: (208) 388·1300

Victor Villegas
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M4ttbaw C. Williarm" JSB #6211
Vaney County Pn)s~uting Attorney

P.O. Box J350
S36U

C~ID

Telephone: (208J3.B2 .. 7120
ra~mite:

p'(8) 382..7124

lII~iIlirum(~. vatley.id.'Utt

chtjstophur H..Meyer~ ISS 114461
Martin C. Hendricksert. ISB fl5876
GIVENS PU.RSLEY l,Lp·
60 1 W. 8annock St.
P.O. Box.2nO

Boise, Idaho 83701-2120
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facs~ile: 208~3g8-13·()O

chrismeyer@giventlp\lriloy.ceRn
mcb@&iv~spursley.com

AttorneY' for·Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COUR'l' OF Tl-IE ~OUR'n{ JUDlCIAL DJSTR1Cr orr

TIlE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VAl.l.EY

BUCKSKIN .PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho
Corpomtjoit, and TIMBBRllN'E
DEVELOPMl:."NT, LLC;,.atlrdano Limited
LiBbilityCo11lp&J\Y,

V ALLEV Cot~..lY'S Mo'rlON ma
ENTRY OF J[JD<~MENT

.Plaintiffs.

v.
VALI",EYCOUNTY, 4 politicai subdivision
Qfthe State of Idaho,

____

~

.

~

.

_

.

_

,

,

_

_ _.._u._..__

.

Detendam.

__

....J

V'ALUY CooHf\"& MU'rwN lOR ."-"iTI\): tW .RIDt::MJI'.JIIiT

Pa8'C' 1

1D91S.?_~059Q1~_1

ReceiHd Time Jan. 13,

4:40PM
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COMES NOW. Defendant, VaUeyCounty.byano through its. attQf'll8YS ofrecord,und

hereby moyes this Court k) ~tcr judgment in favor of Valley ('ourJy ilDd dismiss this 8Ctl<lft in

A ptopo~d judamen1 is a.ttaeht;:d hereoo 118· &hibit 1,

GIVFNS PURSLEY.1LP,

Atrom~

V.\r..l.I~V C~J1'Ijn's MOTlOl'! &"OR. Drr.kY. Of iUDGMk~

1oe1S"2~ fQfi901 t

for Defendant

Page. 2

..1

Received Time Jan. 13.

4:40PM
499

:>1/13/11 1B: 43

208-38B-1300

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY ihat on the 13UL day of lanuary. 201 L a trlle -and correct copy of tbe
foregoing was servod upon the Jbllow~ iodividuBl(sJ by too nted.n8 indicated:
U,S.Mail, P03tag't:p~d
ExpressMml

Jed Manwari.n&
ViCSfn° Villegas

Evans' Keane LLP

Han4 Deli\iety

1405 West M!in

Facsimile-

P.O. Box 9S,9
Boise. ID 83701-09.59
jmauwt'inng@evllmk't;anc.oom

E~Mail

vvmega.@<."VlU'Illke.ane.com

v ALaLr:Y CoiJNTY',s MorfO~n'OR- I:NI1t"f QlIJvDoML'IlT
10915-2:_1~'1_~

Received Time Jan, 13.

4:40PM

Pg U!Hi

a/13/ll 18:43

20-6-3BB-1300-

Pq OQ5

I

/

Exhibit 1: Proposed Judgment

v ALL£\' COUNn'!'j Mm::oJltl FOfi ErfnI!y OJ JVDG.M!f'i'f'
1ot"S~2_1OSQQ;1_~

Receiveo Time Jan. 13.

4:40PM
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1N THE L)1StRJC1' COURT OF "J'Jn~ FOUR.'nr JUl)lCJAL DrSTRICT OF
THE STA.TE OF lDAHO•.TN AND POR THE COlJNTY OF VALLEY

aUCKSKfN PR.()Pl~RTr.ES, lNC., tut fdaho
CDl'pOraEion, and' TlMBERLINfi
DHVELO.PMENT, LLC,lUl.ldabv Limited
J.illbilit)' Company,

Plainti"fls,

VALLEY COUNTY ~ ~ ]1<>lhical subdiVision
of the State ofId;mo,

Detendant.

THIS MA TTJ:o:R luIving t:omc before the: Court ptJr,nlZlt to 'Vail,,,, Couniy's M"ficll/()'!'

Entry ofJrldgm~n(. and this .court: hav.ing previCfusJy granted

Vo.li~y

COUnTY '3' Mt1Iiol'ljot

Summtlr), Juilgme.>71 in -its Memorandum DeciskiD entered.un .january {, 2011;

NOW. 1lfEREFORE1 IT. IS H:ERE-BY ORDERED~ ADJUDGED, AND DEeRE}?;!):
.

.

,

l.

ThatjUdgm~nt

2.

That aU of Plaintiffs' cbums agaiIlSt the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.

is entered. in faypr ofthe Defendant und against tht'! ,P:131nliffi;; and

D."\TED this ,.........,.... day of ~~ua.ry. 2Qll.

MICHAEL R, MCLAUGHLIN
Distric.1 C-Q'Urt Judge

JL'I)G~tt::NT

Page l

~G9t!.t_lo590l3_l

Received Time Jan. 13.

4:40PW
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CLERK'S CERTIFtCA TE OF SERVICE

I hereby CCt'Lify that on 1he .M'_ _ day of Jasr..usry•. 21)11. a true andcorr.ect copy of the
fhregoil'\i was SCI'..,ed 'upon the following in.dividua.l(!I) by the nle.ans indicated:

8
o

Jed MamJllfu1ng.

Vi',;t\)r Villegas
E\'aIlS Keane. LL?

1405 West Main
P,O. B.ox 959
Boise, ID 8370'! -09$9

v.~. Muil, po$tDge prel'ajd
ExpreSH'Mail

Hand Delivery

8

E·Mail

o

V.S. Mail, poatag:e prepaid

Fac.dani1c

jDlanwarlng@evlmskeunc.com
V\ri rle~as@.tCVI.1n5keWte.oom

Matthew C. VlHliams
Vancy COUl)ty P~·o~cut..illi Attorney
1>.0. Box 1350
C8S~de,

lD 836·{ 1
mwiUiams@cCl.voIJt.j'jd·,us

(,;h:ristophE:r H. Mc},(:!.r
M~rtln C. Hendlickson.
GIVENS l)l)RS.U.::V I..!..P

§o

Exptcs.s Mail
Hand D~Hv~ry.
1· ilcsinli1.e
E-Mail

[J

U.S, Mali. po~c·.prepaid
F..tpress MaH
Hand Delivery
Fi:tosimHe

Boise,.I1.) 83701 ··2720

§

chcis.meyer@gi \1cn~'Purslcy.c()m

O.

601 W. Bannock. St
P.O. Se-x 2720
mdl(i:9giwnsvu~fey,c.:om

E~Mail

j\RCHIE·N. BANS'URY
Clerk of th: District Court

By: ........__ ........._........._.._.........._......._........._... _....... _...........
De~)ll:y

p~ ~.

JVDCML...·r
1DEli !)..2_1059G33_ ,

Received Time Jar. 13.

Clel'k.

4:40~M
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AR
BY_~___~"",,,,~,",".DEPUTY

Miatthew C~ Willicu::ns. rSB #6271
Valley County 'PrO~'\ltiug Attoma}'
P.O. B();t 13.50
Cascade, lD :8361.1
Tolcp:hooe: (~08) 38.2-7120
Fllciimile: (208) '382'-1124

mwiUiar:na@oo.va11ey:id.US
Christopher. H. Meyer, ISB 1fo4461
Marlin C.Hendri:ekson.1SB #5816
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
60 J W. Da.nco.ck St.
POst Office Box 1.720
Boise, ldsbo 83701~2720
Tet~hone~ t08·3M 1200
M

208"::'88~J30()
~sm.eyer@.l!ivonspursley.co1lt

.Facsimile:

lnoh@g.ivensp'Ut,ley.C()nl
Att.omcys tQr Det'e:ulam
.I?-( l'HE

DlSTRIC'r COURT OF 11·m POtJ.R:TH JtJDIC.IAL· DlSTRICT OF

'rHE STATE OF !DAltO.1N ."ND FORTHE COUNTY Of' VALLEY

BUCKSKIN P.ROPERTIES, INC.! an Idailo

CS'Hl No.

CV 2009-554

Ct)rporation, .and TlMBE.RLlNE

DEVELOPMENT, LLC~ an I&iho Limited
'V.~LLIY COL'Nt~ts RuPOHSK TO

Liability Company,

Plaintiff&.

MOTlOH JoUR 'P.lUtTJAL·SUM.,.\olUY
JUDGM;DlT

v.
VALL-BY COU~'TY, a political sv.-"xii·vision
of the State of ldar.o.

Defendant

---........-.--........ ..- - ~

v .u.u;y COVfV'fY~S 1lF.5fOl'fSf. ·roM.oTloN fOR PAanAS. St.'MMAJt \" JilDQMElU

Page L

10015-,UOK73IL$

Re:eiHd TIme

h~.

13.

4:43PM
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COMES NOW, ~ant Villey County ecoumy"), by and thI,)ugb its und~ijJ1ed

attorneys ofrcc:o-rd, and submits tbi3~to PlaiDtiU,' Morton../iJr PI~UarS1liJmUl-""
JS4dgmllt-l

("Plaintiffs' Motian")dated Januery 10, 2011. PlaintiftS seek Imtry ofpurtial

summary ju4gment in. their favor on Count 1 of their ComplatJtt.Count t tleeks (ieQ'a,-.tory

On Octob~ t 4.20 lO•. theCuunty tiled Val/ttY Cou.n(y '" .Malia_for Summary JudgmeKI

("'Summary JudgmentMotJOll~I)~. whlch ~ughtjudgnullt agCinJt the PloUn'if.ts on aU CO.UAts on
jw:isdi~dooa1.and Other grourtds. On

Jenaazy 1. 20 J i, the C,'JUn entered Jts M~'"

DecLfi!»l Re:~feruJant'3 MOlitmfo,.. Summary Judgmen! ("Decision;. granting!he County's
motion in full .. Although the ('our! folmd jt un~saty to addr'es$ each of the defensesmised

by the County to 'PwnUffii' suit, !;he e1fecl of the Decision wM to tWJy resolve this litiga.tion by

dismissing fue suit i.n its entirety on statUte of' UmitatioIUI glt>ulllb.
In'Ught of the Court~s. t:io.ding that Piaintitfs·· claims arc bmoQ by the statuto';..,!
limitations. there is no basi$ tbr.pztting,any·reliefill Plaintiffi' faWI. Having m1$Sed r.neir
filing deadline; Piainnffs are entitled. to nCi'.relie[ .m IUercate filil18: today. the COlmty is

MOreover. Pl1DiltiftS· request is moot and unripe.. The County bas hriofCd tb:is o;l(t~ively

arnl ,nffitrienUy befOre, and wiU not repeat it hete. suffice· it to. lay t:hat '& declaratory judgment
with respca t\).fees alnady paid.1'bat ~r; nob-ru:ovenibie· 00 jari.8diction.a18l'0I.lDCb woUld be a
.pointl.1S ~:untluthor!%ed judicii! t.XterciJe. [n'.&. WQ~ it.is moot. As tot' Clny fOC\S that miaht (\1

miSbt nQt. be required.in the futllnl,; those isHlft are patently unripe.

VALU" COUNTY" lU:&~TOMOnO:N FOR p.A.RTIAL SUMNAAV J1).~
1~15-2,_105&730...~

~eceived

T me Jan,13.

4:43 PM
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Finany. given th¢pc4turc Qfthi!J~ 11.'\ framed hy the Motioa f~r SummlU")' Judgment, a

ruling l\n tbemerits,)fP~a1ntift$' elairns would bepttmllturo even ifmc cue'were.stiU alive..
Simply put, if the COWlty~ $ motion had been dcni.1d,. tho next· step woUld be to &;0 to trial at

which poilU Tbere would have been.:furt:her fa<:tual devd.c;ipmeat and llpI argum.c;at.as 10 the
klgsli'ty of tho fees in Cf'.1estion.1 That nt:.y.e.r happened. Alld it ~not happen mow. gi v,an the
COIoltt'sDec:isioa defen;niJU.Il8 that it i. without' j'Uti84idion to tvach the ~tI', It'!. o.thor wordl;,

even if it were l'ipe and riot moot and not liu~ject,to diWIl"!£1t on at8t\Jt~ af"Hmitutions grounds,

----.-.~

-.----

..

I Thts il' no a~ .n,.., Countyaddm.scld tho /lltqWllCIa& of il!lllUl:ll in i~ bru:f1Di~
In Id4bo...ertain. fno..pilCf _ ~ illegal ~ under Idaho's
(~l1ItilUdaQ I.II1teIt iii:JpoIIed. .pa"Ii.&&nt W Q~" coD1.P'~t. with abe. ldabu
Dev;:lopmetJt f.l:tlpICtF-:e.AI:1

('·IDtFA".tdlthoC~n,tl1..32011'06?·82Hl.,

Va-Uoy CflIUiIt), did. Me ~t ati Il)IJ."A-~mplilmt ontizluGGe. ~1Uk: 11 bc·li~Y!:d,
il\.g00d
tbahQ~'wu'ieq'llir.ed. ~ern t.wlIl;ilt mvoi\:lnf . '
XJU.l.IiJcipalities ba'\'e ~cel5fut1y,~ impa.cl &es, ACCOIdWC1y. tC 'be. on
610 11ft Ii~ the <"'owd:y i,,, MW'~~.ct\liBtment Ilf I'l MW mWA.eo~\i!lnt.
O~I!. ~wi:lt9..M;1f1t~~

mtb

~Yr~,.gl:.dlc·mHmJDJIYPtYdoet¥hl ~moaow.d·~
:~~bwk>n·~. fWl~lCQl¥!i~A&1~!.. mg[~

C'f:~~.~~lJcgJ,OO;lx ..A&t H

mse1rt:l.l.tm!!CJte.!'i! ~

ill~8!l..L~.. 'fhcu;II01tfon ~ iQ 1be pedCtiIIe ~.' whethcrPWntitf£
pmpoS4d lItnVor etTtn jpto die ~ 'Nilho!lt o~1ioil,. ~ted ~
CUti witbo"" ~~ avo-ide" ~u 1(1 mac thtI:DIIe
udJ;:a.iDiatrati\·eiy".wI waitM 100 linqJ to..:bat!eogc.
.\lUella ~ tg do 'with dLMl 'PPJlCC'J. PlAiIlda·ha.d pkcty uf
proccu. ~. part oflf;le. County's ric_e i, that PtaiDttffi failed j:(\ e1Cba\.~t

'nu•

Illo rem~ .~Je to the:m. "'aindftl' 1O-uUec1.dI.lepm_;.", ie lwed
01\ the ~_,I.bac ibe County'dtould Ii8w ~ann:>IF li,.'C9mpli&nt
~tfilct·o~ aad.1h.1,. j(it lI&d Cone .:10', tbey 'NQlll.d baw 'beell'li~

cvar'~~, a.uteo~ ~lIIX~ l~·II~or.dim1!.l;. under
lDlfA·. Thut. the questWn ill, wven,tbatV'a1ley COuoty"docwtld. DOl to CQaCtlll1
(\tdill~e lUlckr lOIF'A IWtbe t\1M, Will it mlawful (~r it to - . I CUP
~iriDg ~ Alre~l?
~ JllW:ly a .fate- 'COnSOIll.tilXlll.iew qUCIfton
wb1¢t,' i.f~ in .at1inn'-".e~ wu~r.t\... ri:lO tc .ua.U4C6W1U~ per
J(! re.au1atm}'~ UDder the Ii~ rmd fedeiJl t'Ofll'd1utio.tu. ~l1J1i.~

nat

JKoOCf to· rwh.ih~tI.oI.,fbh lijllW jt rIXl,.DJSI m.u&~~1PB II!K,wU\,
,~~~

.

VallfIJI' C~urlY'.r R"f'tv Rrlli(fbt Suppon (ifMolio"..for:S'IMI'lItlY)'Jt~othtas.1-2 (Nov. 10,2(10) (emphQi.
~lio4).

V ALUl-Y CutrNTV ~$ bSH»flll TO'M0110N POll PA.Iilt1A.l. ScrMMAIl'i JuOOMDIT
10916.-2~..J06S1:30~

Re c e j wed Ti me h

~.

13.

4: 4: PM
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No,! can the Court reach tl;tc: iUepl tc..'<. iSllue (~n the basis of admiuion. The Court $tatC5

on pup: 6 of its Decisioll that:, ~'n appears aom the recmd that Val1ey Coumy did· not fu}low the
provi!iiom det forth in rIDIFA] and VaUey County ooncwes as much,'" However. Valley CQUnty
W.IJS ~tul

to notOl.)nce(1e that· anyoNts ac.:ttons w«c l1CtlUlUy in violation of rrUFA or any other·

provision'of Idaho law;2 Instead. in itsbrlefiri& and at orrJ 1IIlgu~t,. ihe C-mmty acknowledged

County eldvisod the CoiD1. 1hct it is·.exploringadO'pti.~n

0"

8. new

ordil'lBnce with. these concertls in

mind. This dez:uorurtretta that lbe·C.()UDty is not defiil'ltly thumbingits nOBC at these

same· as a legal admission. Aca:.ltdingl,Y. the Court bus'no basi.s torendel' a n.r11."1g OD th.c leplity
ofthe CO~ty'3 action in 1m maner.

----...

-.-~.-

2 TlIe Coumy f~tly ~ IDal it baa M,t ~ _on!i~o 1Mt comptlM 'Mta IDlP,\. Ylllt~
Coamtr '8:Srale»ItllIl.o/Mtu.eriQl.F«1s iIf 5UPPUI1·DlMorfmf fo,. ~'u.lNH~'t)l JlJIignl~tt', " 61. 62. BIU IbM 40ce IlGt
eqlW(110 an i!ldm.iJ$ion Ibfu i{5 i>lcms:I.mi and m . aOtiom viollr.ted lOlFA. Not..u f~ impollCd dIariz;g ihc W1.II:"
ui' pldRi"l attd 7.ming~ IIA mrFA-eompH&ntm\i~ Whether tJl4 fcc. at iJ*'Ie ~ wvr.e ~'Y 'll'itNll
!be COWUy'6 polke pO'WllJ':QTW'efC ilkpl tllX{)8' ill an :Is. !bat ba,·l1tI\'t\rbeen brielbd this pro~. 0.11 ~
oth« ha;Jd, tho COWltY.1.t ac1t laoo."iIa the WIut. iQ~ttbt:ief. tht-CMLnty.$~ "Wba. utiot!s:1hJa .po_tills aDd··1he
CoullCY migbctakct ill cbc:.ftir.ure 'regsrrling yet--tO-be ~tiat~ ii:Itore road dneklPl'DlCDlagr~ is pJmJily
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,

Jed Manwaring lSB #3040
Victor VWegas ISB# 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main

P. O. Bo:x 959

Case No.._ _--'JnstNo._"t""--

Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-maU: j maDtVarlng@evanskellne.com
VviIlegos@evaDskeane.com

Filed

A.M

P.M

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
i

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corperatieo, and TIMBERLINE

~aH No. CV-2009-SS4-C

DEVELOP'MENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO

YALLEY COUNTY'S MOnON' FOR
ENTRY OF .JUDGMENT FILED

Plaintiff,

.JAl'''UARY 13, :Z01l

vs.
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision
of tbe State of Idaho.

Defendant
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, subm.it tlJis
Objection to VaHey County's Motion for Entry of Judgmellt Filed January 13, 2011. as follows:

Although it appears that this Court may have beld that it granted ::he County's motion in
full. it did not fully decide all the claims for reliefthat:Plaintiffs' have sought in their Complaint.

When multiple claims for relief are presented in an acticn, an adjudication of less than all the
claims does not terminate any of the remaining claimS. lmernational Business Machines Corp

v. Lawhorn. 106 Idaho 194, 196, 677 P.2d 507, 509 (Ct. App. 1984). Such an adjudication is

PLAll\R ec e i ve d -;; f~ ecJ an. j 4. J
JA.i~VARi" 13, Z011 • 1

4: 43P~UNTY' s MOT[O~ FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED
.
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interlocutory, subject to revision at any time before entry of a judgment disposing of all
remaining clall:ns. Id. Citing Baker v. Pendry, 98 Idaho 745, 572 P.2d 179 (1977),
Here, Plaintiffs specifically asked Meier Count One of its Complaint" among other things.
for a declaration that Valley County cannot circumvent the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act.
Idaho Code § 67-8201 et seq. by forcing developers to pay impact fees monies under the guise of
a Road Development Agreement. Plaintiffs also asked under its prayer for relief that this Court
enter a declaration that Timberline Development LLC cannot be required to pay fees for the

.

proportionate share of road improvement costs a~butable to the remaining pbases of the
Meadows at West Mountain (i.e. Phases 4 through 6) ..
Final plat for Phase 4 through 6 of the Meadows at West Mountain bas not been granted

artd the County. through

i~

Road Superintendent Jerry Robinson. has told Plaintiffs'

representatives that it must enter into a road

developm~.J.t

agreement and pay fees calculated

under the 2007 Capital Improvements Program beforJ any final plat approval. See Aff~avit of
Mike Mat/hot

mi;

4-8. Affidavit of Larry Mangum 1Ml4-S; Affidavit of Joe Pachner

W 13-16.

Final plat is a necessary approval that is granted by the County Commissioners and, without that
approval, final plat cannot be recorded. See Gordon Cruickshank Deposition pg. 27, L. 18 thru
pg. 28, L. 17.
I

The County did not present any evidence on 'SUJTl['lary judgment refuting the facts set
I

forth in the Mailhot, Mangum and Pachner affidivil~.

Simply put. unless this Court's

Memor3Jldum Decision was also intended to grant partial summary judgment on Count One of
Plaintiffs' Complaint, there still remains a claim not fully adjudicated. Therefore, the County's
proposed Motion for Entry of Judgment is either incoqect or i$ premature. Either way, Pla.intiffs
object to Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgmtffit filed January 13,2011 and request oral
argument.

PLAIl\R ece i vee

Tim eCJ an. 14. 1 4: 43 PMJNTY'S MonON FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED
i

JANUARY 13,2011 - 2

5-1-1

. .
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that this Court deny Valley County's
Motion for Entry of Judgment.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2011.
EVANS KEANE LLP

By

y~~~

Victor Vi1lega ,Of the FIrm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 HEREBY CERTIfY that on this 14th day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimik (208) 382-7124

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

[X] U.S. Mail
[X] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

[X] U.S. Mail

[X] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTlONTO VALLEY COUNTY'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FILED
JANUARY 13,2011 - 3
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Jed Manwaring ISB #113040
Vietor ViDegulSU 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 Weet MaiD
P. O. Bos959
Boile, Idaho 83'701..0959
TeJephouc: (lOS) 384-1800
Faaimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mai1: jmuwaring@muukeane.colD

IlJ002iOll

CaseNo"'_ _-..,Ilnst.fIlO._ __
Filed
A.M O?
_J'r.

14

VviDegu@cv&Dlknne.com

Attorneys lor Plaiatif&

IN THE nrsTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. AD

Idaho Corpol'1ltin, and nMBER.I..INE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Umited
Liability Companyt
Plaiatiff,

CaN No. CV-2009-554-C
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
'RECONSIDERATIONI
AMENDMENT

YI.

VALLEY COUNTY, a poDtiwnbdirisioD
of the SAtc 01 Idaho.
DefcndaDt.
Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and TImberline Development, LLC, by and throu.gh
their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, move thls Honorable Cowt to reconsider and/or

amend those portions of the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant)s Motion for
Summary Judgment dated January 7, 2011 to the extent 1hey are deemed to grant summary

judgment in favor of Defendant Valley County.

n

Received
Time-hn.
1:30FM
....VUV1"
... 0 ... ~lwvl\c.,t/.l.c.MrrON/AMEND'MEJI."'· ,

PLAfW. u·,.,
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This Motion is further made and based upon the files and records in the above.entitled
action, lOgetherwith Plaintiffs' Memorandum filed herewith. Oral argument is requested.
Dated this 21st day of January. 2011.

EVANS KEANE LLP
By,

j/~~~

Victor VillegasJ(Jt11efiIm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTmCATE Of SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of January, 2011, a 1:nte and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to~ by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:

Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120

[X} U.S. Mail
[Xl Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery

[ 1 Hand Delivery

Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendric.kson
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise. ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimi1e: (208) 388-1300

[X] U.S. Mail
[Xl Fax
[ ,] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Victor Villegas
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Jed Mauwariq ISH N3040
Vidor VUlepllSBN 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main
P. O. Box 959
Bolle, Idaho 83701·0959
Telephone: (201) ]84..1100

8Uhr,li~t=n,
Deput'

~y ~1-I-lW"~.:..:.._ _ _

FaatmBe: (108) 345-3514
e-maD! j .....Dwlll'iDl@ena.k....e.mm

vviIIegU@evamkeaae.com
Attora~

for P....timI

IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICl OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. aD
Idaho Cerpontion, ADd 11MBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, lID Id.aIM I.Jmlied
Liability Company.

PlahatHf,

Cue No. CV-1OO9..s54-C
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Oil

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR.
RECONSIDERATIONI
AMENDMENT

v•.
VALLEY COUNTY, a politicalsabdMJioD
of the State of Idaho.

Defea.daat.
Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC, ("Plaintiffs), by

and through their attorneys of record, Evans Keane LLP, move this Honorable Court to
reconsider andlor amend the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for
Sununary Judgment dated January 7,2011,

MEMORANDUM rN SUPPORT OF PLAIN11FFS' MOTION
FORRIReceiveo TimenJan. 21.)1 1:30PM
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I.

lNTRODUCI10N

Plaintiffs move this Court to reconsider and/or amend its entry of summary judgment in

favor of Defendant Valley County and against P1aintiffs. In its January 7, 2011 Mem.orandmn
Decision Re: Defendant's ~otion for SummaI)' Judgment (the "Memorandum Decision")~ the

Court entered summary judgment in favor of Valley County and agairu;t Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs'
claim for inverse condemnation. The Court ruled that Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim

accrued on October 24, 2005, when Valley County
way to under the Capital

(the "Meadows'').

ac~d

Plaintiffs' dedication of a right of

Contribution Agreement for Phase 1 of the Meadows at West MOW1.tain

(See Memorandum Decision, p. S.).

As a result. the Court ruled that

Plaintiffs' claims were not brought within the four-year statute of limitation for inverse
condemnation.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs seek reconsideration andIor an

amendment from this Court with regard to its Memorandum Decision.
JL
A.

ARGUMENT

Staudard for Motion for RecouJderation and/or AmeadmeD'L

As threshold matter, Plaintiffs may seek reconsideration of this Court's ruling under

Idaho Ru1e of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) or 59(e} depending on the nature of the Court's
Memorandum Decision.

Under either rule, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration andlor

amendment is timely and proper.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lJ(a}(2)(B)) governs motions for reconsideration of

interlocutory orders. Rule 11(a)(2}(B) provides a district court with authority to reconsider
interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not been entered. A final judgment is one that
disposes of the controversy or detennines the litigation on its merits. Evans State Bank

'V.

Skeen,30 Idaho 703, 704. 167 P. 1165, 1166 (1917). A judgment or order that is incomplete,

MEMORANDtJ).( iN SUP'PORT OF PLAIN!1FFS' MOTION

FORlUReceivea Til'imJan. 21.)1 1:3C':>M

01/21/2011 14:41 FAX 2083453514
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while it may settle some of the rights of the parties, but leaves some issues remaining in the
adjudica.tion of the parties' rights, is interlocutory. Id. When multiple claims for relief are
presented in an action, an adjudication of less than all the claims does not terminate any of the
remaining claims ilnd is interlocutory and subject to revision at any time prior to entry of a fmal
jUdgment. Internationtll

Bu.ri.ne$$

Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn 106 Idaho 194. 196, 677 P.2d

501, 509 (Ct. App. 1984).
On the other hand, Rule 59(e) allows a district court to modify or atnend a. final order if

a motion is filed within fourteen (14) days of the order. RuJe 59(e) affords the Court an
opportunity to correct errors of fact or law short of an appeal. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263,
646 P.2d 1030,1034 (CtApp.1982) (quoting First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,570 P.2d
276 (1977». Since Rule 59(e) motions are brought after final judgment, new evidence may not
be presented. Id.
In this case there is a dispute between the parties whether the Court's Memorandum

Decision disposes of all of Plaintiffs' claims or only Plaintiffs' claims based on inverse
condemnation. Since Plaintiffs brought more than one claim in this matter, it is PlailJtiifs'
position that the Memorandum Decision is not a ftnal order, which is the position set forth in
Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment. filed with this Court on

January 14, 20] 1. Regardless, this motion is brought within fourteen (14) days of tbe Courfs
Memorandum Decision and Plaintiffs do not attempt to introduce new evidence in relation. to this
motion. Therefore, this motion is properly before the Court whether under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) as a

motion for reconsideration or under Rule 59(e) as a motion to modify or amend.

MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RIR ec e i ved T i mel]lJan, 21,)} ': 30PM
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Plaintiffa l Cltdm tor bv.ne CoadelUatio. o. Pbues lad 3 of the
Meadow. if TiJDeIy.

The Meadows is a multi-phase residential development. VitaUy important to the Coun's
decision on Plaintiffs' inverse condelllllation claim is that each and every phase of a multi-phase

development requiTeS a separate approval of final plat by the County Commissioners. See 67·
6504 (the governing board only, not a planning and zoning commission, has full authority to
"finally approve land subdivisions").

Valley County's Land Use Development Ordinance

outlines the procus for obtaining PUD approvals, each ofwhieh is approved separately starting
with Concept Approval and Ending with Final Plat approval. (See Affidavit of Joseph Pachner.

Ex. A.). Nothing is more telling of this fact than the existence of two separate impact fee

charges to Plaintiff" &ld twu

~o/:!.t¢

coatacwts that providd for the coHecting· of the: -illegal-

impact fee. Furthennore without that approvw. final plat cannot be recorded md a developer

ca:n:oot go fotward with a development. (See Deposition of Gordon Cruickshank ("Cruickshank

Depo."), p. 27, l. 18 -po 28, 1. 17., attached to the Affidavit of Victor S. Villegas in Suppon of
PlaintiiPs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (Villegas Affidavit). Ex. A).
Valley County did not collect its illegal impact fee for Phases 2 and 3 pursuant to the

Capital Contribution Agreement for Phase 1. There was no relationship between the right ofwa.y
tnnlsferred to Valley County pursuant to the Phase 1 Capital Contribution Agreement and the

illegal impact fees paid pursuant to the Road Development Agreement for Phases 2 and 3.
Simply put. the fees demanded by Valley County are a separate impact fee assessment This
assessment is

i!I.

$epsrate taking with its own statute of limitations accrual analysis.

Each

application for final plat stands on its own merits. In order to proceed with final plat for Phases 2
and 3 of the Meadows, Pllintiffs were required to obtain separate approvals independent of
Phase 1. Valley County also required Plaintiffs to enter into an entirely separate contract. the
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Road Development Agreement, and to pay illegal impact fees under the Road Development
Agreement for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows.
Finally. impact fees are only collected after it is determined that an impact will actually

occur. Plaintiffs had no obligation to proceed with Phases 2 and 3 after completing Phase 1.
Had Plaintiffs elected not to proceed with. subsequent phases, there could be no impact and,
therefore, no illegal fee charged. Since Plaintiffs had DO obligation to continue on with Phases 2
and 3 of the Meadows and bad no obligation to pay any impact fee until they sought final plat
approval, no taking could ha.ve occurred until the illegal impact fee aerualJy was paid on
December IS, 2005.

This is clear under established Idaho law on inverse condemnation.

Plaintiffs could not have brought their inverse condemnation claim seeking the plI.yment of just
.'

compensation for Phases 2 and 3 at the time Valley County accepted the dedica.tion of right of

way for Phase 1. A party cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has
actually been a takins of property. KMST,

LLe v.

County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d

56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jejfe,.son County, 131 Idaho 771, 53 PJd 828 (2002». Until
Plaintiffs actually paid the money, there was no taking. Had Plaintiffs flIed a laW1Uit for inverse
condemnation at the time 1hey signed !he Road Development Agreement, but before they
actually paid the illegal impact fee under the Road Development Agreement, their taking claim
would not have been ripe. Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reconsider or amend its ntlina
with regard to Plaintiffs' claim for invenic condemnation for the illegal impact fee taken by

Valley County for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows.
The same holds true for Phases 4 through 6 of the Meadows. Plaintiffs have not yet paid

the impact fee tequired by Valley County or sought approval for final plat for Phases 4 through
6. It is undisputed. however, that the payment of the illegal impact fee remains a condition of

519

0112112011 14; ~Z FAX 2083453514:

~009i0i1

£VANS XEA.\"E LLP

final plat approval. In fact, Valley County. through its Road Superintendent Jerry Robinson. has

iniormed Plaintiffs' representatives that Plaintiffs must enter into a road development agreement
and pay fees calculated Ullder the 2007 Capital Improvements Program before fmal plat for
Phases 4 through 6 can be approved.. (See Affidavit of Mike Mailhot", 4-8; Affidavit of Larry
Mangum. ft 4·5; and Affidavit of Joseph Pachner, "13-16.). Under the Court's current ruling,
if Plaintiffs desire final plat approval for Phases 4 through 6 of the Meadows, they have no

choice but to pay the illegal impact fee without any hope of recourse :fur inverse condemnation
because the accrual date on the claim relates back: to Phasc ]. This is not the law in Idaho.
Establi shed Idaho law requires that a talcing actually occur before a property owner can maintain
an action for inverse condemnation.

C.

TIle Five (5) Year Stato.tc ufLimitatiou in Idaho Code SedioD 5-%1' Based
aD • WriUeD Contract Apply PJaintillil' Declar:am.,. .Judgment Claim••

One of Plaintiffs' claims in Count 1 of its Complaint is for a declaratory judgment from
this Court that Valley COlmty' s Road Development Agreements requiring payment of impact
fees are illegal contracts and void because Valley County uses the agreements to circumvent
Idaho law on impact fees. Set Complaint,

ft 18,

21; Prayer for Relief, .. B.

The Road

Development Agreement is a written contract. The applicable statute of limitations states:
Within five (5) years:
An action u.pon any contract, obligation or liability fOWlded upon an instrument in

writing.
The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in the name
or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor interposed as a
defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state although such
limitations may have become fully operative as a defense prior to the adoption of
this amendment.
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I.C. § 5-216. The Court indicated, however, in footnote 1 of its Memorandum. Decision that the
five year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-216 is inapplicable to this action

because there has been no claim for breach of contract and there is no evidence in the record of a
breach of contract.
Plaintiffs. agree with the

COUrt

that they have not claimed a breach of contract in this

matter. The statute of limitations. however, is not limited to ai:tions for

II

breach of contract.

Section .5-216 states that: "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing" must be brouiht within five (5) years. There is no limitation 0"(' restriction
in the statute that the limitations period applies only to an action "upon any con1:r8.d' for breach
of contract. The limitations period applies to any action founded upon an instrument in writing.

In this ease plaintiffs have sought a declaratory judgment with regard to the validity and
enforceability of written contracts, the Road Development Agreements, A claim of breach is not
necessary in order for the five (5) year limitations period to apply. Plaintiff's respectfully ask this
Court to reconsider andJor clarify or modify its judgment to the extent the January 7, 2011

Memorandum Decision may dispose of legitimate clairm upon a. written contract.

Since

Plaintiffs' declaratory jUdgment claims .have been brought within the five (5) year limitations

period for claims on a written instrument, those claims should not be dismissed simply because
the claims do not involve a claim for breach of contract.

m.

CONCLUSIOl!

For the foregoing reasons, PJaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reconsider and/or
amend its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judament dated

January 7,2011.
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Dated this 21 Sl day of January, 2011.

BVANS KEANE r.tl'

By

Y~r~

Victor Villegas,

the Fum

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OJ! SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2lSl day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person

in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams

ValJey County Prosecutor
P.O. Bux 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
Telephone: (208)382-7120
Facsimile; (208) 382-7124
Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens 'Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, 10 83101-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388·]300

[XJ U.S. Mail

[X] Fax
[ ] OVernight Deiivery

[ J Hand Delivery

[XJ U.S. Mail
[X] Fax

[ J Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Victor Villegas
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Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villegas ISBN 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main
P. O. Box 959
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: Jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
Vvillegas@evanskeane.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV -2009-554-C
STIPULATION TO MOVE
FEBRUARY 17,2011 MOTIONS
HEARING FROM VALLEY
COUNTY TO ADA COUNTY

vs.
VALLEY COUNTY~ a political sUbdivision
of the State of Idaho.
Defendant.

COME NOW Plaintiffs Buckskin Propenies, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC,
and Defendant VaHey County, by and through their respective attorneys of record, and hereby
stipulate and agree that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Reconsideration/Amendment, and Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment scheduled to be
heard on February 17,2011 at 3:00 p.m. before the Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin shall be
heard in Ada County on the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2011 at the hour of_: _ _.m.

STIPULATION TO MOVE FEBRUARY 17.2011 MOTIONS HEARlNG FROM VALLEY COUNTY TO ADA
COUNTY -1

523

2011-01-28 17:0053 (GMT)

OATED this

~

18665753,e2 From: liSahughes lisahughes

day of January. 20J 1.

bVANS-KEANE

.By

LLP

Ywt1Y~

Vi(~tor

VIU¢gas

Attorneys. for· Pwintift's
DATED this

~<L.~y Qf January. 2Q 11.
GIVENS PURSLEY. ,ll.P

By~A({Jc
Martin C. Bendric~soJ)
Attorneys ·tor Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE,
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INTRODUCTION

This is Defendant Valley County's (,'County") response to Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration/Amendment (,;Reconsideration Motion'") and Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion/or Reconsideration/Amendment ("Reconsideration Memorandum") both
dated January 21, 2011.
In addition to the Reconsideration Motion., Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. and
Timberline Development, LLC ("'Plaintiffs") have filed a Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment
and Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion/or Entry 0/Judgmentfiled January}3,

2011. They re-trace much of same ground again in their Motion
Fees and Plaintiffi' Memorandum in Opposition

(0

/0

Disallow Costs and Attorney

Valley County's Memorandum o/Costs and

Statement in Support
All of Plaintiffs' post-<iecision filings share a common theme. They seek to reo-hash the
same issues that they have briefed, argued, and lost. all the while driving up attorney fees and
wasting the Court's time. This is old ground. Plaintiffs' continued churning of this case should

be taken into account in consideration of the County's pending Memorandwn of Costs.
In their Reconsideration Motion, Plaintiffs press two basic points. First, they contend
that the Court should have engaged in a separate statute of limitations analysis for each of the
three phases of the development. Second, they repeat the arguments they have made before with
respect to the state's five~year statute oflimitations.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAL~TIFFSt MOTION IS PROPERLY PRESENTED UNDER RULE

11(A)(2)(8).

At the outset of their Reconsideration Memorandum, Plaintiffs go through contortions to
justity why their motion is proper under either Idaho R. Civ. P. II(a)(2)(B) or 59(e). Their

argument is both wrong and unnecessary.
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Plaintiffs have every right to file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 11 (a}(2)(B), but
not for the reasons they say. The rule authorizes motions with respect to "interlocutory orders."
The Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Decision") dated January 7.2011 is an interlocutory order for the simple reason that it was
issued before entry of judgment. See. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct.
App.2006). Plaintiffs' contention that it is interlocutory because the Court failed to adjudicate
all ofPlaintiffi' claims is wrong. The Court did adjudicate them all; it threw them all out
because the Plaintiffs violated the statute of limitations. But that does not make it a final
judgment. It is an order, not a judgment. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(a).
As for Plaintiffs' reference to Rule 59( e), that ruJe al lows for amendment of a judgment,

and, as oftoday, there is no judgment to amend. Consequently, Rule 59(e) has no applicability
here.
II.

THE FOUR· YEAR STATUTE OF LlI\UTA TIONS RAN ON ALL PHASES OF THE

DEVELOPMENT AS SOON AS PLAINTIFFS BECAME AWARE THAT A FEE WOULD BE
IMPOSED.

The Meadows has been developed in phases.' Plaintiffs insist that the Court is required
to separately address the statute of limitations for each phase, and that the statute has run only on
Phase 1. This is wrong, and the reason is simple. Plaintiffs knew on or before October 25, 2004
that they would have to pay a fee on all phases.
As the Court recognized in its Decision Memorandum, it makes no difference when a
particular fee is quantified or when it is actuaIJy paid. The clock begins running when "the full

I Phase 1 was subject to the Capital Contribution Agreement of July 26. 2004. Phases 2
and 3 were subject to the Road Development Agreement of September 26, 2005. The parties
have not yet entered into a development agreement regarding Phases 4-6. Phases 1-3 have gone
to fina1 plat. Phases 4-6 have not.
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extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent." McCuskey
v. Canyon County Comm 'rs ("McCuskey 11'), 128 Idaho 213,217,912 P.2d ]00, 104 (1996).

The Idaho Supreme Court's reference to "full extent" in McCuskey II does not mean that
the damages must be quantified, just that the plaintiff be aware ofthe impending loss. McCuskey
II was a temporary taking case. The Court rejected McCuskey's argument that the taking did not

occur until it could be quantified. "Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount
of damages cannot bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of action is determined."
McCliskey II, 128 Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105.
The law on this is consistent and settled. In another case decided the same year, the
Idaho Supreme Court explained that the statute begins to run "when the impainnent was of such
a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's property interest became
apparent:' Wadsworth v. Idaho Department o/Transportation. 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d I,
5 (1996). In Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333,1338 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the statute ran on the date of a meeting between parties at which time there was
"recognition of the severity of the problem." In another case, the Court has explained, 'The
actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detennination, is to be fixed at the
point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial
interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100
Idaho 667, 671, 603 P .2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (inverse condemnation based on airport expansion).
In yet another case, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the statute ofIimitations on inverse
condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with
the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease. ·'We affinn the district
court's detennination that the full extent ofthe Hacrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the

V ALLEY COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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property became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the
impainnent constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed
an agreement promising to pay roya1ties and rents on the sand and graveL Therefore, the

Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by l.e. § 5-224."

Harris)/. State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401. 405,210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009).
In light of these precedents, tne County is at a loss to understand why Plaintiffs continue
to harp on this. It became apparent to Plaintiffs at some time in 2004 (more than four years
before the Complaint was filed on December 1,2009) that the County intended to charge a road
improvement fee on all phases.
How was this apparent? In many ways? First, on March 29,2004, Plaintiffs themselves
included a Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement in their application filed with the Planning
3

and Zoning Commission. The paragraph on "Road Improvements" says "Developer agrees to
pay a road impact fee as established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the
Valley County Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit. ..." This
was reflected as well in the [mpact Report also attached to the Application. Exhibit A to
Appendix C and Appendix D to Exhibit 2 to Affidavit 0/ Cynda Herrrick in Support 0/ Motion

for Summary Judgment (Oct. 14,2010). Thus, by their very own statements, Plaintiffs knew
about the road fees even before they filed their Application.

2 The

items listed below are a subset ofthe events documenting that Plaintiffs were aware
from the outset that a road improvement fee would be imposed on aU phases of their
development. Others are discussed in Valley County's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment dated October 14, 2010.
The Application is dated "March 2004" on the footer. The cover letter is dated March
24,2004. The "Acceptance" by Jack Charters is dated March 29, 2004. Mr. Charters also
signed the Application on March 29, 2004. The Application was actually filed on April ], 2004.
3
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Second, Plaintiffs entered into a Capital Contribution Agreement for Phase] on July 26,
2004. Exhibit I to Affidavit of Cynda Herrrick in Support ofMotion for Summary Jluigment
(Oct. 14, 2010). This Agreement set out the formula that would be applied on a per unit basis
($1,844). From this, Plaintiffs easily could detennine what the fee was likely to be on
subsequent phases,
Third, On October 25, 2004, Plaintiffs actually conveyed the property (via fInal plat
approval) to the County, as required for Phase 1. Exhibit 15 to Affidavit ofCynda Herrrick in
Support ofMotionfor Summary Judgment (Oct. 14, 20 I 0). This was the date that the Court

determined started the limitations elock "[a]t the very latest." Memorandum Decision at 5.
Fourth, on September 26, 2005, Plaintiffs entered into a Road Development Agreement
4

for Phases 2 and 3. In this agreement, they agreed to pay cash of$232,160, based on $1,844 per
single family lot and $1,383 per apartment unit. Again, it was easy for Plaintiffs to look down
the road to Phases 4-6. Each of these four events occurred more than four years before the
Complaint was filed on December 1,2009. Accordingly. the Court was correct in dismissing the
entire Complaint.

It is thus inescapable: [f Plaintiffs knew they had a takings problem with Phases 1,2, and
3 (the fees for which were quantified more than four years before the Complaint was filed), they
must also have known that they bad a problem with Phases 4-6. It is irrelevant, for purposes of
the statute of 1imitations, that the actual payment for Phases 2 and 3 was made later, or that the
quantity of the fee for Phases 4-6 has not yet been determined. It is equally irrelevant that

On its face, this agreement refers only to Phase 2. That is because Phase 2 was later
renamed Phases 2 and 3, but this reference was not updated to reflect this, See Minutes of
September 23, 2005, reproduced in Exhibit 18 to Affidavit ofCynda Henrick in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment (Oct. 14,20 I 0) ("Has been a confusion because of changing
Phase 11's name [which] is now called Phase II and Phase III.")
4
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Plaintiffs conceivably might decide not to proceed with subsequent phases; they still have a
cause of action as soon as it is apparent that their right to develop is unlawfully restricted.
Finally, Plaintiffs' contention that a takings claim as to Phases 2-6 would not accrue until a
s
payment was made is simply and profoundly wrong. The Court acted correctly in dismissing
Plaintiffs' entire case.
As the County repeatedly has pointed out, it is now considering what to do going
forward. in light of this and other litigation chal1enging development fees. 6 AU options are on
the table. Accordingly, the County contends that the litigation vis-Ii-vis Phases 4-6 is not ripe.

But if it is ripe, it became ripe in early 2004 when the County began applying its road
improvement fee fonnula. Accordingly, the statute has run in any event.
III.

THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE.

Plaintiffs contend that Count 1 of their Complaint sounds in contract. making it subject to
the state's statute of limitations fur contract actions. This statute sets a five-year deadline for
"[a]n action based uPOn any contrach obHgation or liability founded upon

an instrument in

writing." Idaho Code § 5-216 (emphasis supplied).
Before going further. it may be enough to point out that Plaintiffs have mischaracterized
Count I. In fact, nothing in Count 1 (or any other count) sounds in contract. For starters, Count

I is entitled "Declaratory Relief - Violation of State Law WId State and Federal Constitutions."
5 Ignoring all the case law, Plaintiffs continue to make assertions like this: "Until
Plaintiffs actually paid the money, there was no taking." Reconsideration Memorandum at 5.
6 "Indeed, the County 1S now undergoing a complete review of its policies regarding
pennitting of new developments and is exploring the enactment of a new IDIF A-compliant
ordinance that would moot any claims with respect to future development agreements." Valley
County's Opening Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment, at 25 (Oct. 14, 20 to). See
also, Valley County 's Statement ofMaterial Facts in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary
Judgment,,, 62 and 63 (Oct. 14.2010); Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support o/Motionfor
Summary Judgment, ,,37 and 38 (Oct. 14,2010).
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Paragraph 18 complains about the County's "practice" ofimposing fees on developers.
Paragraph 19 complains that the County has not complied with IDIF A and that money collected
"amounts to an unauthorized tax:' Paragraph 20 also complains that monies collected
"constitute an unauthorized tax." Paragraph 21 complains that because ofthese violations, the
County cannot force "developers to pay monies under the guise of a Road Development
Agreement and/or Capital Contribution Agreement." In other words, the County's actions are
illegal in spite of the contracts, not because of the contracts. Moreover, none of the prayers for
relief involve either breach or invalidation of the agreements.
In sum, ignoring the words of their own Complaint, Plaintiffs now contend that Count I
seeks declaratory relief that the development agreements "are illegal and void." Reconsideration
Memorandum at 6. This is simply not so. Plaintiffs' contract theory is plainly an afterthoughtan effort to re-cast the Complaint in a way that was never intended.
The Court properly rejected such semantic gamesmanship. The Court rightly looked to
the nature of this case-which is plainly a takings case. "In detennining the nature ofthe actions
for limitations purposes, it is the substance or gravamen of the action, rather than the fann of the
pleading, that controls. In other words, in determining which statute oflimitations governs an
action, the court looks to the reality and essence of the action, and not to its name." 51 Am. Jur

2dApplication o/Statutes o/Limitation § 91 (2000).7

7 Another example

of the need to look past the plaintiff's characterization of the case to
its true basis is found in City ojMcCall v. BUX/Oll, 146 Idaho 656, 20 I P Jd 629 (2009). In that
case, the City sued its attorneys for malpractice. It also included a claim for unjust enrichment,
seeking return of the money paid to its attorneys. This Court dismissed that latter claim. stating,
"AJthough styled as a claim of unjust enriehment., Count Six is clearly premised upon legaJ
malpractice:' Buxton, 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld that
portion of the District Court's decision.
V ALLEV COONTV'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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The Court was also correct in declining to apply the five~year statute because "this is not

an action for breach of contract." Memorandum Decision at 6 n.1. Plaintiffs concede that they
have not plead breach of contract, but insist the statute is not limited to breach of contract.
Reconsideration Memorandum at 7. Yet they point the Court to not a single case supporting this
conclusion. What case law is out there does not support their position.
The Idaho Court of Appeals provided this definitive swnmary in 2008:
Pursuant to I.C. § 5·216, an action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be filed
within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues
ypon breach for limitations purposes.

Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis supplied),
This is consistent with the black letter law on the subject:
The statute oflimitations begins to run in civil actions on
contracts from the time the right of action accrues. This is usuaUy
the time the agreement is breached, rather than the time the actual
damages are sustained as a consequence of the breagh.
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation ofActions § 160 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
Plaintiffs' position is further demolished by the fact that they are alleging there was no
valid contract In Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 318, 160 P.3d 754, 757 (2007), the Court
found that contract statute of limitations was inapplicable because the contract at issue was void
ab initio. In other words, if Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that there was no valid contract, this

is not an action "upon a contract.'" Instead, this is an action based on alleged constitutional and
statutory violations, and is therefore subject to the four~year statute.
Plaintiffs seem to believe that if a case's facts involve a contract, it is a suit ''Upon a
contract," This is not the case. For example. the case of Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., l25 Idaho
429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994). involved a single transaction (a court reporter's failure to
prepare an accurate transcript) and various claims based on that event section 1983, fraud,
V ALLEY COUNTY'S REsPONSE TO MonON FOR RECONSIDERAnON
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negligence, tortuous interference, and breach of contract. The Court carefully applied a different
statute of limitations to each claim, applying the contract statute of limitations only to the claim
for breach of contract. The fact that a eontract governed the entire action of the court reporter
did not tum the rest of the case into a case "upon a contract."
An analogy might illustrate. If someone made a contraet to kill another person and then
did so, the resulting homicide cou1d give rise to a crimina] prosecution and a wrongful death
action-but not a suit upon a contract. The problem with the killing is not that the contract was
breached, but that it was carried out. In the case at bar. Plaintiffs' contention that this is a case
"upon a contract" is no 1ess absurd.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs' Reconsideration Motion accomplishes nothing but more stirring of an old pot.
They have offered nothing new and nothing helpful to the Court. Their motion should be denied.
th

DATED this 28 day of February, 2011.
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY

By.

~ ~
....

MattheWC:iiliafilS

{l,.-

GrVENS PURSLEY, LLP

BY.~'M.~.~
~~£E>---Christopher H. Meyer

By.

Attorneys for Defendant
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I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
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Jed Manwaring
Victor ViJlegas
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box. 959
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INTRODUCTION

On January 7. 20] J. the Court filed its Mem()rantium Decision Re: De/endant's Motion

.for Summary Judgment ("Decision")~ which fully disposed of the each oftbe claims by Plaintiffs
Buckskin Properties. Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (HPlaintiffs·'). Two days later. on
January 10.20 J I, Plaintiffs filed their Motion/or Parlial Summary Judgment. On January 13 t
20 J J. Defendant Yaney County ("County") filed Valley County

s Response to Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. On the same day. it filed Valley County '$ Motion/or Entry 0/Judgment.
The following day, January 14, 201 J. Plaintifm filed PlaintUfo Objection to Valley County '$
J

Motion/or Entry a/Judgment Filed January 13, 1011 (""Objection"). This is the County's reply
to that Objeclwn.
ARGUMENT

In their Objection, Plaintiffs contend that Count One ofthe.ir Compl4inl has survived the
Court's Dec{si()n because Count One is forward-looking to yet uncompleted Phases 4-6 for
which a l"OOd development agreement has not yet been negotiated. 'This is incorrect for the
reasons discussed below.

f.

STATUTEOFLIMITADONS

First, the statute of limitations applies to the entire project (which is governed by a single
conditional -use pennit ("CUP"». It does not run separately on separate phases. Plaintiffs knew
when they signed the Capital Contribution Agreement on July 14, 2004, when right-of-way was
conveyed via final plat on October 2S, 2004, and again when they signed the Road Development

Agreement on September 26, 2005, that their project-all of it-was subject to fees which they
allege ace iD.cgaL Plaintiffs bad no reason to believe, at that tim~ that subsequent phoses would
be treated any differendy. Hence, the statute ran on aU phases. and Plaintiffs' Complaint was

filed too late.
VALLEY COUNTY'S RUL\' IN St;PPORT Of' MonoN I'OR ENTRY 0,. JVDGMENT
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II.

M(X)'J'NESS AND RIPENESS

On March 7. 20 J1, the VaUey County Board of County Commissioners adopted

Resolution 11--6: Resolution Regarding Road Improvement Fees and Development AgrcemenlS
("Resolution"). A copy of the Ruolution is attached. to the Affidavit ofCynda Herrick Regarding
Resolution J1-6 filed today. By this action, the County has gone on record stating that

developers who have outstanding payment obligations under existing road development
agreements have three options. These are set out in Section 4 Oll page 3 of the Resolwll'on. First,
they may make those remaining payments. Second. if development is stalled, they may ask: for a

"time out" on those obligations. Third, they may notify the County that the permit holder wishes
to renegotiate the road development agreement.

In addition~ Section 2 on pages 2"3 ofthe Resolution provides that the County will not
enter into any new road development agreements calling for the payment of fees or other
contributions for off-site road improvements unless (1) tbe County has adopted an ordinance in
compliance with the Idaho Development Impact Pee Act, Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 61-8216
("IDIFA") or (2) the permit bolder volWltarily and expressly waives any objection to such fees.

Accordingly. any claim that Plaintiffs may believe they have with r~ to Phases 4-6
has been mooted by the Resolution. Given Plaintiffs' opportunity to negotiate a road

development agTeem.ent subject to the tenns of Resolution 11·6, it is apparent that no one can say
today what that new agreement might look like. Accordingly. lacking II crystal ball. Plaintiffs

cannot possibly contend that the Court is in a position to rule on that new agreement. In other

words, any old claim is moot and any potential new claim is nor yet ripe.

V ALLEYCOVNTY'S REPLY IN SlJI'POItT OF MonON lOR ENTaY OF JUDGMENT
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INTRRAcnON OF' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOOTNESSIRIPENESS.

Given that the entire case is barred by the statute of limitations, there is no need for the
Court to address ripeness and mootness. The Court need address ripeness and mootness only if it
determines that Count One is not barred by the statute of Umitaticns.

By the way, the fact that claims with respect to future road development agreements have
become moot and unripe is not inconsistent with the Court's ruling that the entire case is tardy
under the statute of limitations. In other words. it is possible for the statute oflintitations to run

on a matter that subsequently becomes moot or unripe. This does not occur very often, but it is a

principle recognized by the courts. Cabaccagn v.

u.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services,

627 F.3d 1313 (9111 Cir. 2010) ("[A)lthoughjurisdiction is usually detennined from the filing of

the reJevant complaint,

after~arising

events can defeat jurisdi'tion by negating the ripeness of a

claim. "). In other words.. a claim may be ripe when filed, but become WI-ripe later. Thus, there
i.9oo inconsistency in arguing (1) that the takings claim for the entire subdivision accrued and
was ripe more than four years ago and was therefore barred by Ute statute of limitlltioll$ and (2)

that the furward-looking challenge as to Phases 4-6 has been mooted and made no longer ripe by
the action of the County this week.
CONCLUSION

The COlU1ty'S action in adopting Resolution 11-6 reflects the fact that it has acted in good

faith throughout this process. It adopted the Capita11rnprovements Program in good faith,
believing that it had the authority to do so.

]t issued

CUPs and entered into road development

agreements with these Plaintiffs and others in a spirit of cooperation to improve the roads and

allow development. It relied in good faith on payments made, and it spent that money in
accordance with those agreements for the direct benefit of Plaintiffs and other developers whose
applications might otherwise have been denied for lack of public services. Without conceding
VALLEV COUNTY'S REPLV IN SVPPOJlT Of MonON IIOR ENTRY Of JUDGMENT
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that its actions were in violation of law. the County's action in adopting this Resolution shows

that it is. acting in recoW1ition of the fact. that rec~t litiga.ti~ co~g i'fflpact fees :p~t the
situation in a new light. The County wants to do .the right thing and has done the right thing.
Acting out of caution and concern for all citizens, businesses, and taxpayers, the County is
steering a

OOUl'Se aim~

at preventing further controversies over the Jawfil)ness of its approach to

road improvement funding. At the same time. the Countyseck.s to protect its tax;payers from

unfair claims from persons like Plaintiffs who see an opportunity 10 line their pockets based on
agreements they previously made with the County thatluive served them weB. For these
reasons, the Court should enter judgment in favor of the County on al1 counts.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2011.
VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING AITORNEY

BY.~~
Matthew C. Williams

.

GIVENS PURSLBY~. I.LP

BY:~~
ChriS.~:. ~~.yer..
~
..
~

BY.~')
n .. H
c n
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I h~y certify that on the 911\ day QfMa.rch, 2011, a true and. correct eppY Qfthe

foregoing was served upon the following individua1(s) by the means indicated:

Jed Manwaring

Victor Villegas
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, 1D 83701-0959

o

8
[??J

o

U.S. Mail. postage prepaid
Ex~Mnil
.
Hand DeJivQl)'
Facsimile

E,.Mail

jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vviUegas@evanskeane.com

VALLlY COUNn~S IlEPLY"IN SUPPORT OF MOTION roR Dn'Rv OF JUDGMENT
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MaUhew C. Williams, [SB #627t
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1350
CSSi:ade, JD 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-1124

mwllliams@<:o.valley.id.1JS

Christopher It Meyer, ISB #4461
Martin C. Hendrickson. ISa #5816
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

601 W. Bannock 81.
P.O. Box 2120
Boise. Jdaho 8370]·2720
Telephone: 201-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspmsley.com

mch@givensplU'sJey.com
Att(jmeys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH lUDCCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited

Liability Company,

Case No. CV 2009-554

AfFIDAVIT OF CvNDA IIERJUCK
1 J-6

REG"RDI~G RUOLlfI'lON

Plaintiffs,

v.

v ALLEY COUNTY. a political subdivision
of tile State ofIdaho.
Defendant.

AFPl1)AVn OFCYNI)" HERRICK Ilt:GI\ltDING RUOLlJTlON 11-6
1!l91s-.2_"~it.rC Hcnidt II.tpr4w,. 11.cso. . .
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)$S.

[, CYNOA HERRICK, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

I.

1 am the Val1ey Cowlty Planning and Zooing Administrator and have been for the

entire time the applications for The Meadows at West MOlllltmn ("The Meadows") have been
processed through Valley County.
2.

The slaternent» in this affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge or upon

infonnation contained in official records of Valley County that set forth Valley County's

regularly c;onducted and n:guJarly recorded activities or both.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and coneCI copy of Resolution I J-6 entitJed

"Resolution Reaarding Road Impro....ement Pees and DeveJopment Agreements."

4.

The attached resolution was adopted by the Valley County Board of County

Commiss.ioners on March 7.2011.
I decJare under penalty of perjury tbat the foregoing is tnle and correct.

DATED this 9\11 day of March. 20 II.

Cynd

enid<.

AFflDAvrrOFCV!<iDA H£IUUCK K£CADING RESOUl1lON 11-6

Pap 2
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CERTlnCATI: OF SERVlCE

I hereby certify that on the 91h day ofMarcll.. 201 10, a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following iooividual(s)by the means indicated:
led Manwaring
Victor Villegas

Evans Keane'LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Bois~JD

83701..()9S9

o

~
o

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Expt:es.s Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
E-MWI

jmanwaring@evanskeane.com

vviUesas@evanskeane.com

Christopher . Meyer

AFfJDAVrrCWCYNDA. HEIlRlCk IlEcARbINC R.MoUrnON 11-6

10915.1..1 101I114).DOC
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RESOLUTION NO. U'"'

RESOLUTION REGARDING
ROAD~PROVEMENTFEESANDDEVELOPMENTAGREEMENTS

WHEREAS, in order to provide a fair and equitable proce&s for en.,uring that adequale
pubUc services are provided lo new developments, Valley County (the "County") prepured II
Capital ImprovemenL Program ("CIP"). The CIP; as revised from time to lime. identifies and
quantifies anticipated capital costs for road improvements within discrete geographic areas
within the County.

WHEREAS, the County has entered into agreements under which real estate developers
agree to pay their proportionate share of road improvement costs based on tost estimates derived
from the CIP. These agreements have gone by various names. including "development
agreement," "road development ag:reemen~" and "capital contribution agreement:" They are
referred collectively berein as "Road Development Agreements:'

.0

WHEREAS. in collsidering applications for pennits and zone changes; the County is
obligated by the Lo~1 Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA») to take into account its abiliiyto
provide service, required for the new develOpment. For instance. LLUPA's provision on special
use pennils staleS: "A special usc pennit mlty be granted t() an applicoot if the proposed use is
condirionally permitted by dIe terms of the ordinance, ... subject to the ability of political
subdivisions, including school districts~ to provide services for the proposea use, ..." Idaho
Code § 67651l(a). Sinrilarly. the zoning provision ofLLUPAsta[es: "Particular consideration
shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone change upon the delivery of services by any
pol:itical subdivision providing public services, including school districts, within the planning
jurisdiction." In addition. 1.Oning and conditional use pennits !.!lust be consistent with the
comprehensive plan, which is mandated to address such things as school facilities and

transportation. Idaho Code § 67~6508{c). Pinally. the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act
rrOTl<"'A") provides: -'Nothing in this chapter shall obligate a governmental entity (0 approve
any developo1ent request which may reasonably be expected to reduce levds of S<.."'IVice below
minimum acceptable reve]s established in the developmen~ impact fee ordinance,"

WHERF..AS. foes and other contributions generated by these Road Development
AgreemeJlts have enabled the County to approve new rcal es.ate project' on the basis of
anticipated revenues provided under !he Road Development Agreements. In the absence ofthcse
Road Development Agreements, the County might have been required to deny approval of some
or all of these permil applications. or to impose sequence and timing col'lditions. on the basis that
adequate public services were nOllhen available to serve the proposed development.

RE50LIJTlON 11·6

EXHIBIT
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WHEREAS. fees and other contributions generated by these Road Development
Agreements have in fact been used to provide road improvcmenL<; rn accordance with the CXP,
and these improvcm1ents have benefitted the holders of permits making the contributions.
WHEREAS, the COUDty undertook the program and actions described above in the good
faith belief that. it bad the authority to do so under its police power and under the following
statutory provisions: (I) Idaho Code § 31870, which provides: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law. a board of county commissioners may impose and collect fees for those
services povided by the county which would olherwisc be funded by lWi valorem tax revenues.
The fees collected pursuant to tbis section shall be reasonably related to, but shall not exceed, the
actual cost o.fthe service being rendered," (2) Idaho Code § 61-6SlJA, which authorizes
development agreements in connection with rezones. (3) Idaho Code § 67.6512(d)(2). which
authorizes the County to impose conditions via conditional use pennits controlling the "sequence
end timing of development." (4) Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(6), which authorizes the County to
require "the provision for on-site or off-site public facilities or services," and (5) 1dal10 Code
§ 67--6512(d}(8}, which authori:t..es the COWlty to require "mitigation of effects of the proposed
development upon service delivery by any political subdivision, includinS school district,
providing services within me pla.nningjurisdiction.'"
WHEREAS, based on it..1 understanding that the fees contemplated under the C] P and the
various Road Development Agreements fell within its authority based Oil the County's police
power and the statutory provisions cited above, rhe Board of County Commissioners believed in
good faith that it was not necessary to enact un impact fee ordinance in compliance with IDIFA.
Accordina!y, the COlUlty did not enact an IDIFA-compliant impact fee ordinance.

WHEREAS. the County acted ill good faith in entering into all plior Road Development
Agreements and has spent money calJceted thereunder in accordance with and in reliance on
those Road Development Agreements.
WHEREAS, years after the Road Development Agreements were entered into, some of
the parties to some of the Road Development Agreements have initiated litigation contending
that the fees agreed to under the Road Deve!opmentAgreernenb are unlawful taxo, because the
County has failed to enact an rOfFA-compliant impact fec ordinance.
NOW. THEREfORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY 11m BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF VALLEY COUNTy' as follows:
Section 1: The County will defend its right not to reimburse persons wbo previously
have paid feos or made contributions in accordance with prior Road Development Agreements
whjcb the County entered into in good faith and upon which the County reasonably bas relied.
Section 2: In order to avoid litigatioll costs and ullcertainty, the Board of Cotmty
Commissioners win no longer enter into Road Development Agreemen(s calling for the payment
of fees or other contributions for off-site road improvements until such time as the Calmly adopts

Ib'..soLUT(ON JI.,fj
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.
an IDIFA -complaint ord.inBncc, unless the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any
objection thereto, In the ahsence of such waiver, the County will negotiate the tenus of fulure
Road Development Agreement.') in good faith in a ma.JllICJ' that addresses the. County'S obligation
to assure the availahility of adequate public scrvices in ways other than t.hc imposition of fees or
other contributions for otf·site road improvements. The inability of the County to secure funding
under the CIP on a going forward basis may be taken into account by the Planning and Zoning
Commission and by the Board of County Commissioners in cons.idering appUcatiollS fOI pennits
for new developments.
Section 3: The restricliorn; set OUf in Section 2 of this Resolution do not prohibit the
County from imposing requirements or securing conunitments respecting on-5ite or on-boundary
improvements or dedications that are authorized under LLlJPA and the County's police power)
nor do they prohibit the County from requiring or entering jnto agreements respectjng water,
sewer, trash collection. stormwater, and other services provided by the County or its authorized
agents or oontmctors for the direct benetit of the pennit bolder, property owner, or tenant.
Section 4: To the extent any Road DevelopmenlAgreemenl now in effect calls for
payment of fees .or other contributions which have not been made as of this date, the permit

holder may elect (1) to make those payments or contribution.1i in accordance with the Road
Development Agreement, (2 ) to request the County to temporarily suspend the permit holder's
obligations under the Road Development Agreement and/or other deadlines for a period of time
during which no funhcr development is anticipated, or (3) to nOlify thc County that the permit
holder wishes to negotiate a new Road Development AgretllTlent. Upon such A request to
negotiate a new Road Development Agreement, the Board of County Commissioners will enter
into good faith negotiations with the permit holder in that regard. Jf. at the time of sU(:h
negotiation, IUlIDlFA~mp!ia.nt impact fee Qrdinance has been enacted, the revised Road
Development Agreement wilt he in accordance with such ordinance. If no IDlrA-compliant
impact fee ordinance has been enacted at the time of the negotiation, the County will seek other
ways to meet its obligation to ensure that adequate public .services are availab1e to serve the new
development. This could include conditions respecting the sequence and timing of development
so as to enSLJre that development occur on a schedule con!;istenl with the availability of public
services. Absent an JDlFA-compliantordinance. the new Road Development Ordinance. as in
the past will contain no requirements for payments or contributions by the permit holder l,mJess
such requirements are expressly and voluntarily agreed to by the permit bolder.

ADOl"TED Oft this 7th day of Mnch, lOUt by majority vole o(the Boaol ofCounly
Comlnissionen orValley Cellnty, Idabo pU..,1lant to and In cftmpltaoce with all appltc:able
public notice, hUribg, and other procedunl requinments.

R~OLUTlON

JJ-6
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ORlolNAL
Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villeg.. ISBiI 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West Main

B~~CLERK
(j

~-....;:::::::::;;~Deputy

UA"""""::n

MAR lB 20U
Case Nti_
Filed 1/:

rnst. No.

'/1
-~L.L_ A.M.

-P.M.

P. O. Box 959
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimlle: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: jmanwariDg@evsDskeane.com
Vvillegas@evanskene.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, aD Idaho Limited

Liability Company,

Case No. CV-2009-554-C
NOTICE OF SuPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITY

Plaintiff~

vs.
VALLEY COUNTY, a politieallubdivision
of the State of Idabo.
Defendant.
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, Plaintiffs submit the attached Order on
Summary Judgment in the matter of Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Partners,

L.P. v. Blaine County. Case No. CV-2008-22, and respectful1y ask the Court take judicial notice
of the attached Order on Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment in this case.

NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY-1

555

DATED this 25th day of March. 2011.
EVANS KEANE LLP

By

Ki41~~

Victor Villeg~the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor

P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, 10 836 J I
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Gil/ens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ 1 Overnight Delivery
[ 1 .Hand Delivery

[X]
[ )
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery

Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

Victor Villegas

NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY - 2

556

David R. Lombardi, Idaho State Bar No. l~l¥ens Pursley, ~~_IL;;E::;-;D;;:;::-{J.4:-:M~~-~-~-~-
Christopher H. Meyer, Idaho State Bar No. 4 4 6 1 .
~- --...J..::J"
Martin C, Hen<kickson, ]daho S'ate Bar No. SS76
GIVENS PURSLEY LI-P
601 West Bannock S1.
P.O. Box. 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388~ 1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300

LJ~N

0 ~ 2008
..

1/.

jm-

,........ Clerk Di$(
,Jolynn Drago.
C~·t:!.!!!<line £.~

k1';;;

chrismeyel'@givenspmslcy.com
mch@givenspursley.com

www.givenspursley.com
Martin A. Flannes, Idaho State BarNo. 2874
FLANNES LAW, PLLC
P.O. Box. 1090
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Office: (208) 788-1315
Fax: (208) 788-1316

martin@flannes.net
Attorneys for Pelilion.ersIPlain4/Ts
Cove Springs Development, Inc. and
Redstone Partners, L.P.

IN THE DISTRICr COURT OF THE FIFTlI JUDICIAL mSTlUCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COVE SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, INC., a
Nevada corporation, and REDSTONE
PARTNERS, LP., a Nevada limited
partnership,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. CV2008-22

ORDER ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND J

BLAINE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State ofIdahQ, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH 20, Whose True Names Are
Unknown.
ReblJondents/Defcndants,

TOM O'GARA, .JOliN STEVENSON, and
GERRY BASHAW,
Intervenors.

ORDlm ON SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3

Page I (1(20

557

111is matter came on for hearing before the Court on May 29, 2008. Appearing at that
hearing 011 behalf of the Plaintiffs Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Paltners, L.P.
were Chris Meyer, Boise, Idaho, Martin Hendrickson, Boise, Idaho, and Martin Flannes, Hailey,
Idaho. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant Blaine County was Tim Graves, Hailey, Idaho.
Also appearing at the hearing but not participating was Ned Williamson, Hailey, Idaho on behalf
oflntervenors Tom O'Ga1"a, John Stevenson, and Geny Bashaw. The Court, having reviewed
and considered the PetitionerslPlaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 2 and 3, the

supporting pleadings, and the briefing with respect to the

motion~ and having heard and

considered the oral argument ofrespective counsel, finds and rules as follows:

Count 2 - Tlereslteld, PUD, and CD Standards (or C01l.(orman.ce lvith Compreltensive
Plan (2004 Ordinance)
1.

111 its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 211, 212,213,214, and 215 of

Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows:
211. County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 10-5-2B
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board
determines that: "The proposed subdivision of land conforms to
and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan text and map."
212. County Subdivision Plmmed Unit Development
Standard § 10-6-8A.l 0 states that a planned unit development is
contingent upon the Board's determination: "That the PUD will
conform to the comprehensive plan."
213. County SubdiVIsion Cluster Development Standard
§ 1 0-9-8E states d1at a cluster development is contingent upon the
Board's determination: "That the A-20 CD conforms to the goals,
recommel'ldations and conclusions in the Blaine County
CO mprehensi ve plan."
214. Under Idaho law, the purpose of a comprehensive
plan is to serve as a general guide in instances involving zoning
decisions such a[8] revising or adopting a zoni:1g ordinance
215.

Under Idaho law, the County may 110t elevate its

comprehensive plan to the level of controlling zoning Jaw.
OHm';'l ON SUMMARY JUDCMENTON COUNTS 2 AND 3
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2.

TIle County admitted Paragraphs 211, 212, 213, 214, and 215 of Cove Springs'

Complaint 11lese are accurate statements of the law. U,..ru/.ia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,
358,2 P.3d 738, 743 (2000).

3.

SubdivisionOrdinance§§ IO-5 2.B, 10-6-8.A.lO,and 10-9-8.E,aswriuenin
4

2004, apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout
Blaine County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect ttle
analysis or conclusions reached in this order.
4.

The Local Land Use Planning Act,ldaho Code §§ 67-6501 to 67-6537

C'LLUPA") contemplates that the comprehensive plan shall serve as a planning docwnellt to
guide the adoption of zoning and other ordinances. Comprehensive plans are forward-looking,
visionary documents. Although LLUPA requires that land use ordinances adopted by the County
should generally reflect the broad goals and aspirations ofthe comprehensive plan, not all ofthe
specific provisions in a comprehensive plan are necessarily reflected in current zoning
ordinances. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 2008 WL 803001 (Mar. 27,2008). Thus, the
standards and conditions spelled out in its adopted land use ordinances constitute the County's
articulation as to how the comprehensive plan is to be applied to subdivision applications,
including the Cove Springs Applications. Cove Springs and aU citizens of Blaine County are

entitled to rely on that articulation. Thus, individual zoning and subdivision permit applications
are to be measured against the specific criteria set out in the applicable ordinances.
S.

The foHowing statement by the Idaho Supreme Court is controlling here:

It is to be expected tllst the land to be subdivided may l"tot agree
witll all provisions in the comprehensive pian, but a mOre specific
analysis, resulting in denial of a subdivision application based
solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan ele,'ates
the phm to the level of legally controlling zoning law. Such a
result affords the Board unbounded discretion in examining a
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subdivision applioation and allows the Board to effectively re-zone
land based on the general language in the comprehensive plan, As
indicated above, the comprehensive plan is intended merely as a
gUideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions. Those
Zoning decisions have already been made in this instance ....
Thus,
the Board [may not rely] completely 011 the
comprehensive plan in denying these applications, alld should
instead have crafted its findings of fact and conclusions of law to
demonstrate tlult the goals of the comprehensive plan were
considered, but were simply used in conjunction with the zoning
ordinances, the subdivision ordinance and any other applicable
ordinances in evaluating the proposed developments

Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 358-59, 2 P.3d 743-44.
6.

There is no issue before the Court on these present motions as to whether and

what extent the County may consider its comprehensive plan in passing upon a subdivision
application. More particularly, what weight Blaine County chooses to give to its comprehensive
pJan in considering or passing upon a subdivision application, or the question of whether the
County can give its comprehensive pI all lillY weight in passing upon a

PUD or a Cluster

Development or a Subdivision Application, (as opposed to adopting a new ordinance, Or
considering a COllditional use permit, etc.) are not before the Court.
7.

County ordinances are law.

By including in Its ordinance 10-5-2.B a requiremenl

that "No application sha] I be approved" unless the Board "determines the proposed subdivision
conforms to and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its
comprehensive plan ''to the level of legally controlling zoning law," Therefore, this particular
provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 358, 2 P.3rd 738,
743 (2000), and is contrary to law on its face.
8.

By including in its ordinance 10-6-8.A.(l 0) a requirement that a planned unit

development is "contingent upon the Boards de1errnjnatioll" that "the

pun will conform to the

comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status oflegally

OnDEI~ ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3
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controlling zoning law," Therefore, this particular provision of this ordinance violates Un'uNa,
and is contrary to law on its face.

9.

By including in its ordinance 10-9-8,E a ,.equi,.emem that a Cluster Development

js "contingent upon the Boards determination" that the "A-20 CD conforms

to the goals,

recommendations, and conclusions in the Blaine County comprehensive plan," Blaine County
has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore,
this particular provision of thlS ordinance violates U,.rutia and is contnuy to law on its face.

The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code
Sections 10-5-2.8, 10-6-S,A.! 0, and lO-9-S.E are contrary to law and are therefore nuH, void,

and without fwthel' force and effect.

Count 2 - Unauthorized Exactions in TfEreshold. PUD, and CD Standards (2004
Ordinance)
10.

In its Answer, tile County admitted paragraphs 219,221,223,225,226,227,228,

229.230,231,233,234,235,236,240,241,243,244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint,
which state as follows:

219, County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 10-5-2,C
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board
detennines that: "The proposed subdivision shall not adversely
affect the quality of essential public services and facilities to
current resldents. including but not limited to school facilities,
school bus tral1sportation, police and fire protection, emergency
services, and roads, and shall nor require substantial additional
public funding in O1'der to meet the needs created by the proposed
subdivision. The applicant shall be required by the Board to
mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed subdivision, which
may include, without limitation, contrtbutioll.S for additional capital
improvements, on-going maintenance, and labor costs. The plan
for, timing of, and proposed phasing of the mitigation shall be in a
fOl'm acceptable to the Board."
OIU)l1,R ON SUMMARY .JUDGMENT ON COUNTS:2 AND 3
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221. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development
Standard § 10-6-8.A.9 states that a planned unit development is
contingent upon the Board's determination: "TIlat the developer
will finance the improvement of the road network outside of the
PUD where traffic generated by the PUDs increased densities
make such improvements necessary."
223.
County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard
§ I 0-9-8.D makes apPl'oval of a Cluster Development contingent
upon a determination: "That where off-site impacts are found to
result from the proposed development of the A-20 CD, the
developer has proposed improvements to mitigate said impacts.
Such improvements nlay include but not be limited to the road
network (road improvements not limited to surfacing, school bus
turnarounds, widening, intersections, bridges, culverts, and
drainage facilities), fire protection facilities, and trails/recreation."
225.

Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state.

226. Under OilIon's Rule, counties have no inherent
authority to regulate or to tax.

227. Under Dillon's Rule, the authority ofIdaho counties
to tax derives from grants found in or necessarily implied by the
Idaho Constitution and stale statutes.
228. The Idaho Constitution contains a grant of police
power to [daho counties.
229. The gran: of police power to counties contained in
the Idaho Constitution does !lot include a general authority to tax.
230. The police power lncJudes the authority to impose
regulatory fees that are incidental to proper regulatory programs

for the purpose of funding such programs.
231. The police power includes the authority to chaIge
fees for services provided by the County to a user Df those
services.
USCI'

233. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in genera! are not incidental
regulatory fees.

OUllleR ON SUMMAR Y .fUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3
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234. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in general are not user fees for
services.
235. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public ill general are not the sort of
traditional exactions authorized under the police power in
association with dedications within and primarily benefiting the
development.

236. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefitjng the public in general are taxes.
240. Atticle VII, § 6 ofthe Idaho Constitution is not selfexecuting. Any power of taxation authorized under this section
must be implemented by legislation.

241. The only statute authorizing counties to assess
development impact fees is the Idaho Development Fee Act, Idaho
Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216 ("IDlFA").
243. County Ordinances §§ I O-S-2.C, 10-6-8.A. 9 and 109-8.D do not comply with the procedural and substantive
requirements of IDrF A.

244. The County did not enact County Ordinances §§
5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9 and 1O-9-8.D pursuant to or in reliance on
IDWA.

10~

249. The County has no authority to enforce a void
ordinance or 10 apply a void ordinance to the Development
Applicatiolls.

11.

The County admitted Paragraphs 219; 221,223,225,226.227,228,229,230,

231.233,234,235,236,240,241, 243, 244, and 249 ofeove Springs' Complaint. 'nlese are

accurate statements of the low. Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. Cify of Coeur d'Alene
("meA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P .2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. Cify 0/ Pocafello. 115 Idaho 502,

768 P.2d 765 (1 ~88).
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12.

Subdivision Ordinance §§ IO-5-2.C, lO-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.D, as written in 2004,

apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect througnout Blaine
County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the analysis or
conclusion.s reached in this order.

13.

Subdivision Ordinance §§ 10-5-2.C, lO-6-8.A.9, and 10-9·8.0 establish

development impact fees that the County seeks 10 impose without compliance with lDIFA.
14.

The County bas no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The

County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDIFA or not at all.
15.

The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover certain costro;

associated with new developments pursuant to lDIFA, but apparently elected not to do so.
16.

The fees imposed under these ordinances are not incidental regulatory fees or user

fees, but are intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole.
Accordingly. the fees imposed under these ordinances constitute illegal taxes in violation of the
Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void.
17.
"Approval of a plat may not be conditioned upon payment by the
subdivider of a specified pOltlon of the cost of improvements if no power to exact
such a payment is delegated by the statutes. The county has a duty to keep all
roads in reasonable repair and may not discharge that duty by imposing the costs
011 local developers, absent statutory authority; thus, requiring a developer to pave
a county road as a condition for approving a site plan is ultra vires."
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 485, at 420 (2003) (emphasis added).

18.

In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it

does not), Subdivision Ordinance §§ lO-S-2.C, IO-6-&.A.9, and 10-9-8.0 are void because they
have been preempted by rolF A. rDlFA is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively
addresses development impact fees in Idaho and was intended "to occupy the entire field of
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regulation." Envirosofe Services a/Idaho v. COZIn'Y Q{Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687. 689, 735 P.2d
998, 1000 (1981).

19.

Specifically, with regard to designated paragl'aph 223, the County argues that

compliance with Standard § 10-9-8.0 is voluntary. While part of that may be true, the County
has made approval "contingent" 011 whether the proposed development has voluntarily agreed to
contribute to mitigate off site impacts. When viewed in context, the County has conditJotled
approval upon all agreement by the developer to contl'ibute to offsite improvements for clearly
designated public purposes. In other words, the County has conditioned approval upon the
developer's agreement to voluntarily pay a tax. In tha11'egard, the County seeks to do indirectly.
(by coercing payment of a fee for mitigation of offsite public impacts) what it may not do
directly (levy all "exaction" or tax for precisely the same purpose).
Idaho Code 67-6513 requires that~ "Fees established for purposes of mitigating the
financial impacts of development must comply with the provisions of chapter 82. title 67, Idaho
Code," AdditionaIIy. the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IOlfA") provides, at section 678204(17): "A development impact fee ordin.ance shall include a schedule of development impact
fees for various land uses per unit of d\,:velopment." Blaine County's ordinance includes no such
fee schedule, an omission the County seeks to get around by arguing their fees are "voluntary",
that the County does not need to el1act or set a fee, (because they have placed the burden on the
developer to set a feel), and thaI the County may ot may not actually set a fee requiring any
payment in any particular instance. The issue is ~10t whether the County will or might set a fee;
the statute demands that they set a fee. This attempt by the County (to avoid setting fees as

I

Blaine County Ordinance 1O-9-8.D provides that app!'()val is comingenl upon a determination tila( ",,,the

developer has proposed improvements to mitigate such impacts"
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called for by IDlF A) runs afoul of IDIF A. Another subsection of the same statute sets forth the
result

67~8204(25)

provides:

"Any provision of a development impact fee ol'dinance that is inconsistent
with the requirements of this chapter shall be null and \loid and thai provision
shall have no legal ejJect. A partial invalidity of a development impact fee
ordinance shall not affect the validity of the remaining pcrtiOl1s of the ordinance
that are inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter."

The COUl1 therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Sections IO-5-2.C,
1O-6-8.A.9, and 10-9·8.0 are contrary to law and are therefore null, void, and v.rithout further

force and effect.

Count 3 -Road Mitigation Fee (2025 Ordinance)
19.

1n its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226,227,228,229, 23(}, 231,

233,234,235,236, 240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above.
20.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 256, 257, and 258 of Cove

Springs' Complaint, which state as follows:
256. The Road Mitigation Fee [defined in paragraph 254
of the Complaint as Public Ways and Property 01'dinance § 6-1-4
as amended in 2007] does not fall within the scope oflDIFA
257. The Road Mitigation Fee does not comply with the
procedural and substantive requirements ofIDIFA.
258. The County did not enact the Road Mitigation Fee
pursuant to or ill reliance 011 IDIrA.
21.

TIle County admitted Paragraphs 225, 226, 227,228, 229, 230,23],233,234,

235,236,240,241,256,257, and 258 of Cove Springs' Complaint. These are accurate
statements of the law.
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22.

The Road Mitigation Fee required under Public Ways and Property Ordinance

§ 6-]-6, (sometimes referred to as 6-!-4 in Cove Springs documents) as amended in 2007,
establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with
IDIFA.

23.

The County has 110 inherent authority to impose taxes tinder its police power. The

County must impose development impact fees pmsuant to [DIFA Or not at all.

24.

The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover costs

associated with roads pursuant to lDIF A, but elected
25,

not to do so.

The Road Impact Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is

intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly,
the fees imp<lsed under this ordinance constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho
Constitution and are, therefore, nulJ and void. TI\e County may not use an applicant's failure to
pay an illegal fee as a basis for dellial of a pennit application.

26.

In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it

does not), the Road Impact Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a
broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in Idaho and
was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation." Envirosafe Services a/Idaho v. Counly

q!,Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687,689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987).

The COl.u1 therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Section 6~1·6 of the
Blaine County Code is contrary to law and is therefore null and void, and without further force
and effect.
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Count 3 -lnclusional'l!, Housing Fee (2015 Ordinance)
27.

In its Allswer, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226, 227,228,229,230,231,

233,234,235,236,240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above.

28.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 265,266,267,268, and 269 of

Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows:
265.
Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4 adopted in 2006,
provides, ill relevant part "INCLUSrONAR Y HOUSJNG:
Twenty percent (20%) of the lots and houses in all subdivisions,
including condominium subdivisions, approved and platted after
the adoption date hereof shall be pennanently restricted as
community housing ... ,"

266. Pursuantto Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4, an
applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the Board may
approve, any of four (4) options, or a combination thereof, for
providing community housing that is required by the ordinance, as
follows: (1) the applicant build community housing on the site of
the subdivision; (2) the applicant build community housing off the
site ofthe subdivision; (3) the applicant convey land, either within
the subdivision or off the site of the subdivi!l.ion, for community
housing; or (4) the applicant pay a fee in lieu for community
housing.
267. Subdivision Ordinance § t 0-5-4 does not fall within
the scope of IDIFA.
268.
Subdivi!lion Ordinance § 10-5-4 does not cornply
with the procedural and substantive requirements of IDIFA.

~

29.

269. The County did no1 enact Subdivision Ordinance
to-54 pursuant to or in reliance on IDlrA.

The County admitted Paragraphs 225,226,227,228,229,230,231,233,234,

235,236,240, 24 I, 265, 266, 267,268, and 269 of Cove Springs' Complaint. These are accurate
statements of the law.

O!tI)f:1t ON SUMMAI~Y JUDCMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3

Pa!l,e 12 of20

568

30.

The Inclusionary I-lousing Fee imposed under Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4

establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with

lDIFA.
31.

The County has no mherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The

Cotmty must impose development impact fees pursuant. to lDIFA or not at all.
32.

lDIFA authorizes ce11ain categories of development impact fees, to wit:
1. water supply,

2. wastewater facilities,
3. roads,
4. storm water collection facilitics,
5. parks and open space, and
6. public safety facilities.
Idaho Code § 67-8203(24). Affordable workforce housing is not among them.
33.

Accordingly, the County has no authority to impose a developmen1 impac1 fee for

affordable workforce housing, even ifit complied with the procedural requirements ofIDlFA. If
the County wishes to provide affordable workforce housing, it must do so through the
expenditure of property tax revenues or other authorized means. The Legislature has not
authorized the County to shift tlle cost of building affordable housing from the community as a.
whole to individual developers and property owners.
34.

The County has no inherent authority to 1I11pOSe taxes. The Incll.1sionary HOUSing

Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, butlS intellded to raise revenues for public
purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accol'dingly, the fees imposed under this ordinance
constitute mega! taxes in violation of the Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, nut! and void.
35.

111 addition, even if the COWlty had inherent allthority to impose taxes (which it

does not), the Inc1usionary I-lousing Fee is void because it has been preempted by ID[F A. IDIFA
is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees iIlldaho
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and was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation." Enviroscife Services oj Idaho v.

CounlyofOwyhee. 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, iOOO (1987).

The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Section 10-5-4 of the

Blaine County Code is contrary to law, is therefore null and void, and without fUlther force and
effect.

Count 3 - WildJi& Overlap District (2025 Ordinancel

36.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs'

Complaint, which state as foHows:

262. The Wildlife Overlay District includes all
"Classified Lands" as defined in Zoning Ordinance § 9~20-4.
263. "Classified Lands" are defined in Zoning Ordinance
§ 9-20-4 solely by reference to determinations made by the lDFG
[Idaho Department ofFish and Game].

The County admitted Paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' Complaint.

37.

These are accurate statements of the law as enacted by Blaine County.
Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 defines "CLassified Lands" in terms of elk winter

38.

habitat, mule deer winter habitat, elk migl'ation con'idors, mule deer migration con'idors, and
other areas identified by IDFG. The ordinance provides:
•

"Elk migration corridors in Blaine County are designated by IDF&G."

•

«Elk winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF &G."

•

"Mule deer migration corridors are des! gllated by IDF &G."

•

"Mule deer winter habitat in Blaine County IS designated by IDF&G."
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Page 14 of20

570

39.

Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-5 provides; "Prior to the planning or designating of any

subdivision, the applicant shall contact lDF&G Glnd any other applicable agency or professional
as determined by the admin:istrator to identify any classified lands on the subject property:'

40.

LLUPA authorizes and mandates the establishment of zoning districts. Idaho

Code § 67-65 I L
41 ,

LLU PA does not require creation of a 7..oning map in so many words, but it does

require the designation of zoning districts which, as a practical matter. may be displayed on a
zoning map.
42.

A zoning map describes current zoning, It is not to be confused with the [and use

map that is part of the comprehensive plan?
43.

LLUPA does not expressly authorize overlay districts, which are special zones

imposed on top of an underlying zoning district. However, zoning districts and overlay districts

are permissible fOlnlS of zoning. so tong as they comply with statutory, common law, and
constitutional requirements for land use zoning, One of the requirements inherent in all zoning is

that landowners and other affected parties be informed of the boundaries of the zones. This may
be accomplished either by mapping or by the establishment of objective, textual standards that
allow persons to determine with reasonable certainty which zones apply to a given property.

44.

Accordingly, the County's adoption of a Wildfife Overlay District without

mapping its hound aries does not,
45.

in itself, violate LLUPA.

However, the Wildlife Overlay District fails to provide any objective criteria (or

any criteria at aU) to define its boundaries, other tban "references used by lDF&G."
Accordingly, there is no way for a person to determine whethel' a property is within or outside of
2 The operative provision simply refers to this as a "map." Idaho Code
"land lise map" in Idaho Code ~ 67-6509(d}.
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the Wildlife Overlay District other than to ask for a determination by a third party (an 1DFG
employee) who answers to no one within the County and who can issue a conclusory
deternlination on a case-by-case basis unbounded by any fixed, articulated standards or criteria.
Furthennore. the ordinance allows IDFG to modify such «references" from time to time without
any notice to and/or input from affected landowners.
The COllnty argues that "wildlife move" which makes the adoption of a map difficult.
Petitioners argue that the County bad a map that was used prior to the adoption of this ordinance.
At different times, in different years, virtually everyone in Hailey, Bellevue, or Ketchum has
seen moose in the streets, ell< in their yards or subdivisions, elk or deer wintering on surroWlding
hillsides, bears along the river, etc. Yes, wildiife move, and they move in different quantities to
different locations in different years; however, the county has sought in this instance to avoid
responsibility for fixing or studying or ascertaining the general movement of various animals,
and/or zoning in accordance with general movements of particular populations, by delegating
this entire responsibility to the idaho Department ofFish and Gamc.
Fish and Game wldoubtedly has more expertise than the County Commissioners in this
area, but Fish and Game has no authority to set and/or designate zoning boundaries. The setting
of zoning boundaries is a function that rests entirely

WIth the designated agellts of Blaine County.

In making this delegation, the County has unlawfully delegated all of its authority to
officially designate the boundaries of a zoning district, the Wildlife Overlay District, to a non
elected non county agent that needs to hold

110

hearings, accepts no public input, can change its

designations of "classified lands" (and therefore the zoning boundary line) daily, weekly,. or
monthly, without notice, be subject to differing opinions and criteriu within Fish and Game itself,
and are not required to sct fOlih their designations in a published map or guide for the benefit of

ORDa::nON SUMMAUV JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3
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landowners, buyers, sellers, developers, Or the general pUblic. The boundaries of the zoning
dis.trict don't even shift with the wildlife; they shift Wlth the opinions of unknown persons ill an
amorphous state agency.
Blaine County has wholly abandoJ1ed its exclusive statutory obligation to establish a
zoning boundary in this instance. 'n1e fact that the public can find out where these boundaries
exist by contacting Idaho Fish and Game, or possibly obtain a waiver from the County
administrator, or address grievances or complaints about the process or how Fish and Game
exercises its discretion, before the Board of Commissioners do::s not save the ordinance.
Contrary to the County's arguments, the Board of Commissioners, in this circumstance, is not

able to control the ability of Fish and Game to exercise discretion. It is ioo late for there to be
any discussion regarding an exercise of discretion once Fish and Game has made a designation.
That comes about because Blaine County has delegated to Fish and Game the ability

(0

set and

establish law - the boundary of a zoning district, which may not be delegated. Any challenge
after that is not a challenge to someone's exercise of discretion, it becomes a challenge to
legislative authority, something quite different.

46.

The delegation ofland use planning and zoning authority cotltained in LLUPA is

a complete, comprehensive, and exclusive deJegation to local clty and county governments.
"The LLUPA provides both mandatory and exclusive procedures for the implementation of
planning and zoning." Sprenger, Grubb & Associates v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320,321,986 P.2d

343,344 (1999) ("Sprenger Grubb If'). "[LLUPA J directs cities and counties to plan and zone .
. .. Exercise of the a.uthority to zone and plan, whether by governing board or by the established
[planning and zoning] commissions, is made mandatory by I.C. § 67-6503." Gumprechf v. CUy
a/Coeur d'Alene. 104 Idaho 615. 6 t 7, 661 P .2d 1214, 1216 (1983) > overruled on other ground.s,
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Cilyo/Boise City v. Keep the Commandments Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 257,141 P.3d 1123,
1(26 (2006). "The legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact comprehensive plans,
establish ;toning districts and adopt amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and
county legislative or goveming bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed procedures."

Gumprecht, 104 ldaho

at 618,661 P.2d at 1217 (1983). "We conclude that the power to approve

a subdivision application in the impact area resides excfusively with the County." Blaha \I. Bd
qfAda OJunty Commr 's, 134 Idaho 770, 777. 9 P.3d t236, 1234 (2000) (only the county has the

autbority to approve applications in the area of impact, even if the county wished to cede or
delegate that authority to a city).
47.

IDFG is charged by the Legislature with the regulation of fishing and hunting ano

with wildiif-e research. Idaho Code §§ 36-101 to

36~124,

It has no regulatory authority over

habitat on private lands.
48.

Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 constitutes an unlawful delegation of regulatory

authority by the County to another agency. Gumprechr, 104 Idaho at 617, 661 P .2d at 1216
(holding that the City of Coeur d' Alene may not, in effect, delegate its planning and wning
responsibilities under LLUPA to the people by holding an initiative election on zoning issues).
49.

LLUPA preempts Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4, because the ordinance violates

LLUPA's assignment of decision-making authority to local officials and authorizes non-elected
officials outside of county government to make binding deterrnh1ations that affect the land use
entitlement process.

50.

lithe County desires to make use of the expertise ofIDFG, the U.S. fish and

Wildlife Service, the University of Idaho, the USDA Extension Service, or any other expert, it
should invite their views 10 the context of a hearing process that accommodates rebuttal of

onmm ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3
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evidence and which reserves the final decision to the County, as mandated by LLUPA. The
result of that process should be the adoption ofa map or objective criteria that clearly define the
boundaries of the zone.
51.

Accordingly, Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 is inconsistent with fundamental

principles of zoning law. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 on its face violates both LLUPA and th.e
due process clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions. The Court hereby declares, adjudges,

and decrees it is void and of no further force and effect

Therefore, the Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code

section 9-20-4 is contrary to law and is therefore null and void. and without fU11her force and
effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DA TED this

lttR day of

~

,2008.

ROBE~t

District Judge
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Case N~:-rI7
FIled tWi...~

A.M,_=:::p-..
1nsC. No

2

3

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRaCT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

5

6

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES. INC., an Idaho
corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company.

7

8
9

Plaintiffs,

I

10 .

vs.
11

12

VALLEY COUNTY. a political subdivision,
Defendant.

13

14

Case No, CV-2009-554C
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(2) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
(3) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION/AMENDMENT
(4) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY
FEES

APPEARANCES

15

For Plaintiff: Jed Manwaring and Victor Villegas of Evans Keane LLP
16

17

For Defendant: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens Pursley
PROCEEDINGS

16

19

This matter came before the Court on (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

20

Judgment: (2) Oefendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for

21

ReconSideration/Amendment, and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney

22

Fees. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

23

BACKGROUND

24

The

Plaintiffs

Buckskin

Properties.

Inc.

("Buckskin~)

and

Timberline

25

Development, LLC ('Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in
26

Valley County, Idaho, called The Meadows at West Mountain (the "Meadows"). Valley
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, County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition to approve the Plaintiffs'
1

final plat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plajntiffs filed this lawsuit seeking

2

a declaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of

: I Impact

fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the

5

Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the

6

impact fees.

7

On October 14. 2010, Valley County filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of

8

limitations has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and

9

paid the fees.

On January 7, 2011. the Court entered its Memorand um Decision

10

granting Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11

DISCUSSION

12 '

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion

13

for Entry of Judgment

14

Summary judgment will be granted only

~if

the pleadings, depositions, and

15

admissions on file. together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
16

' issue

17

Imatter of law."

18

19

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

I court
I

I,R.C.P. 56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial

must construe the record liberally in favor of the

non-mov~ng

party and draw all

20

reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's

21

Assoc. v. Bear Lake County. 118 Idaho 343,346.196 P.2d 1016. 1019 (1990). The

22

motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokol, 117 Idaho 963,

24

793 P.2d 195 (1990).
25

26

The Plaintiffs are seeking summary judgment on Count One of their Complaint
because they contend that it survived the Court's ruling on the Defendant's previous
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV-2009-554C • PAGe 2
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Mot~on for Summary Judgment because Count One relates to uncompleted Phases 4-6

for which a Road Development Agreement has not yet been negotiated. However. as
the Court stated in its previous Memorandum Decision. U[t]he actual date of taking.

3
4

although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be fixed at the point In time

5

at which the impairment. of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial

6

interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became

7

Sandpoint. 100 Idaho 667, 671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979).

8

apparent~

Tibbs v. City of

Here. the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Penn it and at

9

the very latest, October 25, 2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to
10

run on all of the Plaintiffs' claims regarding each phase of the entire project because
11

that was the date when the dedication of right of way was accepted and it was at that

12
13

point in time at which an impairment of such a degree and kind as to constitute a

14

substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent. Although

15

there may be some dispute as to the exact date when the statute of limitations began to

16

run, the dispute does not create a genuine issue of material fact because October 25,
2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have began to run

18

as a matter of law.

19

~n

addition. on March 7. 2011. the Valley County Board

of County

20

Commissioners adopted Resolution 11·6: Resolution Regarding Road Improvement
21
22

i'

23

24
25 :
26

Fees and Development Agreements ("Resolution"). The Resolution provides that the
County will not enter into any new road development agreements calling for the
payment of fees or other contributions for off-site road improvements unless (1) the

ICounty

has adopted an ordinance in compliance with the Idaho Development Impact

Fee Act or (2) the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any objection to such
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV·2009-554C • PAGE 3
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fees. Based on the subsequent adoption of the Resolution, it appears the Plaintiffs'
claims with respect to Phases 4-6 have also been rendered moot because the Plaintiffs

2

3

will now have an opportunity to negotiate a Road Development Agreement for Phases

4

14-6. which will be subject to the terms of the Resolution. Therefore, the Court denies

5

,I the PlaintiHs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grants the Defendant's Motion

6

for Entry of Judgment in favor of the County on all counts of the Complaint

7

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment

a

A motion for reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment can be
made prior to entry of final jUdgment. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(8); Puckett v. Verska. 144 Idaho

10

161.166.158 P.3d 937. 942 (2007). A party may submit new evidence with the motion
11

for reconsideration but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros. 143 Idaho 468,

12
13

473. 147 P.3d 100. 105 (Cl. App. 2006).

14

reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial coort. Van v. Por1neuf Med.

15

Glr., 147 Idaho 552, 560. 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009).

16 ; I
17

A deCision to grant or deny a motion for

The Plaintiffs argue that the Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision

\Ion the Defendant's previous Motion for Summary Judgment for two reasons. First, the

18

Plaintiffs argue that the Court is required to separately address the statute of limitations

19

for each phase of the project and that the statute of limitations has only run on Phase 1.
20

Second, the PlaintiHs argue that Count 1 of their Complaint arises from a contract.
21

which makes that claim subject to the five year statute of limitations for contract actions.
22

23

i
The Plaintiffs' first argument is w~thout merit because "[t]he actual date of taking,

24

although not readily susceptible to exact determination, is to be fixed at the point in time

25

at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substan1ial

26

interference with plaintiHs' property interest, became apparent." T;bbs v. City of
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV·2009·554C • PAGE 4
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II
I

Sandpoint. 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979). As stated previously. the
1

:

1

entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and at the very latest,

I

October 25, 2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to run on all of the

41 Plaintiffs' claims regarding each phase of the entire project because that was the date
5

I when

the dedication of right of way was accepted and an impairment of such a degree

I

and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property interest

6
7

became apparent.

a

It is irrelevant that the project was divided into separate phases

because the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and the

9

Plaintiffs had no reason to believe that the later phases of the project would not be
10

subject to the same impact fees as the earlier phases of the project.

11

1:1

13

I
I

The Plaintiffs' second argument is also without merit because this is simply not
an action based on a contract. It is an action based on inverse condemnation. Under

14

the Plaintiffs' interpretation of I.e. § 5-216, any cause of action where there was some

15

type of contract between the parties would be subject to a five year statute of limitations

15
17

18

I; regardless of whether the cause of action

stemmed from the contract itself.

This

interpretation is incorrect. See Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. St. John Med.
Plans, (nc .. 674 So.2d 911. 912

(F~a.

3d DCA 1996) (noting that "[c]haracterizing the

19

claim as an inverse condemnation will not convert what appears to be a pure breach of
20

contract action into something more"); see also, Tex. S. Univ. v. State St. Bank & Trust
21

Co., 212
23
24

S. W. 3d 893, 916-17 (Tex.App.-Hooston 1sf Dlst.

200 7) (discussing the

differences between an inverse condemnation claim and a contract dispute).
Idaho Code § 5-224 applies in this case and contains the statute of limitations for

25

an inverse condemnation cla,m.

"An aelion for [inverse condemnation1 must be

26

commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." See C &
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV-2009·554C • PAGE 5
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G. Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003).
In this case, the Complaint was filed on December 1, 2009 and October 25. 2004 was

2

the latest date when the statute of limitations could have started to run. As such, the
: Plaintiffs

4

were required to bring their inverse condemnation action by October 25. 2008

in order to comply with the four year statute of limitations

5

1

Therefore. the Court denies

,the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment.

6
7

Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

Ii

The Defendant is seeking recovery of $666.00 in costs as a matter of right
9

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 Hc). $697.00 in discretionary costs pursuant to I.R.C.P.

1(}

54(d)(1)(D), and $56,165.00 in attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§12-117 and/or 12-121.
11

as provided under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5}. The Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Disallow Costs

12

and Attorney fees in this matter.

13
14

i.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 HC) provides that:

15

When costs are awarded to a party. such party shall be entitled to the
following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right:

16

9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the
trial of an action.
10. Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties
to the action in preparation for trial of the action.

n

I.R.C.P. (d)(l )(D) provides that:

22

Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of
that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said
costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverso party.

23
24 I

25

I

-

.

t:.llen assurring that tl".e Plaintiffs' cause of action for Inllerse indt/mnlfication could be classified as a
?6 I breach of contract c.aim. the Plainti!is' claim would still be barred under a five year statute of limitations
because they filed theIr Complaint more than five years after October 25. 2004. wPlch was the latest dale
when the statute of limitations could halle started 10 run.
MEMORANDUM DECISION· CASE NO. CV-2009-554C - PAGE 6
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The trial court, In ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs
contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to
why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be
aliowed.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5} provides that:
5

Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as
costs in an action and processed in the same manner as costs and
included in the memorandum of costs ....

6

7 :
8

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19

I.C. 12-117(1) provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or
political subdivision and a person. the state agency or political subdivision
or the court, as the case may be. shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nO'lprevailing party acted without a reasonable baSis in
fact or law.
LC. 12-121 provides that
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's
fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,
partnership, corporation. association, private organization, the state of
Idaho or political Subdivision thereof.
The Plaintiffs argue that the pursuit of their claims against the County was in
good faith and was not without a reasonable basis in fact or law because the County
was collecting illegal impact fees and there were genuine legal issues regarding the

?O

appropriate accrual date of the inverse condemnation claim.

Both parties spent a

2\

22
23

sign4ficant amount of time briefing the statute of limitations issue and it was not clear
from the outset of the litigation exactly when the statute of limitations began to run,

24

Although the Court ultimately determined under the summary judgment standard that

25

October 25. 2004 was the latest possible date when the statute of limitations could

26

have started to run, there was a legitimate issue of law that was in dispute. Therefore.
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the Court finds that the Plaintiffs were acting with a reasonable basis in fact or law and

Ideny the Defendant's request for attorney fees.

<'

The Court also denies the Defendant's

3 '\ request for discretionary costs because the Defendant has not made a sufficient

II showing of how those costs were necessary and exceptional.

4

I award

5

However, the Court will

the Defendant $666.00 in costs as a matter of right pursuant to loR C.P.

: IS4( d)(1 )(e),
CONCLUSION
B

The Court (1) DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2)

IGRANTS

9

the Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; (3) DENIES the Plaintiffs'

IMotion for Reconsideration/Amendment; and (4) GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion to

10

11

• Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees by awarding the Defendant $666.00 in costs as a

~:

I matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(C). The Defendant will prepare an appropriate

judgment with an IRCP ~b) certification,

14

I

1!)

I

DATED this

-.lL day of April 2011 .

16

18

19

20
21
22
23

2::'

2fi

I
I
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I hereby certify that on the

..J..I- day of April 2011. , mailed (seIVed) a true and

3
4

,correct copy of the within instrument to:
I

5

\ VALLEY COUNTY COURT
VIA EMAIL

6
7

B
9

10
11
12

I

Jed W. Manwaring
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 W Main St
PO Box 959
Boise, 1083701-0959
Fax: (208) 345-3514

II Christopher H. Meyer
i

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

1601 W Bannock St
[; PO BOl{ 2720
. Boise. 1083701-2720

13

Fax: (208) 366-1300

ARCHIE N. BANBURY
Clerk of the District Court

By

(J~( tiD

De

y Clerk

2()

22
23

25
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ORIGI.~AL
Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villegas ISB# 5860
EV ANS KEANE LLP
]405 West Main
P. O. Box 959
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
Telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: jmaowaring@evanskeaoe.com
VviUegas@evanskeane.com

IE N. BANBURY, CLERK
·~~~~~~2~Depuly

APR, 3 20tt
Case No

FiIedJ--:-(-r,r--- lost. No. ____

-A,M._

_P.M.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN MD FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROP.ERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
P]aintitf,

Case No. CV-2009-554-C
PLAI1\TJFFS' OBJECTION TO
V ALLEY COUNTY'S PROPOSED
JUDGMENT FILED APRIL 13, 201]

vs.

VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho.
Defendant.
Plaintiffs, by and through their attomeys of record, Evans Keane LLP, submit this

Objection to Valley County's Proposed Judgment delivered under cover letter dated April 13,
2011.

Defendant's proposed Judgment at paragraph #2 states ''That all of PlaintifTs' claims
against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice and;","
This Court's April 11, 2011 Memorandum Decision granted Defendant's Motion For
Entry of Judgment because this Court found that Plaintiffs' claims for Phases 4-6 were rendered

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO VALLEY COUNTY'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 13,2011 1
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moot by the enactment of Resolution 11-6. See. Memorandum Decision pp. 3-4.

Such finding

does not merit dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Phases 4-6. Plaintiffs
have not yet met with Defendant to determine what requirements, if any, will be imposed as a
condition to final plat approval.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs request that any entry of judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs' claims with respect to Phases 4-6 be done without prejudice.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2011.
EVANS KEANE LLP

.

By

r{:41

~~

Victor Vi1legas:the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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r HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

13th day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to~ by fax
transmission to; by overnight deliyery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, 10 836' J
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pursley LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, 1D 83701-2720
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

[XJ u.s. Mail
[X] Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
( J Hand Delivery

[X] U.S. Mail

[XI Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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To .

Page20fG

2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT

18665753182 From : LiA Hughes

Matthew C. Williams~ ISB #6271
VAlley COUllty Prosecuting Attorney

P.O. Box 1350
CS$Cade. (0 83611
Telephone: (201) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-71.24

mwillj,Bms@co.vaJlcy.;<f.WI

Chris10pher H.Meyer"JSB #4461
MartinC. Hendric~ont ISB#$875
OWENS PURSLEY LLP

601 W . .BannockSt
P,D.Box 2720
Boise.. Idaho 83701-2720
T ~)f;ph9De; 208~388-120Q
Facsimile: 208-38.8 -1300
chri~eyer@sj\le~spur&l~y. COJl)

mcb@givenspurs1ey ~com

Attorneys for l),;fend~t
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT O~

THE STATE OF JDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COI,JNTY Of YALLEY
BUClCSlON PROPERTIES,INC.• anlclQhQ

Case No. CV2009-554

Corpomtio~and TlMBERLINE

DEVELOPMENT. LLC. an IdahQ Limited
Liability Company,

Ib;sPQl'CSETO rUINTlffS 'OBJ~CtION
TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v ..

VALLEY COUNTY, BpoliticBl subdivision
ofthc State IJfldahQ, .
DckoolWt.

COMES NOW. the Defendant. Valley County • by and through its at1nmey~ of recorrf,
and hereby submilS its Response 10 Plilintlffs' Objection 1.0 Proposed Judgment.

~-st:TOPLAINT]~F5'OJW:CllONroPROPOSEDJtJDCM£NT·
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To:

Page 3 at 9

2011-04-1315:05:45 MDT

18665753182 From: lisa Hu{tles

On April 11, 2011, the Court entered its lvIef1Wrandum Decision r"Ap,.ilDeci#on')
ccncerning lhe pending motions!R this action. The end result.ofthat decisjon was to cqnfinn

thatth.e Court's Memorandum Decisiol1 Re : Deftndant. 'sMotion for Summary Judgment.
entered on January 7, 2011, fuUy disposed of the each of the claimS by P1aintifls. ]n the A.pril

Decisior,., the Court clarified thal aU ofPlaitllifTs' state lawcl~ms were barred by tht four year
statute Df limitations, noting that th~y all arose· from the same Conditional Use Permit and that aU
of the claiJlls accrued
at the same time.• In accordance with the Court's instructions contained
in
.
.
the finalsenten.;:e
Cowt,~: copy

ofthe April D.ecision. Valley County submitted its proposed judgment to the

of which. is .attached hereto a.s ExllibitA C""PropOsed Judgmenl}.

Pla.intiffsobject:to the ProJ)!)sed Jud$1flent onthe gro~d that Plaintiffs' cl~ims regarding
phases 4 thtough6 oft.beir development were. heldto be moot based upon Valley County's

recent adoption ()fRc::~lutioJ;l t 1~6.~

~Ia.intiffs·

objection to ilieProposad Jlldgmulltis without

merit because the Court, in th~ April De{;i.f ien •. cle-!3.dy statedtlult ~.n of Plaintiffs' ctait.ns vvere
ban'edby the sl;at1,lte of JimifatiQIlS..
Here. lh~ e.,tire project was'governed by' asin~e CoooitlOnal Use Perrnitand.at
9

the very latest, October 25.. .2004 was 1he tlat~ wh~n the s~tute of IimitatiQ.n.s DeQSn to

run on a8 of Ibe Planiffs' claims regarding each -phase of the entire pl'{)jec1because
11
·~2

13

that wa$lhe date

when the dedication of right of W4Y was accepted and it was aOhat·

p(lint in time at which an impainnent of such a degl'ge olln!i kind sst!) constitutes

w1tn th~ Ptaintiffs' Pnlperty intereSllJecame apparent

14

substantial interierenC(l

\5

there may .besome dispute as to -the exact date when the sJalute:of limitaf~ns began to

16

run, tbe displ.Jte does not create

11

2004 was the latest pDlnlin time that the stalute of limitations could .have begc;ln to. run

U!

8.

Although

genuine issue of material fact because. Octol.')er 25,

as a matter of laW.
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(April ])eeisien. p. 3; see also pp. 4-5.) Thus; t~ Proposed Judgment accurately reflects the
,

'

Comi's nllings and dismissal

or all ofPlaintifCs'claims with prejudice is appropriate.

Valley County recognizes tPat tile Co\lI't discussed ileSQJution 11,.0 in the April Decision
and c~nch}(l~dtbat Plaintiffs' claims regarding phases 4,6 oftheh ~'(elopmenthave been

.-e.ndered moot. However. that pOf(i()n of the 4pr.i/ Decisionis plainly articulated .by the Cou,rt to
bean additional ba$is for dismissal of those c1aims. (Id.~ pp. 3-4.) If the ,Court had detennined

that the claims related to phases 4-6 were not Ilarred by the statute of liuritations and, instead.
hadIUled that such claims were subject to dismissal only based onm.ootness, then Plaintiffs.
would have a point. But ajudgrneru or dis.rnissal with prej'iJdice of ~lJ claims l.sproper here
because the Court ruled thal ·'at the very latest, October 25, 2004 was the:,datc when the statute of
<limitations began to run on aU of the Plaintiffs', claims reaardint;t eaehphase of the entire l'rojec1 .
. . ." (ld, p. 5, emphasis added.)
For these reasons, ValleyCounty respectfully submits that the CourtshQUld enter

judgment in favorofthc: County on all c~unt~ c()Osistent with the Propo.<:ed.ludgmlJnJ.
DATED this 131h day of April, 2011.

GIVENSPUllSLEY"LLP

RF.SPON~ETO.PLAJN11U'S'

08Jl:CTlON TO PROPOSE]) JlJDCMI:NT
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I hereby certify that 0t? the 13111 day of April. 20 11 ~ a true and con-eel copy of the
foregoing wasserve(f upon the fnUowil1gindividual (s)by the means. indicated:

JedM<lJIwaring
Vidor Villegas
Evans Keane:LLP
1405 WcstMain
P.O. Box: 959
Boise .. ID 83701 ~0959

D

o
o
~

u..s, Mail, postage prepaid
Express Mail
Hand J)e.livery

Facsimile
E-Mail

j manwarin11@evanskeanc.com

vviUegas@evanskeane.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA,LDISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES~ INC., an Idaho
Corpora:tion. and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT~

Case No.CV 2009-554

LLC. an (dabo Limited

Liability Company,

JUOOMI.NT

Plaintiffs.

v.
VALLEY COUNTY,apolitlcal subdivision
of the Slate of Idabo,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Valley County's Molionfor
Enuy ofJudgmenl, and this Court having previously granted Vulley CQu1IIy '05 Moiionjor
Summary Judgment in. its Memonutdwn Pe,dsiQoentered on.J~unry7,2011.,1mdthis Court

having also c,onsidered Pl,#nNjJs' Motion jorPQrtiqlSum.mary Judgment. Pff.linliffs' Morion/or
ReCDI1Jiderat;on, ValieyCounJy's Me11f(Jram:ium a/Cost... andAllor~y Fee,,~ 8I1.dPlaintifft'
),.forion fa Disallow;

NOW. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED. AND DECREED:
1.

That judgment ;$ entered jn favor nftbe(>efendadt:WlQ against th~ Plaintiff$- on all

counts of P/Qlnti/ft ' Complaint;
2.

That all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Oefendantare dismissed with prejudice,
'and;

JIJUbM~J

Page 1
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That Plaintifis slWl pay to Valle) Cowlty $666.00 foc il$ custs pursuallt to IRCP

Rule 54(d)( l)(C), pJus interest acawngat the statutory rate from .and after the
date of entry ofjudgmenl.

DATED.tbi!l _ _ day ofApril. 2011.

MICHAEL R MCLAUGHLIN
Districl Court Juclge

.RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issuesdetermioed by the aooyejud.gmentit is hereby C~RTIFIED, in
Ifl;cmW:utce;:

wi~h

Rule 54(0). I.R.c'.P... that, the Cowl has. detennined (hat there is no JUSt reason

for delay of the entry ofa final judgmcnt.andthat the Court has and,do~s h~by direct that the
abovejuda:ment shall be a finaljud-'Pllent upon which execution ma.y'issue !md an appeal may be
ta.k.en

I:t.S

provitlt:d by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this _ _ day of April, .2011.

MICHAEL R. .MCLAUGHLIN
District Court .Judge

JUDGMENT

Pl.tge 2.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that.on the _ _ day of April. 2011;.&. true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upo n the following individual(s) by the mean$ indicated:
Jed Man'W8ring
Victor ViIleg~
Evan~ .Keane.

LLP

1405 West Main
P.O. Box 9.59
Boise, ID 83 701 ~09S9·

B
8o

U.8. Mail. postage prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
E-Mail

oB

US. Mail. pOstage prepaid
E"press: Mail

jm.anwaring@ev~keane.com.

vvillegas@evanskeane.com
Matthew C. Wi1liams
Va11eyCounty Prosecud!\g Attorney
P.O. Box 1350

Cascade, ID83611
mwilliam$@co.valley.id,us

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hc.mdricbon
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

601

W.B~St.

P.O. Box 2120
Doise. ID 83701-2720
chrismeyer@APven:n>ursJey.com
mch@givenspursley.com

o
o
o
n

HllIld D~livery

Facsimile

E-MaiJ

U.S,

MaiJ,poSIa~e

E~press

B
o

prepaid

Mail

Hand DeJiv~ry
Facsimile

E-Mail

ARCHIE N. BANBURY
CIeri. of the Distdct Court
By;

~~

__~~__________~_____

Deputy Clerk

JuDOMf.N1'
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Case No

F~'~~~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICTOF--A'~PJf~
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho
Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV 2009-554

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.

VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.

THIS MA'ITER having come before the Court pursuant to Valley County's Motion for

Entry ofJudgment, and this Court having previously granted Valley County's Motion/or
Summary Judgment in its Memorandum Decision entered on January 7, 2011, and this Court
having also considered Plaintiffs' MOlion/or Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion/or

Reconsideration, Valley County's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, and PlaintiffS '
Molion to Disallow;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
That judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on aJ I

1.

counts of PlaintiffS' Complaint;

2.

That all ofPJaintifis' claims against the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice,

and;
JUDGMENT
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3.

That Plaintiffs shaH pay to Valley County $666.00 for its costs pursuant to IRCP
Rule 54(dXI)(C), plus interest accruing at the statutory rate from and after the
date of entry of judgment.

DATED this

rt

day of April, 2011.

~~~
MICHAEL R. MCL
District Court Judge

GH IN

RULE 54{b) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in
accordance with Rule 54(b}, LR.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this

Iq

day of April, 2011.

I).;£h~/£
MCG
MICHAEL R.
District Court Judge

JUDGMENT

IN
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CLERK.S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

-d

day of April. 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:

Jed Manwaring
Victor Villegas
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jrnanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com
Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, ID 83611
mWiJIiams@co.valley.id.us
Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley.com

vEf·

/
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
E-Mail

o
o
oo

~
o

U.S. Mail. postage prepaid

Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
DE-Mail

o
o

/

~
o

o
oo

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Del ivery
Facsimile
E-Mail

ARCHIE N. BANBURY
Clerk of the District Court

JUDGMENT
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EVANS KEANE LLP

J~d

Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villegas JSB# 5860

EVANS KEA.'JE LLP
1405 West Main

P. O. Box 959

~aseNo.

_ _-,\nstNo,_ __

Filed

A.M.

Boise, Idaho 83701..0959
Telephone: (108) 384-1800
Facsimile! (208) 345·3514
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
V villegas@evanskeane.eom

;3:

&~

P.M

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURY O:F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV-1009-554-C

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PlaintitlslAppellants,
VS.

VALLEY COUNTY, a politicaJ subdivision
of the State of Idaho.

DefendantlRespondent.

TO:

TIlE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, AND TO
THE CLERK OF TIlE ABOVE-E~'TTTLED COURT
1.

The above-named Appellants, Buckskin Properties, Inc., and Timberline

Development, LLC, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the District Court's Memorandum Decision Re: DefendanCs Motion for Summary Judgment

entered on January 7, 2011, Memorandum Decision entered on April I!, 2011 and Judgment
entered April 19. 2011 by the Honorable Judge Michael R. McLaughlin, presiding.
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That the pany has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supremc Court, and the

2.

Memorandum Decisions and Judgment described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1) ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

Appellants intend to assert a number of issues on appeal I including, but not

limited to, the following:
(a)
When does a cause of action for inverse condemnation begin to accrue on a multiphase residential subdivision?
(b)
Did the District Court eiT in IIXing the accrual date of Appellant's inverse
condemnation claim upon its payment of road development fecs under Phase l despHe
the fact that AppeUant paid separate road development fees for later phases?
(c)
Did the District Court err in dismissing Appellant's declaratory action on the final
phases of its development as being moot?
This appeal is taken upon both matters of law and issues of ract. Appellants reserve the
right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the issues set torth above.
4.

There have been no orders entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Appellants request pursuant to I.A.R. 25(c) the reporter's transcripts of the

December 6, 2010 hearing on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 8lld the Marth
11, 2011 hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

8l1d

Motion fOT

Reconsideration.
Appellants request the folIowing documents to be induded in the clerk's record in

6.

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R:
No.

Filed

t

12/01109

Complaint

I 2

12/01109

Summons

3

12/01/09

Affidavit of Service

4

12121109

Answer

5

04/15/10

Affidavit of Cynda Herrick

Description
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I No.

I
I

I

I

Filed

IaJ 004

EVANS KEAIiE LLP

Description

6

JO/l4/10

7

10/14/10

8

10114/10

Valley County' s Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

9

10114/10

Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (as Exhibit to Clerk's Recordj

11102/10

Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
SUUUUCU'l Judgment

11

11102/10

Affidavit of Dan R. Brumwell

12
13

11/02110

Affidavit of DeMar Burnett

11/02/10

Affidavit of Robert W. Fodrea

14

11/02/10

Affidavit of Rodney A. Higgins

15

11/02/10

Affidavit of Steve Loomis

16

11/02110

Affidavit of Michael Mailhot

17

11102/10

Affidavit of Larry Mangum

18

11/02/10

Affidavit of John MiHington

19

11102/10

Affidavit of Joseph Pachner

20

11102/10

Affidavit of H~ Rudolph

21

11/02110

Affidavit of Anne Seastrom

22
23

11/02110

Affidavit of Matt Wolff

i

A ffidavit of Victor Villegas in Opposition to Summary Judgment

I[

10

I

11109110

Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment
Valley County's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion
. for Summary Judgment

i

(as Exhibit to Clerk's Recordl
24

1.1/10/10

Valley COWlty'S Reply Brief in Support of Motion fOT Summary
Judgment

25

11111110

Stipulation to Move Summary Judgment Hearing from Valley
County to Ada County

26

01111111

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

27

01/11/11

28
29

01113/11 i Motion for Entry of Judgment

0llt3/11

30

01/14/11 ' Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Motion for Entry of

. Motion to Vacate Trial Date & Request for Status Conference

Response to Motion for Partial S -

.)' Judgment

Judlmlent Filed January 13, 2011
31

01121111

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration/Amendment

601
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I

III 005

No.

FUed

32

01/21111

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
ReconsiderationlAmendment

01128111

Stipulation to Move February 17, 2011 Motions Hearing f-rom
Valley County to Ada COlmty

34

02/28/11

VaHey County's Response to Motion for Reconsideration

l

35

03/09/11

Valley County's Reply in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment

\

36

03/09/11

37

03/28/11

33

I

38

i

04113111

Description

I Affidavit ofCynda Herrick Regarding Resolution 11-6
Notice of Supplemental Authority

I Plaintiffs' Objection to Valley County's Proposed Judgment Filed
April 13, 2011

04113111

39

i Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to YalJey County's Proposed
Ju~

I
7.

40

\

t

All Orders

I

j
I,

I certify:
That a copy of this Notice of ~ppeaJ has been served on the reporter of
(a)
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address .set out
below:
Frances Garrison
Fourth Judicial District Court
Valley County Courthouse
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, lD 83611
Vanessa Gosney
clo Hon. Timothy Hansen
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, 10 83702-7300
Penny Tardiff
c/o Hon. Darla S. Williamson
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702·7300
(b)

(c)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript
That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
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(d)
(e)

EVANS KEANE

flJ 006

LLP

That the appellate fillng fee has been paid.
That service has been made upon all parties Tequired to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DA TED this

J.. (

day of May, 2011
EV ANS KEANE LLP

By

Y&4l~~

Vict~r Vi11ega;,or~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERYICE

I HEREBY eERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2011, a Ulle and COrrect copy
of the foregoing document was served by flrst-class rrulil, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by
fax transmission to; by ovel1light delivery to; or by personaIly delivering to or leaving with a
person in charge of the office as indicated be]ow:

u.s. Mail

Matthew C. Williams

[Xl

VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTOR

[ ] Fax

P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, 1D 83611
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

[ J Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
GIVENS PURSLEY LlP

P.O. Box 2720

[X] U.S. Mail

[ 1 Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Boise, II) 83701-2720
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

ValJey County Clerk
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade. ID 83611
Facsimile: (208) 382-7184

[ J Overnight Delivery

Vanessa Gosney

[X] U.S. Mail

clo Hon. Timothy Hansen

[ ] Fax
[ J Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery

Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, II) 83702·7300

[XJ U.S. Mail
( ] Fax

[ ] Hand Delivery
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Penny Tardiff
c/o Hon. Darla S. Williamson
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, 10 83702-7300

III 007

EVANS KEANE LLP

[Xl u.s. Mail
[ ] Fax
( ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Victor Villegas

604

06/15/2011 WED 17103

FAX 208

1210021006

8 130D Givens Pursley

ARCHIE: 1\1. BANBURY, t;Lth.

BY~,ce..../
Matthew C.

JUN15 2011

WiUiams~

ISB #6271
Valley COWlty Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade. ID 83611
Telephone: (208) 382-7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124
mwilJiarnS@Co.valley.id.us

Deputl

.

Case NO. _ _--..JCJnst.No _ __
Filed

A,M,-£.~..P.M

Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461
Martin C. Hendrickson. ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock St
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 8370l-2720
Telephone: 208-388-) 200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300

chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley.com

Attorneys for DefendantIRespondentlCross-AppeIlal1t

IN THE DfSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idallo
. Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV 2009-554

NOTICE OF CRoss-ApPEAL

PlaintiffslAppe) lant/Cross-

Respondents,

v.
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,

Defendant/Respondent!
Cross-Appellant.

None.: or·' CRoss-APr&t\L

Page 1
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TO;

FAX 208 3B8 1300 Givens pursley

THE ABOVE-NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, BUCKSKIN PROPERTlBS. INC.,
TIMBERLINE DEVELOPMENT LLC, AND THE PARTIES' ArrORNEYS, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTInED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

l.

The above-named RespondentfCmss-Appellant, Valley County, appeals against

the above named Appellants/Cross-Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the

Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's MOIion for Summary Judgment entered on January 7,
2011. the Memorandum Decision (1) Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

(2) De/endant's Motion/lJr Entty ofJudgment (3) Plaintiffs' MOlion/or ReconsideraJiol1/
Amendment (4) Plaintiffi' Motion to Disallow CostJ and Altorney Fees entered on April I I,
20 I 1, and the Judgment entered on April 19, 2011, the Honorable Judge Michael R. McLaughlin
presiding..
2.

The Respondent/Cross-Appellant has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme

Court pursuant to Rules 15(a) and 11 (g), LA.R., and the two memorandum decisions and

Judgment described in paragmph I above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1).
J.A.R.
3.

The following is a preliminary statement of the issues that the RespoooentlCross-

AppeHant presently intends to assert in the appeal:
a.

The thrust of the issues presented by Respondent/Cross-Appellant wHl be

a defense of the District Court's decisions on the merits, both on the legal and factual
bases identified in the District Court's two memorandum decisions and on other legal and
factuaJ bases presented to the District Court. In addition. Respondents/Cross-Appellants
Williaise the issue listed below.

NO"flet: OF CNOSS-ArPEAL
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b.

121004/005

In its two memorandum decisions and Judgment, the District Court erred

in failing to award attorney fees to Respondent/Cross-Appellant. More specifically. the
District Court should have found that Appellants/Cross-Respondents acted without a
reasonable basis in law or fact thus entitling Respondent/Cross-Appellant to an award of
attomey fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 42 U.S.C.

§1988. Respondent/Cross-Appellant intends to seek costs and attorney fees for both the
District Court proceedings and on this appeaL

c.

Respondent/Cross-Appellant reserves the right to raise other issues on

appeal only to the extent pennitted by law. Respondent/Cross-Appellant will object to
any issue, argument, or facl raised on appeal by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents that
was not timely raised below.

4.

RespondentlCross-AppelJant does not request allY additional reporter's transcript.

5.

Respondent/Cross-Appellant l'eqUests the following documents to be included in

the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, tA.R. and those
designated by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents in the initiaJ Notice ofAppe.al:

a.

Affidavit ofMike Mailhot in Support ofApplication for Preliminary

Injunclion filed on 4/612010;

b.

Affidavit ofMatthew C. Williams filed on 1128/2011;

c.

Valley County's Memorandum ofCos Is and Stawment in Support £Hed 011

113112011;

d

Affidtll1it ofChristopher H. Meyer filed on 1131/2011;

e.

Affidavit ofMartin C. Hendrickson filed on 1/3112011;

f.

Affidavil qfMurray D. Feldman filed on 1131/2011;

NO'l'lC(O:Of CRQS!\.. APPEAL
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g.

Molion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees filed on 2/15111;

h.

Plaintiff's MemoranduM in Opposition JO Valley County's Me!1UJranaum

o/Costs and Statemenl in Support filed on 2/15/11; and
i.

Valley County's Response /0 Motion to Di.mllow Costs and Auorney Fees

filed on 3/t /20 11.

6.

Respondent/Cross-Appellant does not request any documents, charts, 01' pictures

offe.t'ed or admitted !IS exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

7.

I certify:
a.

That service of the norice of cross-appeal and any request for additional

transcript has been made upon the repotter;

b.

That the estimated reporter's fees for the requested transcript, if any. have

been paid;
c.

That the estimated fees, if any, for including any additional documents in

the clerk's or agency's record have been

paid~

d.

That all appellate filing fees, if any, have been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R.

DATED this 15 th day of June, 2011.

GIVENS PURSLEY LU'

BY:~'i~
Christopher H. Meyer

Attorneys ./Or RespondentiCross-Appeliam
NOTICt~ OF CROSS-A I'rE.U
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FAX 208 lSt 1300 Givens Pursley

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th day of June. 2011, the foregoing was filed. served,
and copied as foUows:

DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial Disu'ict Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

E-mail

SERV[CE COPIES TO:
Jed Manwaring, Esq.

U. S. Mail

Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main Stl'eet

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

P.O. Box 959
Boise.ID 83701-0959

E-mail

Facsimile

jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

COURTESY COPlES TO:
Honorable Michael R. Mclaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse

200 W. Front St
Boise, ID 83702

oo

[81

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

o

u. S. Mail

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court

o

Ada County Coul1house
200 W. Front Street
Boise, 1D 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

f2l

o

Christopher H.

NOTICE OF CltOSS-AI'I'EAt

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

E-mail

eyer
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~~=
APR 06 2010

Jed Manwaring ISB #3040
Victor Villegas lS8# 5860
EVANS KEANE LLP
1405 West :\'lain

. ca._

w.No-----

Filed / /,' UJ...A.M

P.M

P. O. Box 959

Boise, Idaho 83701-0959
(208) 384-]800
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514
e-mail: jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
Vvil1egas@evanskeane.com

Telephone~

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOllRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUSTY O.F VALLEY

BUCKSKI.~

PROPERTlES. INC. an
Idaho Corporation, and TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
PlainUff,

Case No. CV-20(l9-5S4-C
AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE MAILHOT
IN SVPPORT OF APPLICATION
FOR PRELI:\1II'\ARY INJUNCTJO~

VALLEY COUI'iTY, a political subdivision
of the State of ldaho.
Defendant.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
County of EI Dorado

) ss.
}

Mike Mailhot, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows:
I.

Thm ! have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2.

prainlitT Buckskin Properties. lnc. (HBuckskin") is an [daho corporation and was

the initial applicant for a residential subdivision named The Meadows at West Mountain rThe

Meadows"), which is located in Valley County. Idaho.

AfFIDAVIT OF MIKE MAILHOT Ii\: SUPPORT OF APPLlCATION FOR PRELIMINARY lNJU'IICTION - I
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Plaintiff Timberline Development LLC ('Timberline") is an Idaho limited

3.

liability company of \vhich Buckskin is one of two members. Timberline Development, LLC is
the assigneeisuccessor in interest of the final phases for The Meadows.

4.

I am the managing member of Timberline.

5.

On or about July 12,2004, Buckskin was granted approval for a conditional use

permit titled Conditional Usc Permit For Planned Unit Development No. 04-01 ("PUD"). The

conditional

llSC

permit was for the project named The Meadows at West Mountain. A true and

correct copy of said Conditional Use Permit is attached hereto as Exhibit "A ".

6.

As a condition of approval of its PUD, Buckskin was required by Defcndant to

enter into a written agreement with the Valley County Board of COllnty Commissioners to
mitigate tramc impacts on roadways attributable to The Meadows.
7.

On or about July 12. 2004, Buckskin entered. under protest, into a Capital

Contribution Agreement with thc Valley County Board of Commissioners, which required
Buckskin Properties to pay money for its proportionate share of the road improvement costs
attributable to traffic generated by The Meadows.

According to the terms of the Capital

Contribution Agreement, Buckskin was required to contribute money to road impact mitigation

as established by Valley County at the time the tinal plat for each phase of The Meado\'/s was
recorded. A true and correct copy of the Capital Contribution Agreement is attached hereto as
Exhibit "8".

8.

For Phase 1. the Capital Contribution Agreement required Buckskin to convey

reaJ property in licu of paying a monetary fee. In addition, any monetary amount;; in excess of
the property conveyed to VaHey County would be credited toward future tec payments that
Buckskin would have

to

pay upon recording the final plat for later pl1ases.

AfFIDAVIT OF MIKE MAILHOT IN SL:PPORT Of APf>LlCATION fOR PRELIMINAR Y INJUNCTION - 2
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9.

For Phase 2, Buckskin \"'as again required by Defendant to elllcr into a written

agrcement for the mitigation of tramc attributable to its project.

10.

On or about September 26, 2005, Buckskin entered, under protest, into a written

agreement titled Road Development Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the Road Development
Agreement, Buckskin was required to pay $232.160.00 to pay for mitigation of the project's road
impact, which was due prior to recordation of tIle final plat for Phase 2. A true and COITcct copy
of said Road Development Agrcemcnt is attached hereto as Exhibit "C',
II.

On or about December 15,2005, Timberline issued a check to Valley County for

$232,160.00 for payment under the Road Development Agreement.
l2.

Timberline is currently in the process of completing the final plat for the

remaining phases of The Yleadows.

Valley County has oncc again sought the payment of

monics for the prop0l1ionate share of road improvement costs attributable to trame generated by
the remaining phases of The Meadows as a condition to it signing and recording the final plat for
the remaining
J3,

phase~.

Timberline has sought and obtained approval for an extension to its deadlinc for

filing a tinal plat for the remaining phases of The Meadows.
l4.

Valley County approved and issued said one-year extension to record the final

plat for the remaining pllases of the Subdivision

011

July 9,2009. Said extension will expIre on

July 12,2010. A true and COITCCt copy of said approval is attached hereto as Exhibit "D".

15.

Plaintiffs obligation to pay such monies to Valley County as a condition to the

tinal plat approval and recording is an issued to be tried jn the above-referenced matter,
16.

Without a temporary stay of the extension period during the pender:cy of the

above-referenced matter, Timberline will be ilTeparably hamled because said extension period

AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE :V1AILHOT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICAT10!' FOR PRELI:VIlNARY I"IJCT\CTION - J
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VILLAGE

I
I

I
win exPireldUring the pendency of the above-referenced matter and Plaintiff will be unable to

obtain final/approval and recordjng of the nnal plat for the remaining phases of the Subdivision.
17. I

Sincc the granting of extensions is a discretionary matter, and based on my

experiencej with Valley CoUnty, I fcar Valley Cou.,): will not gnmt Timberline anolb...
extension as retaliation for filing this lawsoit
I

~:::;

I

i

~1ike Mailhot

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before l1)e

I

JOS=PH M. H£NOErtSON
Comrn. !~54514 . l\;
'-,.t>:qt.;<y Pvoi.c.. Caliio((lI i1 ,..,
1'1 Dor.ldo Coumy
Com:n. Expire:s .bl '5.2013

.,

:l. day of April, 2010.

tillS

ota

lie for Califomj~

Residingin£1 :PY~"';) H:,')ls
My Commission Expires; ~ 151 iJS> L$

Crt-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r H~REBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of April, 2010; a true and correct copy of the
cument was served by first..eEass mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
rransmissio, to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person

foregolDg

in chnrge oithe office as indicated below:

MJttbew
C. Williams
I
Valley
County Prosecutor
I

P.O. Box l350

Cai;cade,ID 8%11
Telephone: (208) 381·7120
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124

[.x] U.S. Ma.u

[ 1 Fax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery

!

!I

I
!

)
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Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission
P.O.~1350

CourthOU$8

Ca8CG0'9. Idaho 83611
Phone (208) 382--7114

Buifdlng AnllEl.lC

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT
For .Planned Unit Development No. 04~Ol
(PUD04-0t)
Tbe Meadows at West Mountain

Issued to:

]8I;:k Charters

Buckskin Properties, Inc.
POBox 145

Donnelly. ID 83615
Property Location:

The property is located in the NE4 of Section 17, T. 16N, R. 3E. Boise
Meridian. VaHey County. Idaho. The site contains 122 acres.

There have been no appeals of the Valley County Board of County Commissioner's decision of
12~ 2004. The Board's decision stands and you are hereby issued a conditional use permit
with coDditioos of approval for establishing PUP 04-01 The Meadows at West Mountain as
described in the application as. updated,. staff reports.. and minutes. The approved U$e is for
temporary contractor housing. 221 single-family rl!Sidential lots. 17 common Jots, 2 commercial
lots totaling 11.2 acres, and ] 60 multi-family units.

July

The effective date of this permit is July 13. 2004. All provisions of the eonditional use permit
must be established according to the phasing plan or a permit extension in comp1.i.ance with the

Valley COUllty Land Use and Development Ordinance will be required.

Conditional Use Permit
Page 1 Of3

EXHIB1T A
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Conditions of Approval:

1. The application. tbe staff report, and the provisions of the Dmd Use and Development
Ordinance are all made a pan of this permit as if written in full herein.
2. Any change in the nature or scope of land use activities shalt require an additional
Cvnditional Use Permit.

3. The proposed occupancies described in the application and in this report shalJ be
established. and in use according to the phasing plan or this pennit shall be null and void. A
phase wilt be developed at least every two years.

4. TIle issuance of this pennit and these conditions will not relieve the applicant from
complying with applicable County, State, or Federal laws or regulations or be construed as
pennission to operate in violation of any St3WTe or regulations. Violation of these laws,
regulations or rules may be grounds fur revocation of the Conditional Use Pennit or grounds
for suspension of the Conditional Use Permit.
j.

A site-gradlD8 pJan approved by the Valley County Engineer is required.

6. The irrigation district must approve the relocation of the irrigation ditch.
7. A tetter of approval from the Donnelly Fire Dimet is required.

8. A lerrer from the Anny Corps of Engineers addressing wetlands is required.
9. A letter from North Lake Rec.reationaJ Sewer &. Water District verifying use of the
is required.

sewer

10. A lener verifying

Water rights is required from Idaho Dept. of Water Resources and a
letter from tile Idab<l Department of Environmental Quality addressing the approved water
system is te4plircrl.

11. Prior to issuance of buildin8 permits, water, sewer and fire proteCtion will be available.

12. The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive approval
from the Board of County Commissioners.
13. Development of apomon of

me multi-family units will be moved to Phase It.

14. The Homeowner's Association will take care of snow removal

15. There will be no fencing between single-family structures.

Conditional Use Permit
Page 2 of3
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16. They will not discharge more water into the drainage then pre-development nows.
17. The final plat will either dedicate or deed to the public the right-of-way along West Roseberry
Road on the northern portion oftbe develOpn'lent.
END CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT

Conditional Use Pennit
Page 3 of3
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SlATBOPIDAHQ,County of Valley) S$

J hereby certify thtir the foregoirJg is .
true copy of tIte originl!rOn,fi~ and
record in this offitc.
.

VAUEY COUNTY, CAItM1I, I I M H O .

c:

=tIDr:VAU.ET~"-c::r~
La\.AIID Go. HIW1IlCH

h1..uo~

~~DIIptQ .l_r~ U-OAh<n
Dated: g-.)t,"!Uy.
.-- -.. _. I-Y&W'ULUW8ATWESTMOUNTAIN nr._t. • . - .

.

.

c.uwITAL CON'nU:B1JTrON AGJlEI:MI'.NT

,r

UU~Aoo:g:t~&~
omufit~~

BY4

.

THIS AGREEMBNT is made this 12th day of July- 2004. by aDd between
P'ROPERlBS lNC. wboac addnsa is P.O. Box 145. Do1melIy ID. 83615 the lJew.Iuper of that
certain Project in v.tlcIy Couaty. ldaIJD, JaJowa as 1be Ml.AJJ()WS AT WEST MOUNTAIN. and
VALt.EY C011NTY, B. poJiticIllUbdMsion of the S,* of ldabo, 0-....... ~ I'B&m:d to
as "Valley Coum:y").
.

..

Deputy
.

RBaTALS
Develop« has submitted aldd subdiviaioo. application tor Valley County appnwaL

Through the deveIojaueGt I'8!Iicw of 1his app1icatim,. Valley County idcnitied ea1aio.
impeds OD public services aud ~ N8SOJ'J8bJy atttiba1ablc to dIe.PJqect.

1IIIIIJjtjptcd

Developei' bas asr-d to participate .in the CO¥t of mitigatina these impacts by COJrtributing its
proportioo.ttc 18ir share of tb8 c:ott of tbe needed improwmams idlIIti&d irl tbis Agrecmem, aDd
IistocI OIl the auacbed &bJ"bit A.
VaBey COllDIy aDd the DeWiIopcI' desire to nlCIIlIOriaIifI the terms of1bDir aareemalt regardiug tfJe
De¥eIopc:a". participetloo in me fimdiag ofc:erCrrin ofthe ahesaid impnMme.nts.

AGB.EI':.MI!NT

2.

&_PiPJ Centnblltiou: Developer &gMes to a ptOpOI1iou.ate share of the toad
imp:ovemeot costs att:ribu1abIe to the sitc-geuerated t:r:a:ffic as established by Valley
Couaty, Cm'nmtly this amoUDt has been calculated by tbe VB&y OnIDty &pw.er to be
S461.00 per &weaIF daiJy "'Chicle ttip geb&':raIed by the Project. Road impact 1TIitigarion
may be provided by Developer coDlIibution of JDI)IIIIf or other capital oJJSets suc.h as
right.-ot:.way.

~

or iD-liDd ~

Such otmets are iDcluded in this

AgTeemetIt.

3. Propordoaate S••n,,: .DIM:Ioper agrees to J'AlY a 8UI'Jl cqtJal to 119000 of the total costs
of the road hnprowmeot program identified on tbD attacl:I:d Exhibit A fbI each lIP
vebicJo trip geuerated by the Project. ReR:r: to the attacNxf ExI:Iiblt B 1br details of the
caJcuJatio.n.
4. M.....od od nadIR of PaymeaUi for Road lm(tlP!!!leats: J:le'w:Ioper shaJl ~e
capiIal to lVIId Jmpact mi1igalion as esrablishecl by Valley CoUDty at the time the 1inal plat
of eech phae of' the P.rojed is recorded. Said pIIYIIBIt .may be ~ & ofDets
descn"becl bmein above. T'ht ~'s a1brcsaid couttibutiooB ahaIl be paid as :anJlows::

EXHIBITB
617

A. Metbodffimillg ofPaymcots: The:J.Jeveloper's CODtribution st.n be paid as

fullows:
1) Upon the fiaal approval ofdJe preliminary plat 1br the first phase oftbe
Project,. p&1lDf:U of Sew:oty l1ioc Tho1lSaDd two huDdn:d Jboety t'M) and
No/lOO DoDIIrs ($79,292.00) sbaII be IllIde by the eo~ oftbe road
tight4way described on tlac attached ExlMbits C-l 8Dd C-2. The wtaI
value of'WhidJ is $91,14200 A credit in tbc 8QJOunt ofSll,8S0.00 sbaJ1
be avaiJable to tfJc lJe'Vdopc:t :fOr future c:apial contI:ibubobs..
2) Modifieation. ofDc'vcloper's P8.)'lDBDt ScbtAJu1e: It is admowledged by
Valley County and the Devdoper 1hal the consttucticm. oftbe road.
improvaDf3Jfa and t1Je acquisiDon QfpubJic right-of-way XllutuaIfy
beDeDclal to Valley Coodly and the Developer to complete at tbe earliest
possible dat& In the C'WIIJt that VaHey County demoDStra1'es that a
modification or ~ ofthe tiDq ofDevoJoper's afbresaid
oontribtd.ions would :taciJiIate au. earlier completion ofthis project. the
Developer sbaII DCgOtiate in JOOd 1irith Rlprdins: II» .J:lO&'l'ble
moc:li6cation of fJ1JIJIor ~ ofthe a6.uesaid payment scbedoIe..

B. Upon the recording of the final plat ofany ibture pIJase oftile ~ Developer
sbaIl JIIIY a sum pel' avaage daily ~ trip. which is roughly proportional to
119000 ofthe lbOSt JeCeDt _Bland construction cost oftbc cur:n:ut road
improVClJ:lCDt program tor 1bc service 8IC8. That pto8I'8IlltDly iDcIude (1)
improvemems, which haw been compIded by VEIDey Co1mty prior 10 the dPte of
cotlt.dbutioa,. .... (2) improw:meds. which are budgeted :fOr cor.op)etion 9ritbin the
next teo years fiJDowiog the daCe of comribntion.

C. The COIJtributi.ons made by DevelopCr to Valley County pursuant to the terms of
this.Agreeme:ut shaD be segregated by VaHey CoUDty aDd eaa.uarhd aDd applied
ooly to the projoct costs ofthe road impro'\lClDl!:Dt projects which are specified in
Exhibit A, or to sueh other projects as are llJIIhWiy agrc:cahle ~ tbe parties.
D. The sale by Developer ofpart 01' all ofthe Project prior to the platting tIJereof
sbaU nat trigger any paymtat or COOIribution~. Howeve:r. in such
case, the purchuer ofsudl propaty, and the saccesso.rs and assips tIJereot shall
be bouod by the tams of this .AgIeem.I:IJt it cite same respect as DeYebpcr.

reprdioa the propcrtypm:cbased.
5. ~UQP;
A. It is iDtClJded, t2Jar VaDr:y Couat,y w.il1 n:conJ this AJreement The il1teot of the
:ncordation will be to doc:umc:ot the ofticial aped of the eortractual obfiaation
set Jbrth. in 1bis ~ Tbia Aareement wiD not in any way esmhlLtb a Iieal
or other iDta.rcat in &.vor of VaJey County as to any :real property owned by the
DcwOOper at ~ time of reconIiog, or any real property, vdIidJ, may be acquired
bytbc ~ CD 8tW date a:Iler the recording ofthis Agreement

Page 2
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VALLEY COUNTY BOARD Oli' COMMISSIONERS:

Date:

f
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EXHI8ITA
DONNELl.Y TO TAMARACK ROAD lMPROVEMafIS PHASE 1
PIl.OGUIII SUMMARY
JAN. 7,2004

lTEM NO.

PRmECr

1

DONHaLYTO TNWW.J<.: C1VfRJ.Ay

$1.150.000

2

W. ROSl:BERRY ROAD EXTENSION

$1,600,000

3

~A"t~~,~.) ,

..

W. R~ RD. BRIDGE (95'*1 COMPlETE)

$590,000

5

~ ftf'f. ROAD OJLVERlS ~ CXM'lETE)

$55AOO

'6

IUGlff-oF-WAY ACQUtSmOH

$300,000

J

ROsz:B.fRRY/NORWOOO lNTERSECTION

$200..000

8

CORR1DOR STWY

$SOAOO

9

RCXK a&K BRIDGE

$60,000

10

POISON CREEk BIUDG'E

tfiO,oao
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EXHIBIT 8
DONNELLY TO TAIURA~ ROAD IMPROVEMENlS PHASI! 1
PROGRAM SUMMARY

.

JAIiI.1,2004

TAMARACK RESORT 0 3'""

CAPITAL CXJNiRl8U1lON
CAPACITY All.OCAnON

1,245.000
2700 VPD

PLA1TED DEVELOPMENT. 40~

CAPITAL CllNTRI8UT1ON
OPN::1.TY AU.OCAUON

PlATTED LOTS

$1.245,000
2700VPO

675

$1.Mt /lDf
DlNELOPMENT COST PER WItIClE TRIP

.aBl /vpD
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EXHIBIT "C-l"
A PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED IN THE NE 1/4 OF SECTlON 17,
TOWNSHIP 16 NORTH. RANGE 3 EAST, BOISE MER!DIAN, VAlLEY COUNty, IDAHO

2004
LEC.ENJ)

UN£' TABlE
UN[

l1
'-..L2

BEARING

N89'22· ...7'"W

o
•

LENGTH

35.00'
SlY09'4S"!. 70.00'

•

"*"

FOUND ALUMINUM CAP UONUI.{ENT

CURVE! RADIUS

-81

C1

1 165.00'

C2 1236.00'

10

~

o

~

~

~

~

ClLCULAlEO FIOINf
FOUND 5/S" REBAR
FOUND BRASS CN' MONUMENT

ISO

300

E = 1;

r

600

900

........ ....

I
\
I

'"ti...
1.38 ACRES

SOO'07'OS"W
2176.66

-

-

-

"<

~

~ TOOTH14.AN-ORTON ENGlNEERlN'G CO.

~

ENGIN(tRS

£11f..ItOICIl-1II!l\UItmrl

0\
N

N

SURvEYOftS.

Pt..ANNtRS

9777 CHINDEH BOUlEVARD '\:9JlSE. 10010 8J714-2~
PHONE: 208-~3-2288 • FAX: 208-.323-:239g
:01.....04

_:040117

\

EXHIBIT "C-2"

~ ~,.. ~~

OJ

c.J

0;

')..
~ ~

.~

·a~ I

J~

A PARCEL or LAND SITUATED IN THE NE , /4 Of SECTION 17,
TOWNSHIP 16 NORTH, RANGE 3 EAST, 80lSE MERIDIAN, VALLEY COUNTY, IDAHO

J

~

2004
lEGEIIlJ

LIN£ TABLE

UNEl
WRING 'ILENG&
It SOfr2 .... !l9*E SO.6j
CURVE RADIUS
Cl
C2

CUHVF T.ABL£
DELTA
ILEN<rn1 rr~GEN1'

BEARING

950.00 952.67' 510.72' 5T27'2S' 561 '53'JQ"W
1050.00' 727.6' :mUD 39'4-2'H·- N53'OO'SS"E

CALCU~TEO

fOUND !SIS" REBAR

POINT

+

FOUNO aAASS CAP

•

FOUND Al.UMIHUU CAP

MONU~ENT

WO~ENr

CHORD
.Q'3.2~·

713.14'

o
~

o

e

ISO

300

600

gOO

i

I~

1-

...."..

I~

r""IIf

~

i
l\.

~
:..

~
t.)
ti).i

....
. 0\
iN
W

;' _

200'OT06'W

16J2.oo·

-

-

-

TOO'I'ltYAN-ORTON ENGINEERING CO.
ENCINURS

8UAVEYORS

PLANNERS

9n? CHINOEN BOUlEVARO • BOISE, IIWro 83714-200II
PHONE: 208-32.J-2.288 . FAX: 2.08-J2.)-2399
~ OII~""'._

DUtD'-D1-04

~4CJIIZ

DRAFT
200

100

~~-----~--

- ,-

300

------~--

.......
0.71 ...

EXISTING WETlANDS

THE ~ AT WEST ..OUNTAIN 404 PERIofrT APPUCATIOH

I

IA~

PROPERTY l..OCAlED NEAR CASCADE LN<E. DONNEl.LY IDAHO
lOCAll0N: NW t/4 CORHER, SE'CtTON 17. T.l6N. R. 3E. VN..LEY COUHTY. 10»10

NO

APPl.ICANT: BUCKSKlN PRClf'ERTES
DETAIL SHEET .3
PRt:PARED BY: TOO'THIIWt-oRTOH ENGINEERING COMPANY
DATE: AUGUST t 1, 2004

624

P.D. 60K 072 • C&3CadC. Idaho 63011

Gordon Cruickshank
~ntendent

gcruloonankOco.vallc!Y.ld.us
om~· (108) ;,oz·n9~
fAX· ()06) ~61-7196

Mr. Jack Charters
Buckskin Properties lnc.
P.O. Box 145
Donnell y Jd, 83615
Re: Meadows at West Mountain Phasel

Dear Jack.
1be Construction Plans for the Phase 1 road, drainage and grading work is approved
subject to the following conditions:

1) Prior approval of submittals for the base. su~base and asphall to demonstrate
compliance with ISPWC Specifications. Compliance with minimum strength
standards (L.A. Abrasion> 35) is required unless a geotechnical fabric is installed
below the su~base course.
2) A quality control plan is required. Outlining the responsibility and frequency of
Compaction Tests.
3) Compliance with Valley County fugitive dust standards is required.
4} Compliance with standard Valley County Road permit condition is required (copy
attached)
5) Final inspection and acceptance of lhe work, by the Road Superintendent will be

required prior to County maintenance of the public roads in Phase I
6) 1be temporary gI'BveJ site access at Roseberry Road should be paved between
ChattelS Circle and Cameron Dr. If the Pbase II work is not completed by 2005.

Sincerely,

Patrick

Valley
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Itigllt-of-Way Use Permit - General Conditions

,
\

'-'-

I) All wurk shall be completed in accordance with the plans and speci ficalion
submiUed by the Applicant, (he Idaho S1andal'ds for Public Works Constructions
{1SPWC), and the conditions oflne permit
2) The Applicant will monitor the quality or lhte work pterfonlloo by the,Contraclor
for confomlance with the plans. specifications and conditions ofthis permit. The
required inspection and testing results will be suhmilted to Valley County .in a
timely manner for review, I[(he required fcsting is not provided then Valley
Count}' wiU hire ./lSojJ Engineer 10 perfonn .lbe w1)rk and direct expenses
incurred will be biUed to Ihe applicanl Failure to perfann according to
~!Jir~m~nts 10 this. penni.l will r~\t in 1~ f!!vP!:'-.ation oflh~ J>«:rmit
3) Trench backfill shaH be 6" minus granular fi II material compacted in J8" lifts 10 a
density of95% as measured by ASTM 0 698, Compaction tests shall be
perfonned at least every 500' oftrencll.
4) Road base shall be tYJle 1 crushed gravel confonning 10 lSPWC Section 802
placed with a minimum thickness of 6" and compacled to a density of 100% as
measur-ed by AASHTO T 99. Tests shall be performed at each crossing or at least
every 500' oftrencll. A gradation and abrasion test are required for the gravel.
5) Asphalt resurfacing shall be Class I plant mix asphalt. conforming to JSPWC
Section 8\0. Asphalt shan be placed witb a minimum 1hickness of2 W' and a
minimwn tolerance of y,. .. measur~ with a 10' straight edge standard, Asphalt
shaH be compacted to a denslty of 97% maximum weight as measured by
AASHTO T 166 (method A). Test shall be performed at all road crossing.
6) Asphalt joints shall be saw cut immediately prior to resurfacing. Cuts shall be
made along smooth straight lines with a minimum IXltch width of 4', An
emulsified asphalt tack coat shall be applied on all roge joints.
7J Road sooulders shall be reco/lslmclClJ wilh 6" of type I gravel wilh a mil1imum
width of2 feet and 2: I·emba.nkment side sIOfJe. ShouJder and embankment shaU
be compacted 10 a density of95% (AS1M D 698) <lnd revegetated with an
approved seed mix followingconslructiol1.
8) Roadway borrow ditched disturbed during conslructl0n shall be cleaned and
r~gra~ tp .the :ilandard Valley County dilch 5~tion f;:H19wingf!()l1Slmction.
9) Asphalt road surfaces removed or damaged shall be repaved witllin 7 calendar
days of the initial excavation. Temporary palchi'1B materials shall be approved by
Valley County prior to instaltatiol1.

10) Signs. marker or delinealors posts removed or damaged during construction shaH
he replaced with new posts and compacted bnckfilL Sign installation shall
confonn to ISPWC~ SD-J 131.
II) Construction traffic eontrol devices and activities shall conform to the MUTeD
recommendations.

12)AII public and private loads will remain open to at least one traffic lane at all
times and both traffic lanes wiJI bq open during the night. Construction activities
shall'be schedliled to m'jnimiz.e 'inleITuplion of traffic, Through traffic Sluiu norbe
stopped for more than 5 minutes at any time without prior written authorization,
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ROAD DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT

O?G

of~

THIS AGREDQ;NT is modo Ibis
77z.day
.2005.
by and between Buckskin PJoperties lnc.., whose address is P _ _Box 145. DonnellY.
Idaho 83615, the »noelo.,.. oftbat certain Project in Valley couoty. Idaho. known as the
MeIICiowIat West MeuaWa - Phase 2. and VaUq Ceuty, a political subdivision of
the Smte ofldabo. (hereinafter referred to as "Valley County").
RECITALS
Developer bas submitted a subdivision application to Valley CouDty for approval of 8
J58 lot remdeGrial development .known as the Meadows at West:Moumain - Phase 2.

Through the development review oftbis application. Valley County identified certain
unmitigated b0l*" on public SCl'Vic:u and ia1i:ast:ruc«u reasonably atCributable to the
Project.

DeveJoper has agreed to participde in the cost of mitisatin81bese impacts by

contributing its proportionate &ir share oftbe cost oftbe needed improvements identified
in the Agreeme:ut and listed OlD. the attacbed Exhibit A.
Valley Comly and the Developer desire to memorialize the terms of their agreement
regarding the Developer's participation in the fuudiog of certain of the aforesaid
imprt>vemeots.

AGREEMENT

Therefore. it is agreed as foUo\1lS:
L Capital I"'p1'OlIeInent Program: A lis:ti.qg and cost estimate oftbe West Roseberry
Area 200S Roadway Capitallmprovemeul Program, incorporating construction
and right-of-way needs for Ibc project area is attached as Exhibit A.

2. Proportionate shore: Developer agrees to a proportionate share of the road
UDprovemen.t costs: attr:ibuqbfe to U8ffi.c generated by the Meadows at West
Mountain - Phase 2 as established by Valley County. Curreatly Ibis amount bas
been calculated by the Valley County Engineer to be $461 per average daily
vehicle trip geru:mted by the Project. ReiUlO Ex.hibit A aud Exh.ibit B for details
of the West Roseberry Area 2005 Capitallmpro-vemem Prognun Cost Estimate.
Road impac:t mitigation may be pro"rided by Developer OODIribution of money or
other capital offsets wch as right-of-way, engiDeeri.ng or in-kind coostruction..
Such an offset to the road improvements is addressed in paragraph 3 of this
Agreement.

3. Capital contrilndion: Developer agrees to pay a sum equal 10 $1,844 (an average
of 8 trips per lot x ~ (50% split) x $461 per trip) per each ofdIe 62 single fiuniLy
Meadows - Phase 2

Road Development Agreement
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residential lots. Developer agrees to plY a sum equal to SI,.383 (an average of6
alps per unit X ~ (5()o,4 split) X $461 per trip) per each of the 96 apartment

dwelling units. The Developer's proportionate share of the road improvements
identified in Exhibit A for the 158 residential units shown on the subdivision
application is S247.0961ess the followiogoffsets:
Existing Credit of SII ,850 for roadway right-of-way dediaIled
UDder Phase I of this deveJopmeDt aod dooumented UDder the
subsequent Road Development Agreerneot approved by Valley
County OIl July 26; 2005.

Dedicated roadway right-of-way as shown on the Final Plat and
more specifically described as; Ten (10) feet adjacem to
Roseberry Road for a dismnce of960'. and totaliDg 0.2204 acres.
The value oftbe dedicated ROW is $3,086.
The total value oflhe dec:Iieated ROW is S14,936.
The developer a;rees to PlY Valley Coontythedifference between their
proportiomde share of roadway costs (1247,096) less the otDecs for dedicated
right-of-way ($14,936) for a total cash paymeot 0($232,160 due prior to
recordation of the Final Plat
4. The CObtributions made by Developer to Valley County pursuant to the tams of
this Agreerneot sball be segregated by Valley County and earmarked aud applied
0DIy to tile project costs ofb road improvement projects specified in Exhibit A
or to such otbe:t projects as are mutually agreeable to the parties.

S. The sale by Dewloper of part or aU oftbe Project prior' to the pIattins thereof
sball not trigger any pay:ment or contn"bution respousibility. However. in such
case, the purchaser of sucb property. and the successors and assigns thereof: sball
be bound by die tams ofthis Agreement in the .same respect as Developer.
regarding the property purcbased.
6. Recordation: It is iotended that Valley County will record this A.gl'eement. The
intent of the ~ will be to document the official asped of the contractual
obligation set furth in this A.gl'eement This Agreement will not in any way
establish a lien or otfJcr interests in favor ofVaUey County as to any real property
owned by the Developer at the time af reconiing. or any real property that may be
acquited by the Developer OD any date after 1bc recording of this Agreement.

Madaws- Phase 2
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By:!JJ=a~
Jack A. Charters. uu:mber ofBuclcskiJl Properties.lnc:., Developer

VALLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS:

By: _ _ _ _£"--"X'-'C
......"::..--J._(].,.::J"'"-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date:_ _ __

Commissioner/Chairman F. Pbillip Davis

By:

z;d~
Commissioner F. W. BId

A1TEST:

VALLEY COUNTY CLERK:

4~~~y;JJ_···_ _

yeJt{;l((G~It

Date:

4hJ/~

~

.'/
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STATE OF IDAHO)
) IS.

COUNTY OF VALLEY
On this

)

¥ou'1'

;;:?,.[ptJ.. dayOf~lk»k.,

the undersigned, a Notary

-:s o.c. i:. A c.bu.r-k-;

2005. beforetne. CJc..rJ Nt\. K.
bJie in and for said State, personally appeared
and acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

In witness whereo( I have unto set my hand and affixed roy official seal the day aod year

~r~

/~~~
Reaidins

at~~

,idaA

My CommissiooExpires:

STATE OF IDAHO

206//

<4 3~,
7

.

:l.O){

)

) as.
COUNTY OF VALLEY

OntIUs

;).~

dayof

)

~
2005.befureme. ~-J~~
P\iiiCiIlBDdfOr'said State. personally appeared ~,~ ~

the undersi!ed. a N~
1J-.~ W. K",,JA..l r. w 0.(

'*

. . and actnowIedged to me that they executed the same.

In witDess whereof: I have unto set my band and affhr.ed my official seal the day and year
first
written.

My Commission Expires: _---<Jc..LJ_--'C'J-=---.....,v~!r'-y--

Meadows - Phase 2
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EXHIBIT A
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DONNElLY TO TAMARAC( ROAD IMPROVEMENtS PHASE' 1

PROGRAM SUMMARY

.MJL7,2OM
ESllMAlED 0)S1'

ITEM NO.

PROJECT

1

OONNB.LY TO TN4ARICK CM:Rl.AY

$1,150,000

2

W. ROSEBERIlY ROAD EXTENSION

$1,600,,000

3

CAJ.S;:WAY ENGINEBUNG (PRElIM.)

..

W. ROSEBERRY RD. BIUI:JQ: (951f, (])MPLEJ'E)

$S90,ooo

5

WEST Mr. ROAD OJlVERTS (95'MI (])MPLEJ'E)

$55,000

6

RJGHT...()F-WAY ACQJJSlTION

$300,000

7

ROSt:Bt.RRY/NORWOOO INTERSECnON

$200,000

8

CCIRRlIXIt Sl1JUt

$50,000

9

ROCX CREE)( BR1DGE

$60,000

10

POlSON CREaC BRlDGf

$CiOJIID

$85,000

$41150,000
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EXHIBnB
DONNEUY TO TAMARACK ROAD IMPROVEMENTS PHASE 1
PROGRAM SUMMARY
JAN.7,2D04

$4,150,000
9,000 VPD

TAMAIlACK RESORT • :JOIM.

CAPITAL CONTRlBUTlON
CAPICITY AIJ..OOnlON

1,245,000

2100VPD

PLAna DWELOPMBrI' ......

CAPITAl. CDHTRJIlJ1lCIN

$1,660,000
3600 VPD

t::»fJCtTY AI.J.OCAnON

PlATfED LOTS

900

$1,245,000

2700 VPD

DEVEUJPMDIT COST PER fUTURE lOT
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Phone: 208.382.7115

PO Box 1350

Fax:
208.382.7119
Email: cberrick@co.vallev.id.yS
Website: WHIW.CO. YaIJey.id. us

219 Nortl1 Main Street

Cascade, 10 83611-1350

Todd Hatfield, Chairman
Harry Stathis, Vice-Chairman

Ed Allen, Commissioner
Rob Garrison, Commissioner
Tom Olson, Jr., Commissioner

VALLEY COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING MEETING MINUTES
DATE:

July 9, 2009

TIME:

6:00 p.m. - 7:30 p.m.

LOCATION:

Valley County Courthouse

AITENDANCE: Commissioners present: Chairman Todd Hatfield, Rob Garrison, Tom Olson,
Jr., Harry Stathis, and Ed AJlen were present. Staff member present: Cynda Herrick, AICP,
Planning and Zoning Administrator.
MINUTES:
Commissioner Garrison moved to approve the June 11,2009, minutes. Commissioner Allen
seconded the motion. Molion carried with changes indicated on page 5, second paragraph
changing "law to have a tank".
Commissioner Allen moved to table minutes from June 25, 2009 to July 28,2009.
Commissioner Stathis seconded the motion. Motion carried.
OLD BUSINESS:

1. CUP 05-17 Wbite Cloud Pbase 2 - ExteD~ion Request: Elkhom LLC is requesting
approval of a one-year extension of the final plat approval that currently expires on August I,
2009. White Cloud Phase 1 was recorded July 2006. Phase 2 is a replat of Block 4 and Block 5
of Phase L The site is located in the SE Section 24 & NE Sec 25, T.18N, R.2E. and SW Sec 19
& NW Sec. 30, T.IBN, R3E, B.M., VaHey County, Idaho. [Not a public hearing.1
Staff explained that the applicant was continuing to monitor for septic pennits as described in the
request for extension from James Fronk, P.E., Secesh Engineering. dated June 11.2009. Staff
also explained that the first phase had already been recorded and all improvements of
infrastructure were complete.
Commissioner Stathis moved to extend final plat approval for CUP 05-17 White Cloud Phase 2
to August 1,2010. Commissioner Allen seconded the motion. Motion carried.
Planning and Zoning Minutes
July 9, 2009
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2. pun 04-01 The Meadows at West Mountain, Phases 4-6 - Extension Request:
Timberline Developments, LLC, are requesting approval of an one-year extension of the
Conditional Use Permit which states that a phase will be developed at least every two years.
Phase 4 expires on July 12,2009. The site is located in Section l7, T.16N, R.3E, B.M., Valley
County. Idaho. [Not a public hearing.]

Staff explained that the applicant was requesting an extension in order to finalize the road
development agreement; seek approval from North Lake Recreational Sewer and Water District;
gain approval from Valley County for engineering of phases 4-6; and approval from the county
surveyor. Staff also explained that the first three phases had already been recorded.
Commissioner Stathis moved to extend final plat approval for PUD 04-01 Meadows at West
Mountain Phase 4-6 to July 12,2010. Commissioner Olson seconded the motion. Motion
carried.
3. Impact Fees: Continuation of discussion on Impact Fees - (Moved on agenda to the end of
New Business.)
A.

NEW BUSINESS:

1. C.U.P. 09-09 Elo Estates - Preliminary & Final Plat: Youde - Three Forks, LLC, and
Steve & Ingri MilIemann are requesting approval of a 2-lot single-family residential subdivision
on approximately 24 acres. Subdividing this property would rectify an iIIegaJ Jot split. The
subdivision would be served by jndividual well and septic systems. Conservation easements are
]ocated on the property. The property is currently addressed as ) J 71 & 1291 Elo Road and is
located in the E Y2 SE ~ Section 22, T.ISN, R3E. BM, Valley County, Idaho.
Chairman Hatfield asked if there was any exparte contact or conflict of interest. Chainnan
Hatfield excused himself from discussions due to conflict of interest.
Commissioner Stathis, Vice-Chairman, acted as the Chairman and asked for the Stafi' Repor1:.
Staff presented the Staff Report and read an e-mail from Janet Lord (exhibit [).
Bob Youde, 1210 Samson Trail, managing panner, to represent the applicant:
• 12.5 acre parceJ was approved in 1997, but final plat was never recorded.
• Parcel has been so1d and resold since 1997.
• Discussed septic issue.
• Discussed road right-of-way.
• Intention is to keep this intact as a single family residential site.
• MiIlemann's are co-applicants.
• Purpose is to make this a legal lot.
Commissioner Garrison asked if other half has a house, well, and septic. Youde confirmed.

Planning and Zoning Minutes
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Commissioner Stathis asked if there were any proponents, undecided, or opponents. There were
none.
Commissioner Stathis closed the public hearing. Discussion ensued: correcting error, septic is
taken care of, can find no issues.
Commissioner Garrision moved to approve C.U.P. 09·09 Elo Estates, preliminary and final plat.
and authorize the Chairman to sign. Commissioner Allen seconded the motion. Motion carried.

OLD BUSINESS:
1. Impact Fees: Continuation ofdiscussion 011 Impact Fees.
Chainnan Hatfield announced the item and invited Assessor Campbell and Clerk Banbury to
address the Commission.
Assessor Campbell stated she is here to give accurate infonnation concerning Mr. Moore's
presentation as presented on June 11,2009. She presented exhibit 1 - Crane Shores and exhibit 2
• Hawks Bay Subd Tax Comparison. She then explained the worksheets.
Archie Banbury, Clerk, stated this is the first time he has ever talked to a Commission about
funds. He commended the Commission. He questioned where to go with the discussion. He
said he will try to impart some background - we do fund accounting. aU of which have their own
income and expense. There are 22 funds. At the beginning of this year, there was 8.S million;
but, you need to take out for operating cash, trust funds that cannot be spent, court facilities fund,
etc.
Working capitaJ gets you from the low point to the high point. A financial statement is a snap
shot. Need to take a look at whether we need Impact Fees. Over last three - four years, building
and P&Z have contributed large revenues, which are now down.
Commissioner Olson asked how you budget when impact fees are small. Archie said we
anticipated a slow down. Commissioner Olson asked, how would you budget impact fees?
Archie - you would have to budget it fow. Funds can be put into a contingency fund to save the
money and cannot be spent without unanimous vote of County Commissioners.
Commissioner Garrison questioned black side of the budget. In boom years, where does the
money go? Archie responded, into general fund and can be diverted into capital improvements.
Discussion ensued concerning the court facilities fund.
Commissioner Olson asked ifnew funds could be established for capital improvements. Archie
stated can only have 5% reserve. Talked about decrease in building fees, Tamarack's capital
improvements, etc. but had increase in PIL T funds. Grants were discussed. County grants to
seniors, WICAP, etc.
Commission Allen made a motion to set a public hearing on August 25 at 6:00 for Impact Fees.
Amendments to the comprehensive plan and the adoption of CIP and implementation of impact
Planning and Zoning Minu1es
July 9, 2009
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fees. Commissioner Stathis s~onded. Motion carried. Chairman Hatfield voted no.

B.

OTHER ITEMS:

I.

Facts & Conclusions!
• C.U.P. 09~02 SLRWSD Treatment Plant
• C.U.P. 09-07 Shilo Bible Camp - Managers Residence

Commissioner Allen moved to approve the Facts and Conclusions as listed. Commissioner
Garrison seconded the motion. Motion carried.
2.
Discussion of Proposed Subdivision Regulations & LUDO Amendments: The
Commission agreed to have a work session at the regularty scheduled meeting in August.

3.

Appeal of Administrative Decision - C.U.P. required for Kelly's Whitewater Park

There needs to be public input. This park will be there for a long time. Need to know where
rock will be, parking, facilities, etc.
Jim Fodrea responded. The packages are ready to go to the Corps and state agencies. Focus is to
place rock in river this fall.
Commissioner Allen moved to require a conditional use permit for Kelly's Whitewater Park.
Commissioner Garrison seconded the motion. Motion carried.

Meeting adjourned 7;35 p.m.
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